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Abstract
De facto states, defined as entities that possess control over a defined territory,
population, and government, but without recognition from other states, have become
increasingly important over the past three decades. Although the universe of cases is
small (there have been 24 de facto states since the 1960s), de facto states play an
important role in regional security and stability. Despite this relevance, we still know
little about why de facto states emerge, how their preferences are formed, and what
shapes their behaviour and decision-making. Shedding light on these overlooked issues
will allow us to better understand the role of de facto states in regional and international
politics. The existing literature, although insightful, does not fully explain the behaviour
of de facto states. In particular, the literature has fallen short in explaining the behaviour
of Iraqi Kurdistan.
In order to better understand the behaviour of de facto states, this thesis asks the
following questions: What are the factors that shape and influence de facto state
preferences and behaviour? What are the factors that determine if a de facto state will
declare independence or preserve the status quo? More specifically, in terms of the cases
under examination, why did Kosovo and South Sudan declare independence, while Iraqi
Kurdistan has not? The goal of this dissertation is to identify the conditions under which
a de facto state may declare independence and when it may preserve the status quo.
To address these questions, this thesis employs international relations theories and adopts
a comparative analysis method to explain the behaviour of Kosovo, South Sudan, and
Iraqi Kurdistan. Following extensive fieldwork in Iraqi Kurdistan, the thesis argues that
de facto states will forgo independence when the parent state furnishes the de facto state
with autonomy and offers sufficient economic incentives. Other mitigating factors
include the domestic environment of the de facto state and the parent state, the role of
regional and international governments, and the presence or absence of the old regime of
the parent state. The main point is that the preference for independence is neither fixed
nor inevitable.
Key Words: De facto states, Realism, Constructivism, Liberalism, Kosovo, South Sudan,
Iraqi Kurdistan.
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Chapter 1:

Introduction

The state has traditionally been the primary actor in the international system and the
principal object of analysis in comparative politics and international relations.

The

primacy of the state can be explained by two factors: States possess legal standing under
international law and the state has been the dominant actor in the international political
system since the mid-seventeenth century. The state is defined as “a human community
that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a
given territory.” 1 According to Max Weber’s definition, a state also possesses a
population, territory, government, and recognition from other states. Recognition is
particularly important given that it provides states with a legal standing in the
international system. Highlighting this importance has been the emergence of a growing
number of ‘de facto states’ since the end of World War II.
A de facto state can be defined as an entity that possesses control over a defined
territory, population, and government, but does not possess international legitimacy in the
form of recognition from other states. (A more precise definition will be offered in the
coming pages.) De facto states often emerge following the outbreak of violent conflict
between an ethnic group and the parent state. Some recent examples include the conflicts
between Kosovo and Serbia, South Sudan and Sudan, and the Kurds and Iraq. Although
the universe of cases is small (there have been 24 de facto states since the 1960s), de
facto states play an important role in regional security and stability. De facto states often
possess stable political and economic systems and, according to the existing literature,
aspire to de jure statehood. The latter point will be the focus of this thesis.

1

Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation. Translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1965), 2.
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In order to better understand the behaviour of de facto states, this thesis asks the
following questions: What are the factors that shape and influence de facto state
preferences and behaviour? What are the factors that determine if a de facto state will
declare independence or preserve the status quo? More specifically, in terms of the cases
under examination, why did Kosovo and South Sudan declare independence while Iraqi
Kurdistan has not? The goal of this dissertation is to identify the conditions under which
a de facto state may declare independence and when it may preserve the status quo. The
thesis will examine the cases of Kosovo, South Sudan, and Iraqi Kurdistan. The cases
share similar historical and political trajectories, but diverging outcomes. A comparative
analysis of these cases, therefore, will allow us to identify the factors responsible for
pushing Kosovo and South Sudan, but not Iraqi Kurdistan, towards independence.
The existing literature largely relies on realist and constructivist assumptions to
explain the behaviour of de facto states. From a realist end, the literature argues that de
facto states are largely a product of self-help and the security dilemma facing groups in
multiethnic states, which compel de facto states to view independence as a means to
survival.2 Independence, therefore, is a fixed preference and the ultimate goal of de facto
states.3 From a constructivist perspective, the literature argues that self-interested ethnic

2

Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998); Nina Caspersen,
“Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States,” The International Spectator: Italian
Journal of International Affairs. Vol. 44, No. 4 (2009): 47-60; and Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in
World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
3
See Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics; Scott Pegg, International Society and the De
Facto State; Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik (eds.), De Facto States: The Quest for
Sovereignty (New York: Routledge, 2004); and Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, Unrecognized States
in the International System (London: Routledge, 2011); Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s De Facto States:
Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004); Pal
Kolstø, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” Journal of Peace Research Vol. 43,
No. 6 (2006): 723-740.
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elites exploit nationalism to advance their political and economic agendas. 4 This, in turn,
can harden ethnic identities and lead to a self-fulfilling process towards ethnic conflict
and demands for independence. The existing literature, although insightful, does not fully
explain the behaviour of de facto states. In particular, the literature has fallen short of
explaining the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan. To fill this gap, this thesis will employ a
liberal approach, with a particular focus on political institutions, economic factors, and
domestic politics, to explain the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and South Sudan.
Such an approach will demonstrate that the preference for independence is the result of
the interaction between the de facto state and the parent state, and not inevitable, as the
literature assumes.
I argue that de facto states will forgo independence when the parent state
furnishes the de facto state with autonomy and offers sufficient economic incentives.
Other mitigating factors include the domestic environment of the de facto state and the
parent state, the role of regional and international governments, and the presence or
absence of the old regime of the parent state. The point is this: De facto states can be
persuaded to forgo independence under the right political and economic conditions. This
argument leads to the following hypotheses.

First, a de facto state will pursue

independence if it does not possess ‘sufficient autonomy’ within a democratic parent
state. Second, a de facto state will forgo independence if the economic benefits of a
union with the parent state outweigh the potential benefits of independence. (These
hypotheses will be explored in greater detail in the subsequent pages.)

4

Charles King, “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States,” World
Politics Vol. 53, No. 4 (July 2001): 524-552; Charles King, “Eurasia’s Nonstate States,” East European
Constitutional Review Vol. 10 (2001): 99-102.
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This project will add to the growing literature on de facto states, the ways in
which they emerge, form preferences, and behave in the international system. There are
at least two reasons to study de facto states. The first reason is that de facto states have
become increasingly important actors in regional and international politics over the past
several decades. The increasingly important role of de facto states is evidenced by their
impact on the global economy (e.g., Eurasia’s de facto states have a massive illicit
economy) and in triggering regional conflicts. Despite their relevance, we still know
little about why de facto states emerge, how their preferences are formed, and what
shapes their behaviour and decision-making. Shedding light on these overlooked issues
will allow us to better understand the role of de facto states in regional and international
politics, including in Africa, the Middle East, and Eurasia. The second reason is that the
existing literature simply does not provide a satisfactory explanation for why some de
facto states declare independence and others do not.

More research is required to

improve our understanding of de facto states.

Background on De Facto States
De facto states first emerged from the decolonisation period of the 1960s and 1970s.
They were unable to achieve their political objectives of independence, but established de
facto entities.5 For example, South Katanga (Democratic Republic of Congo) emerged as
a de facto state in 1960 and Biafra (Nigeria) emerged as a de facto state in 1967. The late
1980s to early 1990s produced the greatest number of de facto states following the

5

There is an important difference between de facto states and other autonomous entities such as provinces
or autonomous regions. Whereas autonomous regions must constitutionally answer to a central government,
de facto states are no longer under the purview of a central government.

4

collapse of the Soviet Union.6 The literature has identified 24 de facto states since the
end of WWII. They include: Abkhazia, Anjouan, Biafra, Bougainville, Chechnya, East
Timor, Eritrea, Gaguazia, Iraqi Kurdistan, Katanga, Kosovo, Montenegro, NagornoKarabakh, Palestine, Republika Srpska, Republica Srpska Krajina, Sahrawi Arab
Democratic Republic, Somaliland, South Ossetia, Tamil Eelam, Taiwan, Transnistria,
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and South Sudan.7 Some have since graduated to
full statehood, others have been reintegrated by the parent state, and still others continue
to function as de facto states. De facto states have historically been marginalized and
ignored by the international community due to their tenuous status.
Scott Pegg was the first to systematically bring the term ‘de facto state’ into the
international relations lexicon.8 It should be noted, however, that political scientists were
using the term well before Pegg’s 1998 article. For example, Sean Randolph used the
term to refer to Taiwan in a 1981 article and, in a 1993 article, Michael Gunter used the
term to refer to the creation of a de facto Kurdish state in northern Iraq. 9 Before
considering a definition, it is important to briefly discuss the conceptual framework
regarding the de facto state. There are several names that typically appear: ‘de facto
state,’ ‘quasi-state,’ ‘semi-state,’ ‘unrecognized state,’ and ‘contested state.’ This project
will use the term ‘de facto state’ for a couple of reasons. First, the term would seem to
6

During this period, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Gaguazia Transnistria,
Republika Srpska, and Republika Srpska Krajina emerged as de facto states in Eastern Europe and the
Caucusus region.
7
See Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics; Scott Pegg, International Society and the De
Facto State; Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik (eds.), De Facto States: The Quest for
Sovereignty; and Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, Unrecognized States in the International System
8
Scott Pegg, “De Facto States in the International System,” Institute of International Relations No. 21, The
University of British Columbia (1998).
9
See Sean S. Randolph, “The Status of Agreements Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the
Coordination for North American Affairs,” The International Lawyer Vol. 15, No. 2 (1981): 249-262 and
Michael Gunter, “A De Facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq,” Third World Quarterly Vol. 14, No. 2
(1993): 295-319
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best encapsulate the entity under discussion in that de facto state possesses all the
characteristics of a state, except recognition (de jure recognition). It is, in fact, a state but
lacks legal standing. Second, the other terms mentioned above do not capture the entire
universe of cases of de facto states. For example, Deon Geldenhuys uses the term
‘contested state,’ arguing that “most contested states find their very right of statehood
being challenged by their original (or central) states and the broader international
community.” 10 Geldenhuys’s reasoning assumes that all de facto states are seeking
recognition. But this is not wholly supported by the empirical record. ‘Semi-state’ and
‘quasi-state,’ meanwhile, suggest that the entity is a partial state or resembles one. Such
descriptions fail to accurately conceptualize de facto states, which are not half states, but
rather states in practice but without legal recognition.
In addition to the disagreement about terminology, there are also several competing
definitions in the literature. Scott Pegg offers what is perhaps the most useful starting
point:
A de facto state exists where there is an organized political leadership, which has risen to
power through some degree of indigenous capacity; receives popular support; and has
achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a
specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period
of time. The de facto state views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states
and it seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a
sovereign state.11

A second definition, from Tozun Bahcheli et al. says de facto states are
…regions which carry out the normal functions of the state on their territory, and which are
generally supported by significant proportions of their population. They are not ‘de jure
states,’ because they are not sanctioned by the international order. Instead, other states and
inter-state organizations…continue to recognize the authority of the state from which the
secession occurred, even though its writ no longer runs in the break-away region, and
though its legitimacy is rejected by the region’s population.12

10

Deon Geldenhuys, Contested States in World Politics, 3.
Scott Pegg, International Society and the De Facto State, 26.
12
John McGarry, “Forward: De Facto States and the International Order,” in Tozun Bahcheli, Barry
Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik (eds.), De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty, x.
11

6

Much like Pegg’s definition, Bahcheli et al. view de facto states as secessionist entities by
default.
The issue with these and other definitions used in the literature is the inclusion of
problematic concepts and conditions that do not accurately capture de facto states. Nina
Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield propose one such definition. They maintain that de facto
states must possess the following:
[One,] de facto independence, including territorial control, and have managed to maintain
this for at least two years…[two,] have not gained international recognition, or even if
they have been recognized by some states, they are still not full members of the
international system of sovereign states…[and three,] [t]hey have demonstrated an
aspiration for full, de jure, independence either through a formal declaration of
independence, through the holding of a referendum, or through other actions or
declarations that show a clear desire for a separate existence.13

But the authors do not explain why they impose the two-year cut-off on de facto states,
they do not clarify what is meant by full membership in the international system of
sovereign states, nor do they explain what is meant by “a clear desire for a separate
existence.”14 Pegg’s definition is also problematic. For example, Pegg uses ‘popular
support’ as a criterion of de facto statehood. But it is not clear what is meant by ‘popular
support’ and more importantly, he fails to justify why it is a prerequisite.
In short, the existing definitions provide a useful starting point, but they fall short
of capturing the essence of de facto states. Most definitions offer ambiguous criteria that
do not further our understanding of de facto states. The literature requires a definition
that is narrow and describes the entire universe of cases.

To this end, the project

proposes and uses the following definition: A de facto state controls a defined territory,
provides an array of services to the population, and enters into diplomatic and economic

13
14

Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, Unrecognized States in the International System, 3-4.
Ibid.

7

relations with other states, but it does not possess de jure recognition.15 This definition
intentionally avoids the claim that de facto states are always striving for independence
and recognition given that the literature has not substantiated this claim. To be sure, de
facto states will exhibit varying degrees of the features stipulated in the above definition.

Methodology
The methodology employed in this dissertation will combine a detailed case study of
Iraqi Kurdistan with the comparative historical analysis of South Sudan and Kosovo. The
aim of this project is to identify probabilistic rather than universal generalisations given
the small universe of cases. Although social research cannot draw watertight conclusions,
it can develop and test hypotheses by using the evidence that is available. The objective
of this project is less to develop and test generalizations and more to understand and
explain particular outcomes. This project will use the comparative method to identify and
explain the causes for the different outcomes between Kosovo and South Sudan on the
one hand and Iraqi Kurdistan on the other. It will do so by using the case study method
and J.S. Mill’s method of difference.
The case study is advantageous, as it will allow for in-depth analysis and
identification of causal mechanisms.16 John Gerring defines a case study as the “intensive
study of a single case for the purpose of understanding a larger class of cases. Case study

15

This definition borrows from Bahcheli et al. and Scott Pegg.
Darren Hawkins, “Case Studies,” in Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.), The Sage Handbook of
Comparative Politics (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009), 59. There is a trade-off when choosing case
studies: the project will gain depth versus breadth, construct validity versus generalizability, causal
mechanisms versus causal effects, deterministic versus probabilistic arguments, and theory generating
versus theory testing.
16

8

research may incorporate several cases.”17 Case studies allow researchers to identify and
thoroughly ‘measure’ the pertinent indicators and concepts.18 Case studies identify new
variables and lead to new hypotheses through the study of deviant or outlier cases and
fieldwork. 19 In addition, case studies identify the causal mechanisms (or intervening
variables) responsible for an outcome. One can reach generalization by increasing the
number of observations, which can be achieved by observing “additional units similar to
the unit under study.”20
There are also disadvantages to the case study method. One of the primary
critiques against case study research is the issue of ‘selection bias.’21 This occurs when
researchers select their cases on the dependent variable and therefore have the same
outcome for all cases. This issue will be discussed further in the subsequent paragraphs.
A second limitation is that case studies can make only “tentative conclusions on how
much gradations of a particular variable affect the outcome in a particular case or how
much they generally contribute to the outcomes in a class or type of cases.”22 A third
criticism is that case study research is not representative of a larger universe of cases.
That is, case study researchers are willing to trade-off generalizability “to develop
cumulatively contingent generalizations that apply to well-defined types or subtypes of
cases with a high degree of explanatory richness. Case study researchers are more
interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur, and the

17

John Gerring, “The Case Study: What it is and What it Does,” in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds.),
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 95.
18
John Gerring, “The Case Study,” 20.
19
Ibid., 21.
20
Darren Hawkins, “Case Studies,” 54.
21
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 21.
22
Ibid., 25.
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mechanisms through which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which
those conditions and their outcomes arise.”23
This project will use process-tracing to construct the case studies and to
complement the comparative methods outlined below. Process-tracing can be described
as the exploration of the causal mechanisms, which are the intervening factors that occur
between the causal variable(s) and the outcome.24 A particular advantage of this method
is that the spatial and temporal context of the case study is considered and studied
meticulously. George and Bennett note that researchers will cite history, primary and
secondary documents in the form of archival documents and interview transcripts in order
to identify the causal mechanism between the independent variables and the dependent
variable.25 Process-tracing is a complementary tool for other research methods such as
Mill’s methods of agreement and difference.26 For example, George and Bennett note
that “process-tracing can identify single or different paths to an outcome, point out
variables that were otherwise left out in the initial comparison of cases, check for
spuriousness, and permit causal inference on the basis of a few cases or even a single
case.”27
The method here is explicitly comparative as it will highlight the similarities and
differences across the three cases and will draw conclusions based on the outcomes of

23

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,
30.
24
James Caporaso, “Is there a Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Comparative Politics? The Case of
Process-Tracing,” in Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Comparative
Politics (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009), 70.
25
Ibid.
26
Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences,
215.
27
Ibid.
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each case.28 The case studies and process-tracing will be complemented by J.S. Mill’s
method of difference (or the most similar systems design). In A System of Logic, John
Stuart Mill first outlined the method of difference and the method of agreement, which
have since been used and reformulated by other social scientists. Adam Przeworski and
Henry Teune note that the method of agreement is perhaps the “dominant view” for
comparative inquiry.29 With the method of agreement, researchers choose cases with the
same outcome and identify the similar features or variables. Once the independent
variables are identified, the researcher then looks for the independent variables that are
constant across the cases and will be considered the explanatory variables. 30 The
independent variables that vary are not considered to be a factor in the outcome.
With the method of difference, researchers examine cases that do not have the
same outcome (or dependent variable).

The researcher then identifies the possible

independent variables (or causes) and looks for the independent variables that differ and
the others that are constant across the cases.31 The independent variables that differ are
considered to be the cause and will be further examined. The logic of each method is
outlined in the tables below.

In Table 1, Variable X3 would be considered the

explanatory variable and in Table 2, Variable X1 would be considered the explanatory
variable.

28

James Mahoney and Celso M. Villegas, “Historical Enquiry and Comparative Politics,” in Carles Boix
and Susan C. Stokes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007).
29
Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New York: Wiley
Interscience, 1970), 32.
30
Ibid., 33. Also see Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and The Comparative Method,” American
Political Science Review Vol. 65, No. 3 (1971): 682-693.
31
Stanley Lieberson, “Small N’s and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative
Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases*,” Social Forces Vol. 70, No. 2 (1991), 312.

11

Table 1: The Method of Agreement
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3

Outcome
1
1
1

Variable X1
0
1
0

Variable X2
1
0
1

Variable X3
1
1
1

Variable X1
1
0
1

Variable X2
0
0
0

Variable X3
1
1
1

Table 2: The Method of Difference
Case 1
Case 2
Case 3

Outcome
1
1
0

The issue of selection bias is particularly problematic in qualitative research.
According to Barbara Geddes and others (e.g., King, Keohane, and Verba) it is important
to select cases with diverging outcomes in order to avoid bias.32 Selecting cases on the
dependent variable will only highlight the differences between those cases without
providing insight into cases with a different outcome.33 To explain why de facto states A
and B have not declared independence and why de facto states C and D have done so, one
must identify the factors present in cases A and B that are missing in C and D.34 In order
to avoid the shortcomings of selection bias, this project has selected cases with different
outcomes.
Two of the de facto states (Kosovo and South Sudan) have declared independence
and one (Iraqi Kurdistan) has not. Kosovo and South Sudan are both relatively poor and
landlocked countries that do not have a strong (neither political nor economic)
institutional capacity to build effective states. Despite these apparent limitations on their
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33
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wherewithal for independence, both Kosovo and South Sudan declared independence in
2008 and 2011, respectively. Iraqi Kurdistan, on the other hand, possesses a functioning
democratic government, an increasingly strong economy, and the institutional capacity to
function as an independent state, but it continues to function as a de facto state.
Kosovo and South Sudan share many similarities, including recent declarations of
independence. Both cases represent economically poor regions with ineffective security
and political apparatus. Both territories are landlocked and economically weak, factors
that will contribute to the difficulties associated with independent statehood. South
Sudan possesses a ruined infrastructure, it is economically one of the weakest states in the
world, and relies solely on oil for its revenue. Kosovo’s infrastructure was damaged
during the 1999 NATO bombings of Serbia’s forces and the nascent state faces issues of
corruption, poor management, and weak economic and bureaucratic systems. Despite
their economic and political weaknesses, both pushed for independence. What accounts
for this behaviour?
Iraqi Kurdistan is selected for three reasons. First, Iraqi Kurdistan shares many
historical similarities with Kosovo and South Sudan. Like its counterparts, Iraqi
Kurdistan fought bloody civil wars against the parent state and faced oppressive regimes
and policies. In this sense, Iraqi Kurdistan shares the same motivations as Kosovo and
South Sudan for pursuing independence. Second, Iraqi Kurdistan possesses a functioning
democratic system that has been in place for decades and it has built, over three decades,
the institutional capacity to govern its territory and population. Iraqi Kurdistan is also
economically well off relative to Kosovo and South Sudan. The region has experienced
steady economic growth and it has rebuilt its infrastructure since 2003. In other words,
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Iraqi Kurdistan is in a better political and economic position than other de facto states and
therefore would stand a good chance of surviving as an independent state, but it continues
to function in a federal Iraq. Third, the existing literature has largely ignored Iraqi
Kurdistan. We know very little about the preferences and behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Iraqi Kurdistan, therefore, represents an interesting case, as it is an outlier that the
literature has overlooked.
A final and significant methodological component of this work is the use of data
collected from elite interviews, which are particularly relevant for process-tracing.35 Elite
interviews will accomplish three objectives. First, the information from the interviewees
can strengthen the robustness of the findings gathered from existing sources.36 Second,
data collected from elite interviews can also reveal new information about the research
topic. 37 Third, data from elite interviews can be used to extrapolate the views and
preferences of a small group to that of a larger population. 38 This is possible in
democratic systems where politicians and other officials have been elected to represent
the views and advance the preferences of the larger population.

Outline of the Argument
Despite their growing impact on regional security and stability, our understanding of the
de facto state is limited and has progressed little over the decades due to the focus in the
literature on Eurasia’s de facto states (i.e., Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia

35

Oisín Tansey, “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability Sampling,” PS:
Political Science & Politics Vol. 40, No. 04 (2007), 766.
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Ibid.

14

and Transnistria). 39 The existing literature on de facto states does not adequately
understand or explain cases outside of Eurasia. For example, the de facto state literature
fails to explain Iraqi Kurdistan and, in particular, it has failed to explain why the Iraqi
Kurds have not declared independence. Given the similar historical experiences with
South Sudan and Kosovo, the Kurds should be equally committed to independence. The
literature and its conceptual framework assume that all de facto states are secessionist in
nature.40 The empirical record does not support this assumption. The goal of the project,
therefore, is to explain the variation in de facto state behaviour and to identify the
conditions under which a de facto state will forgo independence. In other words, why do
some de facto states declare independence, while others do not?
The existing literature lacks a theory that can fully explain the behaviour of de
facto states. The aim of this dissertation is to develop such a theory and to examine it
empirically. Grounded in existing theoretical and empirical findings on ethnic conflict
and de facto states as well as primary data from interviews and participant-observation
research in Iraqi Kurdistan, the dissertation has two primary objectives.

The first

objective is to understand and explain de facto state preferences and behaviour in the
cases of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and South Sudan. The second objective is to develop a
set of generalisations that can help to explain not only the cases under consideration here,
but also other similar cases.

39
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In addition, this dissertation will highlight the conditions under which de facto
states emerge, how they function in the international system, and how we can better
understand their behaviour. The following questions will guide the project: First, why
and how do de facto states emerge? Second, why do some de facto states pursue
independence while others do not? And finally, what are the implications for Iraqi
Kurdistan?

More specifically, I explain why Kosovo and South Sudan declared

independence while Iraqi Kurdistan has maintained the status quo. What explains the
divergence in the outcomes? Is it a group’s historical trajectory or is it geopolitical
considerations on the part of regional and international powers? Do de facto states make
cost-benefit analyses before declaring independence or does the fervour of nationalism
compel its leaders to push for independence? These questions have not been adequately
addressed by the literature.
My findings, grounded in liberal theory from international relations, lead to the
following hypotheses. A de facto state will pursue independence when the parent state is
unwilling to offer ‘sufficient accommodation’ in the form of political institutions, such as
autonomy and federalism. This hypothesis suggests that secession is viewed as a last
resort in order to attain the political rights and goals of a group. Second, a de facto state
will stop short of independence when it has secured autonomy from the parent state and
the de facto status offers more economic and political benefits than full independence.
This hypothesis suggests that material factors, including economic incentives and
political conditions, shape and influence de facto state behaviour. The main point is that
the preference for independence is neither fixed nor inevitable.
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In addition, the case studies indicate that there are additional factors that can
mitigate the demand for independence. First, a de facto state will find it difficult to
secure independence and survive without support from the international community and,
in particular, a major power. After all, it is difficult to secure widespread recognition
without the backing of major powers. Second, the presence of certain individuals can
play an important role in assuaging the push for independence.

For instance, the

unexpected death of John Garang, who was a federalist, left the door open for South
Sudanese officials who were adamant on the South’s independence. In Iraqi Kurdistan,
former Iraqi President and high-ranking Kurdish official, Jalal Talabani, repeatedly
voiced support for a democratic, federal, and united Iraq. A final mitigating factor is the
presence or absence of the old regime of the parent state. A de facto state will be
reluctant to enter into a political union with a regime that is responsible for its oppression
and, in most cases, a regime that has committed violence against the de facto state’s
population.
The project consists of seven chapters including this Introduction, which outlines
the definition and history of de facto states as well as the dissertation’s methodology,
argument, and scholarly contribution. It is followed by Chapter 2, which has two primary
functions. First, it assesses the existing literature and its explanations for the emergence
and behaviour of de facto states. This will include an evaluation of the approaches
employed to explain the emergence of de facto states, including the various approaches to
ethnic conflict. Second, the chapter will outline and evaluate the explanatory power of
competing theories from international relations to the study of de facto states. The chapter
outlines the ways in which realism, constructivism, and liberalism explain the origins and
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behaviour of de facto states. The objective is to account for the origins of de facto states
and to identify the factors that shape and influence the behaviour of de facto states. The
chapter concludes that de facto states can emerge from ethnic conflicts and international
interventions and that the preference formation and behaviour of de facto states is best
explained by liberalism’s emphasis on political and economic institutions of the parent
state and the domestic context of the de facto state.
Chapter 3 examines the case of Kosovo and explains Kosovo’s decision to
unilaterally declare independence in 2008. The chapter begins by tracing Kosovo’s early
history starting in the fourteenth century to the present. The historical account will
provide the context necessary for understanding Kosovo’s tumultuous relationship with
Serbia. Next, the chapter examines the political relationship, beginning in the twentieth
century, between Kosovo and Serbia and provides an explanation for the descent into
violence. The outbreak of war between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia ultimately
compelled the international community to intervene and establish a de facto state in
Kosovo. The next section examines the factors that shaped Kosovo’s behaviour during
its de facto status and its ultimate decision to unilaterally declare independence. The
chapter concludes by arguing that Kosovo’s independence was not inevitable if Serbia
had initiated meaningful political and institutional reforms during the late 1980s to the
early 1990s. Although the old regime was removed from Serbia, the other two conditions
were not met – Kosovo was not granted sufficient autonomy until it was too late and the
union with Serbia offered Kosovo few economic incentives.
Chapter 4 examines the case of South Sudan and identifies the conditions that
allowed South Sudan to break away from Sudan in a constitutional referendum. The
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chapter begins with a historical account of the Sudan and South Sudan. It demonstrates
that the early history and political makeup of Sudan played a major role in the conflict
between Sudan and South Sudan. Specifically, the chapter reveals that the early political
and economic institutions of Sudan were responsible for the discontent in the South and
the outbreak of civil war in 1955. The chapter reveals that South Sudan emerged as a de
facto state following two long and bloody civil wars that did not produce a clear winner
and, as a result, the regime in Khartoum and South Sudan agreed to a peace agreement
that laid the foundations for the South’s secession. The chapter argues that South Sudan
ultimately seceded from Sudan due to flawed political institutions, too few economic
incentives, and the presence of the old regime in Khartoum. From South Sudan’s
perspective, Khartoum did not undertake significant democratic reforms and the presence
of the Omar al-Bashir regime created an environment of mistrust and fear among the
South Sudanese.

As a consequence, South Sudan did not trust the old regime in

Khartoum to uphold the autonomy granted to the South.
Chapter 5 introduces the case of Iraqi Kurdistan. It begins with a summary of
Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan’s early history beginning in the early twentieth century with the
creation of Iraq. Like Sudan, the early history of Iraq highlights the importance of
institutional design, especially in multiethnic states.

Iraq’s political and economic

institutions excluded the Kurdish population and successive regimes in Baghdad adopted
oppressive policies and harsh tactics in response to Kurdish requests for political rights.
The chapter then examines the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan as a de facto state in 1991
following three decades of political and military conflict between the Kurds and
Baghdad. The chapter illustrates that Iraqi Kurdistan did not possess the capabilities to
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establish a de facto state and, instead, the chapter argues, the intervention by the United
States and the United Kingdom was imperative for the emergence of Iraqi Kurdistan. It
concludes by arguing that Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and behaviour were shaped by
the political institutions and economic incentives constitutionalized in the post-2003 Iraq.
Chapter 6 examines the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan in two time periods. The
first section covers 2005 to June 2014 and the second section covers June 2014 to early
2015. The chapter examines the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan and outlines the reasons for
Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to forgo independence in favour of a continued union with
Iraq. The chapter reveals that Iraqi Kurdistan passed on two windows of opportunity to
secede from Iraq. The chapter relies on data collected from interviews with governmental
and non-governmental officials from Iraqi Kurdistan and argues that Iraq’s post-2005
constitution furnishes the Kurds with sufficient autonomy, significant economic
incentives, and established a democratic political system. These factors have thus far
persuaded the Kurds to forgo independence.

Chapter 7 concludes by restating the

primary objectives of the project, summarizing its main findings, and discussing the
implications of the findings for the existing and future research and for policymakers.

Scholarly Contribution
The project is original and contributes to the existing literature on many levels. At the
broadest level, this dissertation is the first attempt to systematically examine the
divergence in de facto state behaviour. The thesis demonstrates that de facto state
preference for independence is not predetermined, but rather a product of the parent
state’s political institutional design, economic factors, and the de facto state’s domestic
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context.

In doing so, the dissertation challenges the existing assumptions that the

preference for independence is a constant in time and space. The dissertation examines
cases with three different outcomes, unilateral declaration of independence (i.e., Kosovo),
negotiated secession (i.e., South Sudan), and peaceful reintegration (i.e., Iraqi Kurdistan),
in order to identify the conditions that influence and shape de facto state behaviour.
The project is also original in its application of international relations theory for
understanding and explaining de facto states. It will contribute to the existing literature
by testing different international relations theories and by better situating the de facto
state literature in the broader theoretical debate in international relations. The existing
literature implicitly uses realist and constructivist assumptions and concepts to explain
the emergence and behaviour of de facto states. On the one hand, the literature argues
that the desire for security as well as military capabilities determine a de facto state’s
preference for independence. On the other hand, international norms of state sovereignty
and territorial integrity often prevent de facto states from achieving independence. This
project argues that these explanations are incomplete and, instead, relies on liberal
assumptions about the role of political institutions, economic incentives, and domestic,
regional, and international factors in shaping the preferences of de facto states.
The thesis also makes an empirical contribution to the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.
Much of the case of Iraqi Kurdistan relies on the analysis of data gathered from three
fieldwork trips. The first extended field trip was a two-month tour of Iraqi Kurdistan,
mainly Erbil and Duhok provinces, which included interviews with high-ranking
politicians, political party officials, academics, members of NGOs, and journalists. In
total, I conducted semi-structured interviews with over 30 officials from Iraqi Kurdistan.
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The second field trip was a two-week visit to Iraqi Kurdistan in the lead up to the
Kurdistan regional elections held in September 2013. During this trip, I was able to
observe the campaigning tactics of the political parties and I participated in the election
as an international observer for the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq. The
final field trip was undertaken in the lead-up to the Iraq general election of April 2014.
Over a ten-day period, I gained valuable insights into the electoral and campaigning
process. I observed the campaign of a Kurdistan Democratic Party candidate, attended a
political rally, and observed the election and the outcome results.
Finally, the project makes an original contribution to our understanding of Iraqi
Kurdistan’s preferences and behaviour. As mentioned above, the existing literature has
largely ignored Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqi Kurdistan is currently a footnote in the de facto
state literature. Focusing on Iraqi Kurdistan is particularly important given the uncertain
realities in Iraq and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS also known as ISIS and ISIL
and by a loose Arabic acronym Daesh).

Understanding the motivations of Iraqi

Kurdistan will provide researchers and policymakers with information that will increase
our understanding of the issues between the Kurds and Iraq. This case is an important
test case for the de facto state literature given the historical and political contexts. Iraqi
Kurdistan suffered decades of political and social oppression at the hands of successive
regimes in Baghdad and yet it has not seceded from Iraq. From a policy perspective,
therefore, the thesis will demonstrate that policymakers and the international community
possess the tools and mechanisms required for containing violence between a de facto
state and the parent state.
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Chapter 2:

Theorizing De facto states

The purpose of this chapter is to review international relations (IR) theory and the
existing literature to outline the explanations for the origins and behaviour of de facto
states. The argument presented by this research will rely on theory from IR. The project
attempts to explain the variation in de facto state behaviour and, more specifically, to
explain why Kosovo and South Sudan declared independence while Iraqi Kurdistan
continues to function as a de facto state. The existing literature inadequately addresses
these issues. This project will try to explain and identify the conditions under which a de
facto state will pursue independence and when it may preserve the status quo. The
objective of this section is to explain de facto state behaviour and preference formation.
It will begin by outlining the general assumptions of realism (both classical and
neorealism) and constructivism, how each theory explains the origins and behaviour of de
facto states, and the ways in which preference formation and capabilities influence de
facto states. The objective is to demonstrate that realism and constructivism, although
insightful, do not provide a thorough explanation for the emergence and behaviour of de
facto states.

This will be followed by a general overview of liberalism, its core

assumptions about international politics, a liberal account of the origins and behaviour of
de facto states, and a discussion on how state preferences are formed and to what extent
capabilities matter. The theoretical section argues that liberalism, its explanation for how
preferences are formed, and its emphasis on institutions, interests, and the domestic
political system provides the best explanation for the behaviour and decision-making of
de facto states. It will conclude by identifying the weaknesses and criticisms of this
approach and what, if any, implications this has for understanding de facto states.
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The prevailing consensus, both from IR theory and the de facto state literature, is
that groups engage in conflict, including ethnic and nationalist conflict, as a means to
security and survival in an anarchic system. According to realism, under such a system,
threats from others are constant and therefore security is the overriding imperative for
groups and states alike.

This approach uses the related concepts of the ‘security

dilemma’ and anarchy to account for ethnic conflict. Another explanation, offered by
constructivism, suggests that nationalism is constructed and used by elites to advance
their own interests, which can lead to ethnic conflict and the desire for independence.
Both explanations overlook the role of institutional design and economic interests
in explaining the emergence of intra-ethnic political competition and the creation of de
facto states. This dissertation relies on liberal theory from IR and focuses on how flawed
political institutions and economic incentives also shape actors’ behaviour. There is little
doubt that most de facto states emerge as a consequence of ethnic conflict, but it is not
clear what sparks ethnic conflict in the first place. The existing literature contends that de
facto states desire independence but it does not explain how or why the preference for
independence materializes. This chapter will argue that groups engage in conflict when
institutions fail to assuage their political needs and when their economic interests are not
being met.

Realism and Neorealism
Hans Morgenthau argues that: “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for
power.

Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the
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immediate aim.”41 Classical realists such as Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr argue
that the innate human desire to dominate others leads to conflict and wars.42 Realists
believe that human nature, which is immutable, compels individuals and states to want
power as an end in itself.43 Individuals cannot satisfy their desire for power due to the
constraints imposed by societal rules and norms and, therefore, attempt to satisfy their
desire for power through their nation or nation-state. 44 This is one of the motivations
behind the struggle for statehood. It provides groups with a means for satisfying the
desire for power and for protecting their nation.45
In addition to power, realism stresses the importance of the state, the notion of
self-help, and survival. Ethnic groups, or nations, want to establish their own state not
only for power but also to ensure their survival. Although a nation’s survival does not
always depend on the creation of its own state, it is the most desirable political
objective.46 According to realist thought, therefore, because states are in a competitive
self-help system, they must be prepared for war at all times. 47 This reality causes
perpetual insecurity within the state as ethnic minorities may pose a threat to the state’s
internal and external security. 48

States will often persecute minorities if they are

perceived as a potential threat to the its internal security. Based on these assumptions,
the preference for statehood is predetermined, as nations want power and security.
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The central premise of all realist theories is that “the existence of several states in
anarchy renders the security of each one problematic and encourages them to compete
with each other for power or security.”49 Due to this insecurity international politics is
viewed as a “self-help” system where states cannot rely on others for protection. Power
and its acquisition are essential for political actors.50 Neorealists agree that international
politics is a struggle for power but disagree with the fundamental classical realist notion
that the struggle for power is a result of human nature.51 Instead, neorealists argue that
power is a means to security in an international system that is characterized by anarchy.
Anarchy is the organizing principle of the international political system and is
differentiated by the notion of hierarchy governing the domestic system. The units in the
international system are functionally similar but differ in capabilities and the relative
distribution of power is therefore a key variable for understanding issues in world
politics.

Kenneth Waltz argues that states are sensitive to the material capabilities of

other states given the anarchical nature of world politics. 52 This sensitivity to the
capabilities of others, Waltz believes, forces states to maximize security rather than
power.
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Kenneth Waltz argues that states (and by extension de facto states) have little say
in how their preferences are formed.53 Waltz’s structural analysis of world politics argues
that the structure restricts certain actions while propelling states toward others. 54
Structural realism’s defining feature vis-à-vis classical realism is “the idea that
international politics can be thought of as a system with a precisely defined structure.”55
It is the structure that allows neorealism to formulate a theory about the international
political arena.
Realists argue that interests are predetermined and “exogenous to social
interactions.”56 That is, states enter into social interactions with their interests already
formed and, as such, social interaction does little to influence interests. This point is
particularly important for how realists understand de facto states. From this perspective, a
de facto state’s preference for independence is structurally determined rather than a
deliberate policy decision. The structure of anarchy and the goal of survival compel de
facto states to pursue independence to ensure their survival. Preferences are
predetermined and therefore what matters is whether or not actors possess the capabilities
to advance their interests and secure their preferences.

Realism and the Origins of De Facto States
Neorealists argue that the distribution of capabilities across competing states is one of the
key ordering principles of the anarchic system.
53
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therefore, is a key variable for understanding issues in world politics. Waltz argued that
states are sensitive to the material capabilities of other states given the anarchical nature
of world politics. This assumption can also be applied to different ethnic groups in a
multiethnic state. Groups are particularly sensitive and feel at risk if one group controls
the political, security, and economic apparatus of the state. In such cases, groups begin to
make political and economic demands that often lead to conflict.
The existing literature has framed the onset of ethnic conflicts and the emergence
of de facto states through a realist lens. This position has garnered strong support from
the academic literature and, in particular, from realists.57 Barry Posen argues that the end
of the Cold War and the disintegration of Yugoslavia demonstrate that ethnic conflicts
can be explained by the notion of the ‘security dilemma.’58 He notes that once groups
became responsible for their own security in the early 1990s, they had to assess the nature
of security threats emanating from their neighbours and determine what, if anything,
could be done to mitigate the threats. Realism’s emphasis on security and relative power
may encourage the security dilemma where “what one does to enhance one’s own
security causes reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure.”59 This is prevalent
amongst groups that previously coexisted under a central authority but are expected to
maintain their security and build states at the same time.60 The collapse of Yugoslavia
and the subsequent ethnic wars is illustrative, according to Posen. He examines the
conflict between the Croats and the Serbs where each group viewed the emergence of the
57
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other’s identity as a threat.61 This is equally applicable to the conflict between Serbia and
Kosovo. Kosovo viewed Serbian nationalism and actions as a threat to its identity and
security. Serbia was equally concerned that Kosovar nationalism and demands would
lead to the breakup of Serbia.
Chaim Kaufmann argues that ethnic conflicts will endure as long as rival groups
exist under the same physical territory. He argues that physical separation of groups into
‘defensible enclaves’ is the only possible solution to ethnic conflict.62 Physical separation
will reduce the security dilemma associated with ethnic conflicts. Kaufmann views
ethnic identities as fixed and extremely difficult to change in the short and medium terms.
Kaufmann and Posen do not believe there can be any room for compromise because the
security dilemma compels groups to harden their positions in order to protect the group.
This approach leaves little room for agency, institutions, or material factors. Instead, it
prioritizes security and power. It assumes that ethnic groups rebel and seek power and
independence in order to survive in a system that pits one group against another.
David Lake and Donald Rothchild also argue that ethnic conflict is a consequence
of insecurity and uncertainty. They argue that “ethnic conflict is most commonly caused
by collective fears of the future. As groups begin to fear for their physical safety, a series
of dangerous and difficult-to-resolve strategic dilemmas arise that contain within them
the potential for tremendous violence…Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs,
operating with groups, reinforce these fears of physical insecurity and cultural
domination and polarize society.” 63

They attribute ethnic conflict to “information

61

Barry R. Posen, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” 35-36.
Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars,” 137.
63
David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (eds.), The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, 4.
62

29

failures, problems of credible commitment, and incentives to use force pre-emptively
(also known as the security dilemma).”64
Similar to Posen and Kauffmann’s discussion of the effects of the security
dilemma on ethnic conflict, Donald Horowitz notes that group apprehension about
survival and subordination highlights the “importance accorded to competitive values: a
group that cannot compete will be overcome or will die out.”65 Horowitz outlines the
ways in which group comparison influences group relationships. The fear of
subordination is a main feature of group interaction in multiethnic systems and can lead
to fear of extinction.66 The threat (or even perception of a threat) to a group’s survival
can lead to ‘extreme demands,’ which from the perspective of an outside observer may
seem disproportionate.67 Finally, in some cases the threat may be perceived as imminent
and severe that it may prompt exclusivist demands that can lead to confrontation and
violence.68
In terms of de facto states, the literature argues that civil wars and security
concerns explain the emergence of de facto entities. Daniel Byman and Charles King
note that de facto states emerge from civil wars, particularly in cases where there is a
weak parent state. Michael Rywkin adds that all de facto states have emerged as a result
of “ethnic or religious conflicts or state disintegration.”69 Deon Geldenhuys, likewise,
emphasizes secession as “the single most common” cause for the emergence of de facto
states. 70 Charles King notes that Eurasia’s de facto states (i.e., Abkhazia, Nagorno64
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Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria) emerged as a result of the collapse of the
Soviet Union and the ensuing ethnic and separatist wars.71 In these cases, civil war broke
out between the minority group and the parent state as a consequence of the state’s
weakness (and with the support of outside states such as Armenia in the case of NagornoKarabakh and Russia with Abkhazia and South Ossetia), the minority group creates a de
facto state. Once it has secured its status, the de facto state is able to build institutions
that allow it to function like a de jure state.
According to this position, de facto states emerge from ethnic conflicts or civil
wars that break out when an ethnic group feels threatened by another group or the parent
state. Often times, the conflict does not produce a clear winner and the ensuing stalemate
leads to the creation of a de facto state. Neighbouring and regional states are reluctant to
intervene or recognize the incipient state as such an intervention would violate the
international norm of territorial integrity. 72 Additionally, states fear that recognizing
secessionist movements may lead to their own territorial breakup.73 The norm of nonintervention thus prevents other states from recognizing secessionist entities.
Neorealism’s concepts of anarchy, self-help, security dilemma, and power
(capabilities) are thus very relevant to the study of de facto states. First, much like
sovereign states, de facto states want to survive and, some, desire full independence. As
mentioned earlier, neorealism assumes that states have little agency due to the pressures
thrust upon them from the anarchic system of self-help and competition. As such, state
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identity and interests are fixed and stable. That is, states are rational and self-interested
actors whose main objectives are security and survival. Second, the ability of de facto
states to advance their preferences largely depends on their capabilities. Capabilities play
a central role in the emergence, survival, and resolution of de facto states. Much like
sovereign states, de facto states must possess sufficient power, or capabilities, not only to
establish a de facto state, but also to survive and to gain independence. Capabilities as
understood here refer to the power, both military and economic, that a de facto state
requires to ensure its survival. Without sufficient capabilities, de facto states stand little
chance of surviving, let alone successfully seceding from the parent state.
As mentioned above, neorealism is often used by the existing literature to explain
de facto states. The literature emphasizes that de facto states exist in an international
system that prefers state sovereignty and disapproves of secessionist entities. De facto
states must attain enough power to preserve their status while trying to secure recognition
and independence. Sovereignty is therefore seen as the ultimate goal of de facto states.
Neorealism’s emphasis on power and capabilities, anarchy, and self-help also explain the
emergence of de facto states. In a neorealist international system, states are left to their
own devices for security and survival. When a domestic group challenges the authority
of the parent state and the state does not possess the capabilities to put down the
rebellion, a de facto state can emerge. The conflict can only be resolved if one actor
possesses the capabilities to defeat the other.
Although realism’s notions of capabilities, security, and anarchy provide valuable
insights, they do not fully explain the onset of ethnic conflicts or the emergence of de
facto states. First, if ethnic conflict is a consequence of the ‘security dilemma’ then what
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explains the absence of ethnic conflict in certain multiethnic states? For example, there is
an absence of violence between various ethnic groups and the central government of
India and the Catalans and the central government in Spain despite the presence of the
conditions outlined by realism. In these cases, institutional frameworks (e.g., federalism,
autonomy, power-sharing, and democracy) have mollified the demands of ethnic groups
in a multiethnic state. The effects of the security dilemma are either absent or reduced
with the suitable institutional setup.
Second, realism’s focus on security and capabilities overlooks the role of material
factors that drive the demands of ethnic groups. Many ethnic conflicts are a result of a
state’s unwillingness to meet a minority group’s political and economic demands. As a
consequence, groups resort to violence in order to gain the political and economic
institutions necessary to meet their demands. Third, if the system is one of anarchy and
self-help then what explains the endurance of de facto states? De facto states often have
a long life span despite their military and economic weakness. Finally, neorealism
underestimates the role of international law and organizations and their influence on the
emergence and outcome of de facto states.

The international norm of sovereignty

prevents most de facto states from acquiring recognition from the international
community and compels them to settle for de facto statehood until their status can be
resolved. Although neorealism can explain the role of power and force, it overlooks the
role of interests, institutions, and material factors in understanding the emergence and
persistence of de facto states.74
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Realism and the Behaviour of De Facto States
From a realist perspective, de facto state behaviour would be very similar to the
behaviour of sovereign states. First, de facto states will prioritize security and survival.
These imperatives are thrust upon states by the self-help system, which compels states to
prioritize survival over other imperatives.

De facto state preference for statehood,

therefore, is fixed under the anarchic structural environment. Institutional arrangements
such as federalism and power-sharing are unlikely to engender cooperation between the
de facto state and the parent state. Realism argues that the fixed preference for statehood
and survival is the primary objective of de facto states.

Achieving independence,

however, is a difficult task without sufficient capabilities. In short, de facto states desire
independence, but achieving this goal largely depends on capabilities.
As mentioned earlier, from a realist perspective de facto state preferences are
formed exogenously. Preference formation is a result of the interaction between the
anarchic structure, the self-help system, and the desire for survival. These key features of
realist theory dictate that states and de facto states will pursue security, power, and
independence in order to survive. Domestic politics have little influence over how
preferences are created in an anarchic international system.

Ethnic conflict, also a

consequence of the security dilemma, reinforces the preference for independence. States
and other actors have little agency in an anarchic international system that compels states
to pursue security and survival.

Under such constraints, de facto states prioritize

independence to ensure their survival. Because preferences are predetermined, a de facto
state’s behaviour is dictated by its capabilities. Without adequate power, a weak state
may face existential threats from a more powerful and aggressive state. Similarly, a de
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facto state must possess enough capabilities to simultaneously defend itself against the
parent state and to pursue the goal of independence.
These realist assumptions provide useful insights into de facto state behaviour.
For instance, the regional setting in which the de facto state finds itself shapes and
influences its behaviour. Iraqi Kurdistan is a case and point. It is surrounded by states
that strongly oppose Kurdish independence. Given this setting, Iraqi Kurdistan is unable
and unwilling to push for independence lest it provoke Turkey and Iran. South Sudan, on
the other hand, received support from neighbouring and regional states in its struggle
against Khartoum. Similarly, Kosovo’s demand for independence was influenced by the
support it received from regional European powers.
However, it should be noted that regional and/or international support does not
determine whether a de facto state declares independence. In fact, most de facto states
(i.e., South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, Taiwan, Somaliland, Tamil Eelam, Transnistria, and Biafra) have declared
independence even though they have little support from the international community and
regional governments. Indeed, most states condemn or ignore de facto states due to
instability associated with them. For example, Charles King has argued that Eurasia’s de
facto states pose a serious security problem to the region’s stability. That is, unlike
Taiwan and the TRNC, Eurasia’s de facto states contribute to conflict, corruption, and
crime.75 As a consequence, the likelihood of cooperation between the de facto state and
the parent state is further diminished.
The anarchic international system and security imperatives make cooperation
between states, and by extension de facto states and the parent state, difficult to achieve.
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Joseph Grieco argues that realism with its emphasis on conflict and competition offers a
comprehensive understanding of cooperation.76 Realists assume that “the fundamental
goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from achieving advances in their
relative capabilities.”77 This builds on Waltz’s assertion that: “If an expected gain is to be
divided, say, in the ratio of two to one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to
implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other.”78 Robert Jervis also argues
that cooperation under anarchy remains difficult due to the lack of enforcement in the
international arena.79 As a result, states are unwilling to risk their security and economic
well being even though cooperation can be mutually beneficial. This is the same line of
reasoning Kaufmann provides regarding the behaviour of ethnic groups. Cooperation is
risky for realists not only because of the fear of cheating but also because of the fear that
cooperation might spread benefits disproportionately.
In an anarchic and self-help international system, it follows that ethnic groups and
de facto states would be unwilling to cooperate or negotiate with the parent state to
resolve the conflict. The de facto state does not want to lose its de facto status and the
parent state fears the breakup of its territorial integrity. Both actors view cooperation in
terms of relative gains. That is, both sides fear that the other actor will gain more from an
agreement or settlement of the conflict. The ensuing security dilemma perpetuates the
conflict and compels the de facto state to seek independence. Security and survival
become paramount for both actors reducing the potential for a negotiated settlement.
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According to Kaufmann, power-sharing or federalism are unlikely to permanently
resolve ethnic conflicts.80 Power-sharing cannot mitigate the intractable differences or
the security dilemma which characterize ethnic conflict.81 Ethnic groups are unlikely to
submit to a power-sharing agreement under the conditions of ethnic violence and
heightened security threats from other groups or the parent state.82 Kaufmann argues that
ethnic conflicts harden ethnic identities and the security dilemma deepens the divisions
and the conflict. These conditions, says Kaufmann, make it difficult, if not impossible, to
resolve ethnic conflict “until or unless the security dilemma can be reduced or
eliminated.”83 Kaufmann proposes ‘physical separation’ as the best method for ending
and resolving longstanding ethnic conflicts. 84 Under such conditions, there is little
chance that de facto states would agree to cooperate with and function in a political
arrangement under the control of the parent state.

Constructivism
The following section will outline and examine the ways in which constructivism
explains the origins and behaviour of de facto states. Constructivism can be divided into
the ‘conventional’ and the ‘critical’ strands. Ted Hopf notes that conventional
constructivism shares methodological and epistemological assumptions with traditional
theories such as neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism.85 Conventional constructivism
grew out of first-wave critical theory but differs in an important way: conventional
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constructivism accepts and indeed adopts empirical analysis.86 Critical constructivism, on
the other hand, rejects the fundamental epistemological and methodological assumptions
of traditional IR theories. This thesis will discuss the assumptions and applicability of
conventional constructivism to the study of de facto states.87
Constructivism’s opening emerged with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the
end of the Cold War, an event that called into question the supposedly explanatory
powers of the mainstream theories, neorealism and neoliberalism. There are three
important constructivist assumptions that will be discussed here. First, in addition to
material structures, constructivists believe that ideational and normative structures (i.e.,
systems of shared ideas, values, and beliefs) shape and influence behaviour.88 Second,
constructivists argue that identities influence interests and actions. Unlike the realists,
constructivists do not view interests as exogenously determined, but instead attempt to
show how actors develop their interests in order to understand international phenomena.89
Third, constructivists believe that “agents and structures are mutually constituted.”90 In
other words, actors have more agency than realists claim. Instead of taking structures as
constant, constructivists believe that structures and actors produce and reproduce one
another through norms. 91

Actions have no meaning without the intersubjective

understanding formed by these norms and ideas. Furthermore, abstract structures such as
anarchy, the state system, and sovereignty, which seem to be natural, are socially
constructed by ideas and these too can change.
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On the issue of anarchy, constructivists believe that it is ‘indeterminate’ and
mutually constituted by actors adopting norms. Anarchy exists because states accept its
implications and constraints. Neorealism’s notions of anarchy and self-help are
applicable, therefore, only when a state faces ‘catastrophic consequences’ for not
possessing the capacity to defend itself. But when states are willing to cede control over
outcomes to other actors, it demonstrates that neorealism’s notion of anarchy is
‘imaginary.’ 92 In short, the difference between neorealist and constructivist notion of
structure is that “[n]eorealists think it is made only of a distribution of material
capabilities, whereas constructivists think it is also made of social relationships.”93 As
Alexander Wendt has noted, anarchy does not have any consequences other than what
states accept.

If states choose to interact with each other as allies rather than as

adversaries then anarchy would not have any consequences. Wendt says the international
arena is characterized by the “beliefs and expectations that states have about each other,
and these are constituted largely by social rather than material structures.”94 Self-help
and the security dilemma, therefore, are not consequences of the structure of anarchy, but
rather products of the interaction of the units in the system.95

Constructivism and the Origins of De Facto States
Constructivism, as outlined by Alexander Wendt, largely accepts the statist approach of
neorealism but disagrees with the implications of anarchy on state identity, preference
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formation, and interests. Constructivists disagree with the structural and deterministic
worldview of the neorealists. Wendt argues that the notion of self-help is a result of the
interaction between states rather than anarchy.96 Anarchy, from a constructivist point of
view, is not a determining cause of self-help, but rather a permissive one. Wendt notes
that “structure has no existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and
power politics are institutions, not essential features of anarchy.”97 Essentially, Wendt
believes that the international arena is characterized by the “beliefs and expectations that
states have about each other, and these are constituted largely by social rather than
material structures.” 98 Furthermore, Wendt argues that the materialist approach to
structure fails to recognize how the international system constructs state identities and
interests. That is, the system affects and constitutes state identities.
Constructivists are also concerned with the ways in which state identity and
interests are formulated. According to constructivists, state identity and interests are not
predetermined or fixed, but are malleable. State identity and interests take shape through
interactions and ideas. Martha Finnemore argues that the identities and interests of states
are a product of their interactions with each other in the international system. Finnemore
says, “We cannot understand what states want without understanding the international
social structure of which they are a part…States are socialized to want certain things by
the international society in which they and the people in them live.”99 It follows then that,
if identities are constructed, they can also be changed and reshaped.

Such an

understanding of international politics also assumes that states can learn to cooperate.
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These assumptions can also be applied to the interests and behaviour of ethnic
groups. Constructivists view identity in terms of Benedict Anderson’s ‘imagined
communities.’ That is, modern technology and a modern economic system have made it
possible for individuals to conceive of a larger and ‘imagined’ ethnic community.
Modernity provides groups with a wider communal base and institutionalizes ethnicity.100
Although constructivists view ethnicity as constructed, they recognize that ethnicity is an
enduring concept and difficult to dismantle once it takes deep roots.101 Constructivists
also view identity and ethnicity as an instrument that can be exploited by elites. From
this view, ethnicity is a purely instrumental tool used by elites for political or economic
goals. This position argues that political elites may promote peace in some places and
drive conflict in other places to advance their interests.102 Instrumentalists view ethnicity
as a means to an end rather than an inherent and fixed trait. Although constructed, ethnic
identity has powerful emotional appeal to individuals and organisations. David Laitin
argues that although some ethnic identities are relatively deep, as primordialists say, it is
culturally and more contingently constructed.103
Constructivists argue that ethnicity is neither natural nor completely open, but
rather a social phenomenon. Based on this perspective, ethnic violence is caused by
‘social systems’ and it is the socially constructed nature of ethnicity that leads to

100

Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2002), 31.
101
Ibid., 34.
102
Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life, 29.
103
David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998), 27. Primordialism refers to the belief the nationalist is a natural part of
human identity and that nations are ancient. Primordialism is best explained by Clifford Geertz, who says,
primordial identity refers to “the ‘givens’…of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection
mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community,
speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices.”
See Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 259.

41

violence.104 Ethnic conflict occurs, and de facto states emerge, when elites use the idea of
identity and nationalism to advance their own personal interests. Constructivists believe
that “ethnic conflicts are the result of pernicious group identities created by
hypernationalist myth-making” subsequently used by ethnic entrepreneurs striving for
power.105 According to this reasoning, if ethnic identities can be forged and manipulated
by ethnic entrepreneurs, then individuals and groups can also be influenced to adopt less
exclusive identities and cooperate. 106 Chaim Kaufmann, however, argues that even if
ethnic identities are created, it is impossible to reverse the consequences of ethnic
conflicts and to create peace following an ethnic conflict.107 The violence from ethnic
conflicts creates fear and hatred between groups that cannot be reconstructed to create
peace.
The constructivist interpretation of nationalism and ethnic conflict demonstrates
the importance assigned to the role of agency. Whereas realists emphasize the structure
of the international system in dictating state preferences, constructivism argues that
individuals and groups can also influence and shape state preferences and policies. It
follows then that state preferences are not exogenously given by the structure. Rather,
preferences are often a reflection of the extent to which elites and individuals have the
power to influence government. This does not mean that ideas are more important than
power and interest, which remain as important as they were, but that power and interest
have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.
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According to constructivism, traditional capabilities such as, military power and
economic resources can facilitate a group’s fight for independence, but the power of ideas
underpinning the struggle for independence is also important. When a group does not
possess capabilities, it will be forced to accept de facto independence. In addition to the
role of capabilities and ideas, international norms of sovereignty and non-intervention
make it difficult for aspiring states to seek support and recognition from other states.
From a constructivist viewpoint, de facto states are a by-product of the international norm
against recognizing unilateral secession and the sanctity of state sovereignty. Lowering
the threshold for secession would encourage other discontented minorities to seek
independence rather than to accept autonomy.108
Constructivist assumptions offer valuable insights into the origins of ethnic
conflict and the emergence of de facto states. In particular, the idea that leaders of ethnic
groups use nationalism as a pretext for advancing their personal interests is an interesting
concept. Still, constructivism does not adequately explain ethnic conflict for two reasons.
First, nationalist identities cannot simply be created without a historical foundation with
which to work. The historical and cultural foundations of ethnic groups demonstrate that
nations have some common past that binds their members. Ethnic identity and loyalty to
one’s ethnic group is often strong, particularly after a conflict, that it matters little
whether it is constructed or ancient. Whereas realism ignores the role of agency;
constructivism overstates its importance on ethnicity.

Second, like realism,

constructivism ignores the role of interests and material factors in explaining the
behaviour of ethnic groups and the emergence of de facto states. Ethnic entrepreneurs
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would not be successful at mobilizing ethnic groups for war or secession if those groups
are economically and politically content.

Constructivism and the Behaviour of De Facto States
According to constructivism, de facto state behaviour is shaped by ideas, international
norms, and the role of elites in constructing preferences.

De facto states are not

constrained by anarchy or capabilities, but by the ideas and international norms that
influence and shape the behaviour of states and state-like entities. First, in terms of
international norms, de facto states must consider how the international community
would respond to a declaration of independence. (The international community prefers to
maintain the territorial integrity of its constituent states and therefore frowns up
secession.109 ) Second, ideas about anarchy and survival only matter if de facto states
accept such ideas and the implications and constraints associated with them. That is, de
facto states can choose to pursue security by acquiring military capabilities or they can
choose to pursue dialogue with the parent state and neighbouring states to arrive at a
negotiated settlement.
The role of agency is also an important feature of constructivism. Individuals and
other actors possess agency and can influence and shape the behaviour and preferences of
states and de facto states. For example, if elites mobilize ethnic groups for their own
ends, then state preferences and policies can reflect the interests of such elites. De facto
states are also susceptible to the influence of elites and agency. Ethnic conflict may
create strong nationalist feelings that will be difficult to change in the short-term and may
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encourage ethnic groups to demand independence, but the point is that preferences are
not fixed. Indeed, institutional arrangements such as power-sharing or autonomy may
encourage the de facto state to forgo its bid for independence. Preferences can change.
This is particularly true given international norms and partiality for the territorial integrity
of states. De facto states must be prepared to endure opposition and disapproval from the
international community. Even when a de facto state possesses the capabilities to break
away from the parent state and provide security to its territory and population,
recognition and independence are not assured. For example, Taiwan possesses all the
capabilities (military and economic) necessary for functioning as an independent state,
but it is unable to secure recognition and support from other states in the international
system.
Like realism, constructivism is insightful for explaining some aspects of de facto
state behaviour.

For instance, one could argue that de facto states learn to pursue

security, power, and independence due to institutions such as anarchy and self-help and
ideas surrounding power and security. In addition, constructivism demonstrates that
identities and interests are not given or fixed, but are constructed and constantly
renegotiated.

The identities and interests of de facto states can also change.

For

example, rather than pursuing independence, de facto states may prefer to institutionalize
the status quo. Still constructivism cannot fully explain the behaviour of de facto states.
First, constructivism’s emphasis on ideas, institutions, and norms overlooks the
importance of the institutional structures and material considerations that influence de
facto states. For example, Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to participate in a federal Iraq is
shaped by the political autonomy and economic incentives offered by the union. Second,
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although institutions such as anarchy and self-help may be constructed, states and de
facto states must possess sufficient power and capabilities to maintain order. A de facto
state, meanwhile, must possess sufficient capabilities to defend itself from an aggressive
parent state that wishes to reintegrate the territory.

Summary of Findings
The overview and discussion of realism and constructivism reveals gaps in how the
existing literature explains ethnic conflict and the origins and behaviour of de facto states.
Realism’s emphasis on anarchy, structure, and power overlooks the role of the domestic
political structure and especially economic interests and institutional design. Economic
interests and effective political institutions provide the incentives for a disaffected ethnic
group or de facto state to stay with the parent state. Realism fails to consider that under
the right conditions preferences can change. Constructivists, meanwhile, overstate the
power of elites have in mobilizing ethnic groups. The power of nationalism can ebb and
flow to reflect the short to medium-term interests of an ethnic group or de facto state.
Finally, constructivists also overstate the extent to which international norms of
sovereignty and non-intervention will deter de facto states from seeking recognition from
other states (and possibly from unilaterally declaring independence).

For example,

Kosovo understood that its unilateral declaration of independence would not be
recognized by many states including powers such as, China and European states such as,
Spain and Greece. Governments will ignore norms of sovereignty and non-intervention
for various reasons such as, pressure from domestic groups to advance their strategic
interests.
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Existing explanations do not sufficiently account for the emergence of de facto
states. International interventions have contributed to the emergence of de facto states,
yet the scholarship has paid little attention. The literature does acknowledge intervention
as a factor, but it does not adequately evaluate the significance of interventions. De facto
states can emerge from military intervention taken by individual states or the
international community. Pegg identifies foreign invasions (e.g., Turkey’s invasion of
Cyprus to establish the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) and external humanitarian
interventions (e.g., the US and UK imposition of the safe zone in northern Iraq and the
intervention in Kosovo in 1999) as contributing factors for the emergence of de facto
states.110 Contrary to the notions of the norm of non-intervention and the inviolability of
a state’s sovereignty, the international community has demonstrated its willingness to
intervene in certain cases where gross human rights violations have taken place. Indeed,
two of the cases here (i.e., Kosovo and Iraqi Kurdistan) are examples of de facto states
that emerged as a direct consequence of interventions from the international community.
Although interventions are uncommon in the international community, they are
nonetheless responsible for ending conflicts and establishing de facto states.

Most

recently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) undertook an air bombing in
Libya to pre-empt a massacre and to oust the former dictator Muammar Gaddafi from
power.

It is true that the international community has been accused of selectively

choosing to intervene in order to protect particular economic and/or security interests.
However, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to evaluate the merits or intentions of
the international community when it chooses to intervene. Instead, the focus here is the
role of international interventions in creating a de facto state. That some de facto states
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emerge as a result of international interventions does not contradict the idea that all de
facto states originate from self-determination movements. It would be more accurate to
claim that the interplay between domestic and international factors leads to the creation of
de facto states. The case of South Sudan is illustrative. Initially, the conflict was a
domestic issue between the South and the government in Khartoum until regional states
and outside powers (e.g., the US) were dragged into the conflict. Outside governments
provided covert military support to the South and eventually helped both sides reach a
peace settlement in 2005.
The goal here is not to challenge explanations regarding the origins of de facto
states, but rather to highlight the importance of external interventions.

I hope to

demonstrate that international interventions played a significant role in the emergence
Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo. Furthermore, the thesis will argue that ethnic groups rebel
and sometimes resort to violence to protect their interests (political, economic, etc.).
Most de facto states emerge from civil wars that do not produce a clear winner and the
secessionist entity establishes a functioning political unit that possesses the features of a
state but it is not recognized. Weak states do not possess the capability to prevent the
establishment of de facto states and do not possess the capabilities to bring the de facto
state back into the fold. De facto states can emerge from the actions of a group seeking
autonomy or secession from the parent state, but they can also emerge from international
interventions. Indeed international intervention can help to mitigate the intensity of
ethnic conflicts, especially in cases where there is a group that is at risk against a
militarily strong state.111
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Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo faced strong parent states, in Iraq and Serbia
respectively, that were prepared to use overwhelming force to end the conflict. Neither
the Kurds nor the Kosovars possessed the military power to compel the parent state to
establish an autonomous region.

Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo were in the midst of

uprisings against the central government and both faced imminent threats and the
possibility of massacres at the hands of the governments of Saddam Hussein and
Slobodan Milošević, respectively. International interventions were undertaken in both
cases to stop the parent states from continuing to inflict violence against the weak
minorities.

Following the imposition of the no-fly zone against Saddam Hussein’s

regime over the Kurdish region in 1991, Iraqi Kurdistan created a functioning political
unit that closely resembles a state. International organizations such as, the European
Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), and NATO, established a de facto state in Kosovo
(from 1999 to 2008) when they created and supervised administrative, legal, and security
apparatus for Kosovo.
The empirical record also puts into question the literatures’ assumptions regarding
the behaviour and evolution of de facto states. Nina Caspersen argues that some de facto
states gain recognition and secure independence (e.g., Eritrea and Kosovo), but most
(e.g., Chechnya and Tamil Eelam) are forcefully reintegrated by the parent state.112 The
record, however, does not support this argument. In fact, from the 24 de facto states
listed in this work only five have been forcibly reintegrated by the parent state. This is
often achieved with a thorough military defeat of the de facto state. The most recent
example of this was the military defeat of Tamil Eelam by Sri Lanka in 2009. Other
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examples of forced reintegration include Chechnya (1999), Serbian Krajina (Croatia)
(1995), Biafra (1970), and South Katanga (1963). Peaceful reintegration is also rare
(Anjouan 2008, Bougainville 1997, Gagauzia 1994, Republika Srpska (Bosnia and
Herzegovina) (1995)). Much of the existing literature argues that gaining independence
is very difficult for de facto states. But the empirical evidence suggests that graduating to
independence is as common as a military loss or a negotiated settlement. To date, five de
facto states have graduated to full independence (i.e., Eritrea 1993, East Timor 2002,
Montenegro 2006, Kosovo 2008, and South Sudan 2011).
The most common outcome for de facto states is a stalemate. That is, in most
cases de facto states maintain the status quo and are neither defeated nor induced into rejoining the parent state. Eiki Berg and Raul Toomla argue in favour of maintaining the
status quo when it comes to the question of de facto states. 113 They note that “the status
quo may offer various forms of normalisation even when legal recognition has not been
granted. Especially, when the political nature of the ‘recognition game’ leaves no space
for evolving opportunity structures and does not enable de facto states to legalize their
practices.” 114 Svante Cornell’s article dispels the long-held notion that autonomy can
mitigate ethnic tensions between a minority and its parent state.

Cornell’s article

examines the role of an autonomous framework in reducing conflict between Eurasia’s de
facto entities and the parent states. He concludes, “autonomy has been a source of
conflict and not a solution to it…secessionism is likely to be significantly higher among
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autonomous minorities than among nonautonomous minorities.”115
Berg and Toomla notwithstanding, much of the emerging literature overlooks the
idea of the status quo as a potential solution. This dissertation argues that de facto
statehood, or the status quo, is seen as a legitimate medium to long-term goal for some de
facto states. Given the international community’s reluctance to recognize these entities
and the parent state’s inability to forcibly reincorporate them back into the fold, it is not
unlikely that these entities may continue to function as de facto states.

Nagorno-

Karabakh, a de facto state in Azerbaijan, for example, has turned its focus away from
gaining recognition in favour of internal development. Its leadership believes that its de
facto “status is sustainable and can fulfill [its] goals of security and independence.”116
The case of Taiwan is also illustrative. Taiwan has functioned as a de facto state for four
decades with a functioning democracy and a strong economy. In a recent 2009 poll in
Taiwan, more than 60 percent of the population over 20 voted for maintaining the “status
quo.”117 Taiwan is not the only case in which the status quo is appealing. The Turkish
Republic of Northern Cyprus has functioned as a de facto state for over three decades,
while Iraqi Kurdistan, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh have done so for
over two decades. Under the right conditions, de facto statehood can provide stability for
the parent state and the neighbouring states.

For example, rather than pushing for

secession from Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan demanded that its autonomous status, or de facto
statehood, be entrenched in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. This has, to date, satisfied
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Kurdish demands for autonomy, Iraq’s desire to maintain its territorial integrity, and
Turkey and Iran’s need for stability in the region.

Liberal Theory of International Relations
Liberal theories in international relations stress the importance of institutions,
preferences, information, and the domestic political system in shaping and influencing
state behaviour. In fact, Andrew Moravcsik argues that preferences and interests are
more important than capabilities in explaining state behaviour. 118 Helen Milner, like
Moravcsik, emphasizes the role of institutions, preferences, and interests in influencing a
state’s foreign policy and shaping state interests. 119 Milner argues that the domestic
political system and the relationship between citizens and the state are more important
than the international structure of anarchy in shaping state behaviour. 120 She further
argues that states look for information and institutions to mitigate issues related to
anarchy. It should be noted that liberals (e.g., neoliberal institutionalists), although not
all, accept many of the fundamental ontological and epistemological assumptions of
neorealists regarding the primacy of the state and the presence of anarchy.

The

difference is that liberals believe institutions, preferences, material factors, and the
domestic political system to be important, particularly in mitigating the effects of
anarchy.
In addition to institutions, information, and domestic political pressures, liberals
also give attention to the effects of material factors on state behaviour. Although states
118
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are influenced by the anarchic system, institutions, information, and cooperation can
mitigate these effects. Given liberalism’s preference for institutions, domestic politics,
and ideas, states are not bound by the effects of anarchy and therefore possess more
latitude in their preference formation. According to liberalism, states pursue objectives
that are largely determined by domestic factors rather than the anarchic structure of the
international system. This does not mean that anarchy does not have any consequences
for states. Indeed, liberals argue that although state preferences are largely formed at the
domestic level, the pursuit of such preferences is constrained by the preferences and
actions of other competing states. The state is viewed as the aggregation of interests from
individuals and groups in society. A state’s interests, therefore, are not determined by its
place in the structure of the international system, but by the many interests and ideals of
the members who capture governmental institutions.121
Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi outline general liberal (what they call pluralism)
assumptions. First, nonstate actors play an important role in international relations. This
includes the role of international organizations (IO), nongovernmental organizations
(NGO), and multinational corporations (MNC).122 Second, the state is not a unitary actor.
Instead, it is comprised of various individuals, groups, and institutions that compete for
influence over the decision-making processes.

Third, the rationality of the state is

challenged by the competition of various individuals and groups at the domestic level.
The particular interests of domestic actors can shape and influence the state’s foreign
policy. Finally, the research agenda of pluralists goes beyond the major issues related to
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the military-security domain. 123

The assumptions outlined by Viotti and Kauppi

encompass the various strands of liberal theories in IR. I believe that these assumptions
and liberalism in general provide the best theory to explain the behaviour of Iraqi
Kurdistan and de facto states more generally.
In “Taking Preferences Seriously,” Andrew Moravcsik outlines a liberal theory
free from normative and ‘utopian’ ideals. Liberal theory of IR (hereinafter liberalism)
believes the relationship between the state and its domestic and international contexts has
a fundamental impact on its behaviour. 124 The ‘configuration of state preferences,’
according to liberals, matters most in world politics.125 Using this idea as the foundation,
Moravcsik’s article outlines ‘positive’ liberal assumptions that, like other IR theories,
will allow researchers to formulate hypotheses, provide explanations, and make
predictions.126 Moravcsik’s goal is to present a general and parsimonious liberal theory
that can be used to connect otherwise disparate issue areas. 127 Liberalism, he argues,
offers a distinct research program and it is progressive “in the sense of explaining a broad
and expanding domain” of empirical phenomena.128
Liberalism emphasizes the impact of domestic politics on a state’s behaviour at
the international level.

It argues that ideas and domestic interests and institutions

influence state behaviour by shaping state preferences. For liberals like Moravcsik, state
preferences matter more than state capabilities.129 Liberal theory’s basic premise is that
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“the relationship between states and the surrounding domestic and transnational society
in which they are embedded critically shapes state behaviour by influencing the social
purposes underlying state preferences.” 130 The state is not viewed as a unitary and
rational actor constantly at war; instead, liberals view the state as the aggregation of
interests from individuals and groups in society.131 Moravcsik defines ‘state preferences’
as “a set of fundamental interests defined across ‘states of the world.’” 132 He also
provides an important point of clarification regarding preference and strategy. He says
that
[I]t is essential to avoid conceptual confusion by keeping state ‘preferences’ distinct from
national ‘strategies’ that constitute the everyday currency of foreign policy. State
preferences, as the concept is employed here, comprise a set of fundamental interests
defined across ‘states of the world’.[…] By contrast, strategies and tactics are policy
options defined across intermediate political aims, as when governments declare an
‘interest’ in ‘maintaining the balance of power’, ‘containing’ or ‘appeasing’ an adversary,
exercising ‘global leadership’, or ‘maintaining imperial control’.133

State preferences are formed by the interaction of competing individuals and
groups at the domestic level, which in turn shapes state behaviour on the international
stage. To explain this process, Moravcsik presents three core assumptions connected to
the fundamental principle that “the relationship between states and the surrounding
domestic and transnational society in which they are embedded critically shapes state
behaviour by influencing the social purposes underlying state preferences.”

134

Assumption one asserts that, “the fundamental actors in international politics are
individuals and private groups, who are on the average rational and risk-averse and who
organize exchange and collective action to promote differentiated interests under
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constraints imposed by material scarcity, conflicting values, and variations in societal
influence.”135 This assumption presumes that the preference configuration of individuals
and societal groups occurs independently of politics and that there is competition as a
result of scarcity and differentiation. In addition, the assumption claims that because
individuals are on average risk-averse, “they strongly defend existing investments but
remain more cautious about assuming cost and risk in pursuit of new gains.”136 Some
individuals, of course, may be more risk tolerant.
Assumption two declares that, “states (or other political institutions) represent
some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define
state preferences and act purposively in world politics.”137 According to this assumption,
the state is an institution prone to capture by competing groups in society looking to
advance their particular interests. Such ‘societal pressures’ can formulate or alter ‘state
preferences.’138 Liberals view the state as a representative institution that is subject to
“capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social forces.”139
State preferences and action, therefore, are contingent on the preferences of “powerful
domestic groups enfranchised by representative institutions and practices.”140 Liberalism
prioritizes state-society relations as it examines the relationship between the government
and the individuals and groups that it represents or controls. State behaviour, according
to this belief, is a reflection of the relationship between the government, its citizens, and
the international system.141 According to the first two assumptions, state interests and
135
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preferences are not fixed, but instead determined by the social context.142
Assumption three says that, “the configuration of interdependent state preferences
determines state behavior.”143 Essentially, liberals believe that states pursue their policy
preferences under the constraints imposed by the preferences and behaviour of other
states. 144 Moravcsik uses the concept of ‘policy interdependence’ to explain the link
between state preferences and state behaviour. Policy interdependence is “the set of costs
and benefits created for foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek
to realize their preferences.”145 In short, liberals believe that state policies are largely
determined by the preferences governments establish.
This principle is often criticized for seemingly ignoring the international system
and for being a domestic level theory. Moravcsik dismisses these criticisms on two
grounds. First, liberalism accepts that state preferences are formulated in response to the
domestic and international contexts (i.e., it does not draw a firm line between domestic
and international levels of analysis). Second, the behaviour of any state reflects not only
its own preferences, “but the configuration of preferences of all states linked by patterns
of significant policy interdependence.” 146 States pursue their policies and preferences
under the constraints imposed by the preferences of other states.

For liberals the

variation in state preferences is privileged over capabilities and information.147
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Identifying Preferences
The concept of preferences is key to liberal theory. Jeffrey Frieden provides a strategy
for researching preferences and interests in world politics. In order to identify and assess
the role of preferences in state behaviour Frieden makes two suggestions.

First,

preferences must be kept separate from other factors, especially the “strategic setting” so
as not to confuse “between the causal role of actors’ interests and that of their
environment.” 148 Second, researchers must be explicit about how they determine the
preferences of actors. That is, preferences must be clearly identified as “variables of
interest or control variables.”149 Preferences are not tangible and therefore researchers
can never know the true motivations of actors. He says, “an actor prefers some outcomes
to

others

and

pursues

a strategy to

achieve its

most

preferred

possible

outcomes.”150 Frieden believes that researchers are more interested in how preferences
influence choices (i.e., preferences are examined for the behaviour they cause). Both
preferences and the environment shape an actor’s behaviour.151 An actor establishes its
preferences, and then formulates strategies according to the constraints presented by the
environment.152
Preferences can be identified by way of assumption, observation, and
deduction. Assumption is the simplest way to obtain an actor’s preferences. For
example, one can say that states look to maximize their welfare. Observation, or
induction, can take the form of studying an actor’s statements and actions to arrive at a
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conclusion regarding its preferences. Frieden is rather pessimistic about the utility of the
above two approaches. The third, and according to Frieden, the most effective method
for

identifying

preferences

is

through

deduction

or

by

using

existing

theory.153 Deduction, however, is hampered by the quality of the available theories. To
circumvent this shortcoming, Frieden suggests that researchers present their “own prior
theory of preferences, perhaps by analogy to some roughly similar problem.”154
This project will employ observation (induction) and deduction to identify Iraqi
Kurdistan’s preferences. First, the study will observe Iraqi Kurdistan’s policies and
rhetoric as a baseline for its preferences. There are ample primary resources such as
governmental documents, news material, and media interviews with Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) officials. Such information will shed light on the policy objectives
(and preferences) of the KRG. This will be complemented by interviews with KRG
representatives and other political and non-governmental officials in Iraqi Kurdistan. The
objective of the interviews is to obtain direct answers from policymakers and
governmental representatives of the KRG regarding its preferences and interests.
Second, the project will use liberal theory to identify Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences. By
examining the preferences and interests of powerful individuals and groups in the
Kurdish region one can determine how these actors will influence the preferences of the
de facto state. After all, the domestic political scene often shapes the state’s foreign
policy and preferences.
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Liberalism and the Origins of De Facto States
Liberal assumptions also help explain the origins of ethnic conflicts and de facto states.
Like states, ethnic groups cannot ignore institutions, interests, and the preferences of its
members. Instead of relying on the security dilemma or socially constructed ideas to
explain ethnic conflict and the origins of de facto states, liberalism emphasizes the
institutional demands and material interests of groups. That is, ethnic groups will often
engage in violence when they face an oppressive parent state and they do not possess the
political and economic institutions necessary for advancing their interests. Conflict
breaks out when the demands of ethnic groups are not met by the parent state. Contrary
to the prevailing view, ethnic groups seem to view violence as a last resort. For example,
the South Sudanese, Kosovars, and Kurds repeatedly requested political autonomy before
resorting to violence against the parent state. The appropriate political institutions and
economic incentives could have assuaged the grievances of these groups.
The central debate here is the way in which a group’s preference for
independence is constructed. Is the preference for independence fixed or is it a deliberate
decision taken based on rational interests? Whereas realists argue that the preference for
independence is fixed, liberals contend that material and institutional factors influence
actors’ preferences. According to Ashutosh Varshney, institutional explanations provide
the best explanation for ethnic conflict. 155 The basic institutional argument is that
political institutions play a significant role in either mitigating or causing ethnic
conflict. 156

Institutionalism argues that ethnically diverse societies require political

institutions that can manage the differences and mitigate tensions.
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That is, ethnic

pluralism requires political institutions that lessen tensions related to sharing political
power and economic resources. The crux of the argument is that there are clear links
between ethnic conflict or peace, on the one hand, and political institutions, on the other.
For example, Arend Lijphart argues that consociational power-sharing can reduce ethnic
conflict by instituting compromise between elites.157 Others, including Brendan O’Leary
and John McGarry, have argued that some form of federalism can mitigate ethnic conflict
and the demand for secession.158
Secession is defined as: “an attempt by an ethnic group claiming a homeland to
withdraw with its territory from the authority of a larger state of which it is a part.”159
Although there are cases of groups demanding full independence (e.g., Abkhazia and
South Ossetia in Georgia), there are also cases of groups demanding autonomy. One of
the reasons that autonomy is more desirable than secession is that secession is much more
difficult to achieve. One barrier to secession is the high costs associated with it. For
instance, Robert Young argues that seceding from an advanced industrial economy could
impose heavy economic costs on the secessionist entity.160 In such cases, secession is a
matter of costs and benefits and secession becomes unattractive when the government can
impose “large costs on citizens” (including those who want to secede) and “all citizens
and firms must be fearful of transition costs.” 161 It is also worth mentioning that
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independence is not the end-goal of all nationalist movements. Michael Keating notes
that independence is “only one possible outcome of the national claim and that there are
many other constitutional formulas that can accommodate it.”162 In its place, a number of
formulas have emerged, including autonomy and independence-lite, which maintain the
unity of the parent state.
Another impediment to secession is that the domestic and international traditional
paradigm in dealing with secessionist movements is governed by a “disapproval of
secession.” A possible explanation is that a lowered threshold for secession would
motivate an inordinate number of discontented minorities to seek independence.163 This
has two consequences. First, governments fear that they too could face the threat of
secession and therefore oppose unilateral secessions.

Second, recognizing unilateral

secessions would create international instability, particularly in view of the correlation
between secession and violence.164 Disapproval of secession is particularly strong when it
is unilateral; that is, without the consent of or an agreement with the parent state.165 The
disapproval against unilateral secession is highlighted by domestic and international laws,
which emphasize the indivisibility of state sovereignty. 166 Stéphane Dion notes that
although there is not an international law against unilateral secession, this does not
suggest that there is a “positive right to secession” that would compel governments to
accept or recognize a unilateral secession. 167 In addition to the domestic laws and
international norms against secession, Dion notes that states are “extremely reluctant” to
162
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recognize unilateral secession unless it falls under decolonization. 168

Given the

challenges associated with secession, it is not uncommon for ethnic groups to
request/demand political autonomy.
There are alternative political arrangements other than independence that can
settle the status of de facto states. This is supported by the empirical data. Liam
Anderson identifies three possible outcomes for de facto states: independence, forced
reintegration, and peaceful reintegration.169 A fourth possible resolution to de facto states,
largely overlooked by the literature, is the status quo, or continuing as a de facto state.170
Scott Pegg categorizes the status quo or the continuation of de facto statehood as a
solution for managing de facto states. He says, “one distinct possibility for these entities
is a continuation of the status quo.”171 The status quo is also implicitly outlined by Pal
Kolstø who suggests a federal arrangement with the parent state as a way for resolving
the conflict.172 Kolstø argues that a federal arrangement tends to foster the least tension
between the various factions. John McGarry, meanwhile, proposes “a negotiated re-entry
resulting in a decentralized federal system combined with consociational powersharing.”173
Others such as, Eiki Berg, argue that the federal structures put in place to preserve
a state, often encourages the “formation of territorial administrative structures which lack
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democratic governance and/or do not represent the will of sovereign people.”174 Martin
Dent counters Berg and calls for the decentralization of states that encompass a
region/group of people that wish for independent statehood. That is, secessionist groups
must be afforded with a ‘status’ that is something like statehood. He argues that “this
status must have something of the same discrete nature as independent statehood, it
cannot be just a bit more autonomy.”175 For instance, Dent argues against the breakup of
Iraq. Instead, he calls for a federal or ‘super-federal’ system, which, according to him, is
“entirely compatible with national unity.”176
Liberal theory’s assumptions about institutions, economic factors, and the
domestic political system provide valuable insights for understanding the origins and
behaviour of de facto states. De facto states often emerge as a result of the parent state’s
unwillingness to implement the institutional framework necessary to mollify a minority
group’s political and economic grievances. The institutional framework can take the
form of providing political representation (e.g., representation in the executive or
legislature of the state) where it did not exist previously, granting the minority with
political and economic rights previously denied, or adopting a federal system that
furnishes the minority with political and economic autonomy. Often times, federalism is
the most effective means for managing minority grievances. In fact, the groups from all
three cases under consideration here demanded autonomy and a federal framework from
the parent state as a precondition for maintaining the unity of the state. From the
perspective of the minorities, institutions such as federalism and a democratic
174

Eiki Berg, “Merging Together or Drifting Apart? Revisiting Political Legitimacy Issues in Cyprus,
Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Geopolitics Vol. 18, Iss. 2 (2013), 468.
175
Martin J. Dent, Identity Politics: Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence (Conrwall:
Ashgate, 2004), 17.
176
Ibid., 104.

64

constitution provide sufficient political and economic safeguards against an oppressive
central government. This notion is supported by the liberal assumption that institutions
can help attenuate actors’ apprehensions regarding cooperation with others.177

Liberalism and the Behaviour of De Facto States
According to liberal assumptions, actors’ preferences are neither predetermined nor fixed.
Instead, preferences are contingent on and shaped by economic interests, institutional
design, and domestic politics. Similarly, de facto state preferences are not fixed and as
with other actors, de facto states are influenced by economic interests, institutional
factors, and domestic political pressures. In addition, according to liberal theory, de facto
states behave in a rational way to advance their interests and preferences despite the
anarchic structure of the international system. That is to say, nationalism and the dream
of statehood will not compel de facto states to behave in a way that is counterproductive
to their interests and long-term objectives.

Under the right political and economic

conditions de facto states will cooperate with the parent state and shelve the goal of
independence. Liberals believe that, despite the presence of anarchy, cooperation in
international politics is possible under the right conditions.
Preferences are created by the interaction between economic interests,
institutional design, and domestic politics. First, de facto state preferences are shaped by
the potential economic costs of breaking away from the parent state. Independence is
less appealing if the economic costs associated with secession are too high. Conversely,
de facto states will consider a union with the parent state if there are economic incentives.
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Second, poor institutional design (both political and economic) can be a centrifugal force
that pushes the de facto state to demand independence. At the same time, effective
institutional design that considers and addresses the grievances of the de facto state can
reduce the likelihood that the de facto state will push for independence. Finally, de facto
states, like sovereign states, are constrained by the pressures from their domestic
constituencies. The political parties and governments of de facto states are not immune
to the feedback and pressures from the population. For example, many Kurdish officials
indicated that although their constituents desire Kurdish independence, their primary
concerns are economic development and security.
The point is that the domestic context matters, even for a de facto state. Kristin
Bakke et al. maintain that, in addition to the abovementioned reasons, de facto states
endure as a result of internal legitimacy. 178 They define internal legitimacy as both
regime legitimacy and the population’s approval of the state’s social order. 179 The latter
refers to the people’s belief that the de facto state is an independent entity from the host
state and the former refers to the people’s confidence in the government of the de facto
state.180 Bakke et al. find that “people’s concerns about the provision of public goods
such as democracy, economic development, and health services, are, in addition to
insecurity associated with criminal violence, important determinants for internal
legitimacy.”181 To gain legitimacy de facto states will often adopt democratic practices
and provide security for their population.
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recognition is one of the main priorities, de facto states attempt to establish democracy
and order to gain legitimacy not only domestically, but also internationally.182 In their
quest for independence, de facto states will emphasize the democratic institutions they
have built and the empirical statehood they have achieved.183
States require a certain measure of capabilities and power in order to protect and
advance their interests and preferences. Liberalism does not dismiss the importance of
power and capabilities as imperative assets for state security. After all, some de facto
states (e.g., Tamil Eelam and Chechnya) cannot survive without sufficient capabilities.
However, power and capabilities are not the only tools with which de facto states can
advance their interests and preferences. For example, South Sudan reached a negotiated
settlement with Khartoum and peacefully seceded from the rest of Sudan. Kosovo did
not possess the capabilities to militarily challenge Serbia, but it successfully seceded
from Serbia as a result of support from key international actors and powerful states.
These examples demonstrate that capabilities can matter, but they also show that de facto
states can secure their survival and advance their interests through institutions and
cooperation with the parent state or other member states of the international community.
Liberalism acknowledges the importance of structural constraints and the importance of
capabilities, but it also recognizes that agency plays role in an actor’s behaviour and
decision-making.
De facto state behaviour is a reflection of the interaction between domestic
pressures, economic interests, and political institutions. The case studies will demonstrate
that de facto states are willing to forgo independence if their economic and political
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demands are met by the parent state. Institutional frameworks such as autonomy, powersharing, and federalism can encourage otherwise secessionist groups to reconsider
independence. Economic interests also contribute to a de facto state’s behaviour vis-à-vis
the parent state and its decision regarding independence. The appropriate institutional
arrangement and economic incentives from such an arrangement can convince de facto
states to stay with the parent state. Finally, the governments of de facto states must, to
some degree, consider the demands and interests of its domestic population and groups.
De facto state political parties and governments cannot ignore the feedback from citizens,
elites, and other interest and societal groups.
These factors can facilitate cooperation between the de facto state and the parent
state to preserve the unity of the state. Democracy and its associated institutions are
significant in maintaining the unity of ethnically divided states.

Research has

demonstrated that secession from well-established democracies (i.e., states with “at least
ten consecutive years of universal suffrage”) is rare.184 The reason, according to Stéphane
Dion, is that well-established democracies are unlikely to engender fear in the union and
confidence in secession simultaneously. 185 Fear refers to a group’s concern for its
cultural, language, and economic and political situation in the union and confidence is a
group’s belief that it will be better off by seceding from the union.186
Cooperation does not imply a state of harmony, but rather a condition with
converging and diverging interests between states.187 Liberal explanations of cooperation
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rely on both the domestic and international level. At the domestic level, Helen Milner’s
work illustrates how domestic politics shape foreign policy and cooperation. Milner
outlines three factors that contribute to a state’s decision regarding international
cooperation: interests, institutions, and information. 188 Milner argues that the structure of
domestic politics – comprised of the interests of actors, the dominant institutional
arrangements, and the information possessed by actors – will determine whether or not
cooperation will emerge. This explanation provides a sounds basis for understanding the
behaviour of de facto states in relation to the parent state. Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad,
for example, have a cooperative, albeit at times discordant, political arrangement.
The liberal explanation underlines the importance of interests and institutions in
mitigating fears about cooperation. Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane identify three
factors that facilitate cooperation under anarchy. First, mutuality of interests (or payoff
structure) demonstrates that a convergence of preferences can lead to cooperation. 189
Second, the shadow of the future can promote cooperation with long time horizons, the
reliability of information about other actors, and quick feedback about in the other actors’
actions.190 Third, the number of actors can influence cooperation. It is easier to monitor
and sanction others if the number of actors is smaller.191 The decision to cooperate is not
always shaped by objective factors; actors’ expectations are an important consideration.
One way to attain cooperation is through institutions. International institutions
can solve the Prisoner’s Dilemma and the issues related to the three aforementioned
188
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factors. Robert Keohane has defined institutions as a “human-constructed arrangement,
formally or informally organized…with persistent and connected sets of rules, (formal or
informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations.”192
Institutions are characterized by rules that set expectations of its members and therefore
can reduce the uncertainties and risks associated with cooperation. Robert Keohane notes
that institutions and regimes reduce transaction costs and uncertainty and “tie
governments to the mast” by generating costs for reneging. Keohane argues that, “in
general, regimes make it more sensible to cooperate by lowering the likelihood of being
double-crossed.”193
A liberal lens will provide a more insightful understanding of the behaviour of de
facto states. By opening the ‘black box’ of the de facto states, we can identify the
sources of their preferences and in turn explain de facto state behaviour.

Such an

approach emphasizes the role of domestic politics, interests (i.e., economic), and
institutions.

The role of domestic politics is a valuable source of information for

understanding the behaviour of states and de facto states.

In addition, liberalism

considers the regional and international context. That is, a de facto state cannot pursue its
preferences without consideration for its environmental setting and without considering
the preferences of other states. Liberalism considers the domestic and international
spheres as inextricably linked and views states as transparent entities whose relations
with other states are shaped by its internal structure.194 Liberals tend to view individuals,
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groups, and other non-state actors as primary actors in the domestic and international
political arena. 195 As such these actors largely shape state behaviour through their
relationship with the governments representing them. Finally, a liberal account of de
facto state behaviour reveals that the preference for statehood is not fixed and instead
largely contingent on economic and material interests and domestic politics and
institutional design.

Criticisms of Liberalism
Liberalism is criticized for underestimating the influence of the international system,
eliminating the role of normative elements, and assuming actors have stable preferences
prior to politics. Christian Reus-Smit, for one, contends that the reformulation of liberal
theory in IR has “undermined its status as a political theory.”196 According to Reus-Smit,
the new liberalism has two weaknesses: “It expels normative reflection and argument
from the realm of legitimate social scientific inquiry; and it embraces a rationalist
conception of human agency that reduces all political action to strategic interaction.”197
Gerry Simpson offers two critique of Moravcsik’s liberalism. First, Simpson
questions Moravcsik’s notion that actors possess preferences ‘prior to politics’ (i.e.,
actors come to the table with predetermined interests).

These preferences are then

brought into the political arena where they face competition from the preferences of other
‘preconstituted’ actors. 198 Simpson asks whether there is a ‘feedback loop’ that may
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shape actors’ preferences.

Moravcsik agrees with the notion that individuals are

embedded in and influenced by the domestic and transnational society. Liberalism, as it
is used here, does not suggest that individuals and social groups are “unencumbered by
nation, community, family, [and] and other collective identities but only that these
identities enter the political realm when individuals and groups engage in political
exchange on the basis of them.”199
Second, ‘new’ liberalism understands state preferences to be shaped by the
interaction of domestic actors and such preferences “remain largely unmodified by the
operation of other actors in the international system.”200 A shift in a state’s preferences is
possible, but it occurs as a result of change at the domestic level. Simpson questions this
notion for demarcating the domestic and international levels as mutually exclusive. 201
Moravcsik’s liberalism clearly states that although state preferences are shaped by
domestic politics, this does not suggest that “each state simply pursues its ideal policy,
oblivious of others; instead, each state seeks to realize its distinctive preferences under
varying constraints imposed by the preferences of other states.”202 The notion of ‘policy
interdependence’ demonstrates that liberalism does not view the domestic and
international levels are mutually exclusive.203
Beate Jahn also criticizes Moravcsik for presenting a liberal IR theory that is
‘ideological.’

204

Moravcsik responds that critics, and Jahn in particular, have

199

Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 517 (Footnote 6).
Gerry Simpson, “The Ethics of New Liberalism,” 257.
201
Ibid.
202
Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously,” 520.
203
Moravcsik (page 520) defines policy interdependence as “the set of costs and benefits created for
foreign societies when dominant social groups in a society seek to realize their preferences, that is, the
pattern of transnational externalities resulting from attempts to pursue national distinctive purposes.”
204
Beate Jahn, “Liberal Internationalism: From Ideology to Empirical Theory – And Back again,”
International Theory Vol. 1, No. 3 (2009): 409-438.

200

72

misinterpreted the theory. He clarifies that “variation in ‘preferences’ is the fundamental
cause of state behaviour in world politics.” 205 He further notes that whereas realism
stresses resources and an anarchic structure and institutionalism stresses information and
transaction costs, liberalism identifies the variation in state preferences as a fundamental
feature of international relations.206
Despite the criticisms, I believe liberalism is appropriate for identifying the
origins and explaining the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan (IK), Kosovo, and South Sudan.
In order to understand the behaviour of these entities, one has to identify and observe
their preferences. In particular, liberalism’s focus on the role of individuals and groups,
the importance of domestic politics, and the international context will allow for a
systematic and thorough explanation of the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo, and
South Sudan. Liberalism’s broad approach to international politics and state behaviour
and preferences is particularly advantageous because it does not constrain the researcher
to a single variable or actor. With liberalism, researchers have the ability to examine the
role of individuals, groups, and the domestic and international contexts.
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Chapter 3:

Kosovo

The existing literature tends to take a realist approach when explaining the behaviour of
de facto states. This is particularly the case on the issues of survival and independence.
The existing literature contends that all de facto states want to survive and to secure
independence from the parent state. In short, the literature assumes that all de facto states
always want independence. At the same time, the parent state attempts to reassert its
authority over the de facto entity. The potential outcomes of de facto states, therefore,
are limited to secession or reintegration into the parent state. This project asks if there are
conditions under which de facto states may forgo independence in favour of the status
quo. In the case of Kosovo, we know that it moved forward with a unilateral declaration
of independence (UDI) in 2008. What we do not understand is why Kosovo did not
accept a political arrangement short of independence. That is, why did Kosovo rebuff
Serbia’s proposal for an arrangement that would have furnished Kosovo with significant
autonomy? The conventional wisdom argues that the goal of independence in itself is
sufficient for explaining the decision-making of de facto states in general and Kosovo in
particular. Such an explanation is informed by the core assumptions and concepts of
realist theory.
While providing strong insights, realism does not adequately explain the
behaviour of Kosovo. After all, Kosovo did not always demand independence. Indeed, it
was willing to participate in a federation with Serbia until the mid-1990s following
decades of political and social oppression. This chapter argues that the independence of
Kosovo was not inevitable and that, rather than the security dilemma, greater explanatory
emphasis must be placed on the failure of Serbia to offer sufficient political autonomy
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and economic incentives as well as on the role of the international community in
supporting Kosovo’s bid for independence.

In other words, Serbia was unable to

persuade Kosovo to accept a federal framework within a united Serbia. The argument is
grounded in liberal theory and its emphasis on institutions, material factors, and the role
of regional and international geopolitics provides a more complete explanation for the
behaviour of Kosovo’s UDI.
The case of Kosovo presents interesting comparative insights into the behaviour
of de facto states. Kosovo is a landlocked territory with weak political institutions and
few economic prospects and yet, despite weak capabilities, it unilaterally declared
independence in 2008. This raises questions about the motivations behind Kosovo’s
decision to declare independence despite its weaknesses and the challenges associated
with independence. Specifically, what explains Kosovo’s decision to declare
independence when it does not possess the institutional or economic capacity to function
as an effective state? This question becomes more interesting when Kosovo is compared
to the case of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Unlike Kosovo, Iraqi Kurdistan possesses strong

institutional capacity, including an effective government and judiciary, and a booming
economy that boasts vast natural resources. In other words, Iraqi Kurdistan possesses the
wherewithal to function as an independent state, yet it has not declared independence.
Kosovo’s decision will be explained by examining the role of political institutions,
economic factors, and the domestic and international factors in shaping de facto state
behaviour and decision-making.
Kosovo is an example of a de facto state that was established following an
international intervention by the UN, the EU, and NATO against an aggressive parent
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state. The international community hoped to resolve the increasingly violent dispute
between the Kosovar Albanians, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and Serbia in the
late 1990s.207 In 1999, the international community presented Serbian President Slobodan
Milošević with an ultimatum: to evacuate his forces from Kosovo or face NATO military
forces. 208 Despite international pressure, Milošević refused to accept the terms of a
negotiated settlement.

NATO responded to Serbia’s incursion into Kosovo with a

bombing campaign and subsequently passed Resolution 1244, which established a joint
body – the Kosovo Force (KFOR), responsible for maintaining peace and the UN
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), responsible for the civilian administration of Kosovo.209
Negotiations over the future status of Kosovo between the European Union, the
United States, and Russia followed these events. It was revealed in February 2007 that
Serbia would be willing to concede significant autonomy to Kosovo. 210

Such an

arrangement would have provided Kosovo with a high degree of autonomy under the
framework of a federal Serbian state. It meant that the Assembly of Kosovo could
govern the province autonomously, but Belgrade would reserve the right to oversee
foreign and defence policy. 211 Kosovo refused this offer.

Kosovo’s refusal for a

negotiated settlement demonstrates that it was unwilling to accept any arrangement short
of complete independence. 212

Kosovo’s political leadership identified the lack of

207

Iain King and Whit Mason, Peace at any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (London: Hurst and
Company, 2006), 41-44.
208
Leon Malazogu, “When Doves Support War and Hawks Oppose It: An Analysis of Humanitarian
Intervention in Kosova,” in Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo
(London: Frank Cass, 2003), 129-132.
209
Ibid.
210
International Crisis Group, “Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Peace.” Europe Report No. 188
(Brussels, 6 December 2007), 8.
211
Ibid., 10.
212
International Crisis Group, “Kosovo Countdown,” 10.

76

mutually acceptable terms for its unwillingness to continue with a political arrangement
in Serbia.
The case of Kosovo and its unilateral declaration of independence divided the
international community on the issues of international law and secession. As of January
2014, over 100 UN member states have conferred recognition, but over 80 UN member
states refuse to recognize Kosovo. Many states (e.g., Cyprus, Argentina, Spain, Greece,
and Singapore) fear that Kosovo’s secession and recognition could set a dangerous
precedent for future secessions, especially their own secessionist groups. Others (e.g.,
Brazil, Vietnam, China, and Russia) have cited the principle of territorial integrity and the
breach of international law for their unwillingness to recognize Kosovo. States that
conferred recognition argued that Kosovo was a unique case and therefore it does not
establish a precedent for future secessions. It is said that Kosovo’s secession is justified
based on its unique historical trajectory and the human rights violations it suffered.
This chapter will explore the case of Kosovo and is outlined as follows. The first
section will present a brief account of the early and modern historical relationship
between the Kosovar Albanians and Serbia and the political context in which this
relationship has evolved. The historical account will highlight the main reasons for the
conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. The remainder of the chapter will focus on the
origins and behaviour of Kosovo. The second section will trace Kosovo’s emergence as a
de facto state. In particular, it will attempt to identify Kosovo’s preferences prior to de
facto statehood in order to demonstrate that the appropriate political institutions and
economic incentives could have resolved the conflict between Kosovo and Serbia. The
third section will examine Kosovo’s evolution as a de facto state with a particular focus
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on its bid for independence and behaviour post-de facto statehood. This section will
examine Kosovo’s behaviour and will offer an explanation for Kosovo’s decision to
declare independence. The fourth section will examine the Kosovo-Serbia relationship
post-2008 following Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.

Kosovo’s Early History
Kosovar Albanians trace their ancestry to the ancient Illyrian tribes who inhabited
Kosovo before the arrival of the Serbs.213

This is one of the ways in which Kosovar

Albanians make the claim to modern day Kosovo. Miranda Vickers notes that the
Serbian medieval empire, which included Kosovo, absorbed much of the Albanian
population and many converted to Serbian Orthodox and in fact Albanians and Serbs
were united in the battle against the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth century. The
‘Battle of Kosovo’ in 1389 signalled the decline of the Serbian kingdom and, more
importantly, paved the way for Ottoman expansion into the Balkan region.214 The Battle
of Kosovo is a symbol of Serbian identity under threat; one that is often used by Serbian
nationalists to mobilize against the breakup of Serbia.215 Kosovo is significant for Serbia
given its history as the ‘cradle of Serbia’ and due to the presence of the Serbian Orthodox
Church in Kosovo.216
The Ottomans controlled Kosovo from the fifteenth until the twentieth century
and in the process altered the religious and the demographic makeup of Kosovo in favour
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of the Albanian population.217 This outcome, argue Vjeran Pavlakovic and Sabrina Petra
Ramet, resulted in competing claims for Kosovo: The Serbs presented a historical claim
to the territory, while the Albanians pointed to their majority and the reality on the
ground.218 A significant number of Serbs, estimated at 185,000, migrated to the north into
Serbia proper – a move that significantly reduced the Serbian population in Kosovo.219
This is one of the explanations for the majority Albanian population in Kosovo.
The demographics shifted again in the late nineteenth century with the arrival of
approximately 155,000 Albanians in Kosovo.220 This issue became significant when the
Ottoman Empire was defeated and Kosovo fell under Serbian rule.221 James Ker-Lindsay
notes that despite the historical claims from both sides that date back centuries, the
contemporary conflict between the Albanian Kosovars and Serbia can be traced back to
the early twentieth century.222 Kosovo remained under Serbian rule following the end of
World War I and the creation of Yugoslavia in 1929.223 By the end of World War II
(WWII), the Albanian population viewed Kosovo as its native homeland and its proper
place was with greater Albania.224
In 1939 Mussolini’s Italy invaded and captured significant territory to form
Greater Albania, which included Kosovo and western Macedonia. During this short
period (1939-1943), large numbers of Albanians settled in Kosovo, while the Serbian
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population was forcibly expelled from their homes further widening the demographic
disparity.225 According to Serbian officials and nationalists, tens of thousands of Serbs
were expelled from Kosovo during the 1940s. 226 Italy’s capitulation in 1943 led to the
collapse of Greater Albania and paved the way for the emergence of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) under Josip Broz Tito. In 1945, Kosovo became a
constituent of the SFRY and was recognized as an autonomous region, a position the
Albanian Kosovars found unacceptable. They believed that Kosovo ought to possess the
same degree of sovereignty as the six republics that constituted SFRY.
In addition, while the six republics constituted Yugoslavia’s official nations, the
Kosovar Albanians were viewed as a minority. 227 This unequal status prompted the
Kosovars to request recognition as a nation equal to the other republics throughout the
1950s.228 These appeals were rejected on the grounds that republic status would pave the
way for Kosovo to secede from Yugoslavia to join neighbouring Albanian.229 Not all
Kosovar Albanians desired a union with Albania, however, as many demanded
independence for Kosovo. 230 From the early 1960s until the constitution of 1974,
Yugoslavia underwent political reforms that provided the republics with increased
sovereignty. While Kosovo was granted more autonomy; its demands for republic status
were ignored.231 Extended autonomy was insufficient from Kosovo’s perspective as it did
not include the right to self-determination and it did little to improve Kosovo’s poor
225
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economic position.232 As a result, Kosovo’s political and economic grievances intensified
beginning in the 1980s with the death of Tito.

The Origins of Kosovo as a De Facto State
Preferences
This section will outline the emergence of Kosovo’s preference for independence and
will demonstrate that meeting Kosovo’s autonomy requests (i.e., republic status) could
have moderated its demands for independence. Granting republic status to Kosovo could
have reduced political tensions and the likelihood of violence between the Kosovars and
Serbia. Throughout the 1980s, Kosovo requested republic status to protect its political
and economic interests against an increasingly hostile central government in Belgrade.
Rather than accommodating Kosovo’s requests, Serbia repealed Kosovo’s constitutional
autonomous status and thereby pushed Kosovo to demand independence.
One of the main consequences of the instability brought on by Tito’s death in
1980 was the rise of Albanian nationalism and the backlash against the Serb population in
Kosovo. The ethnic tensions forced many Serbs in Kosovo to leave and resettle in Serbia
proper. This once again dramatically altered Kosovo’s demographics in favour of the
Albanian population.233 Whereas the Albanian proportion of Kosovo’s population soared
from 67 percent in 1967 to 84 percent in 1991, the Serb population decreased from 27
percent to 10 percent during the same period.234 The demographic shift, according to
Lazslo Gulyas, was distressing to Belgrade and fuelled its fear of the disintegration of
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Serbia.235 Serbian fear and Kosovo’s demands for more political rights, including the
right to self-determination, set the stage for the conflict between the Kosovar Albanians
and Belgrade.
Kosovo’s increased demands for autonomy and republic status began with student
demonstrations in 1981. 236 A contributing factor to the unrest in Kosovo was the
increasingly worsening economic conditions of Kosovar Albanians who viewed federal
officials as the reasons for Kosovo’s poor economic performance.237 The protests were
initially conducted by students demanding improved conditions at the universities, but
soon included other groups such as miners, teachers, and civil servants. 238 When the
protests turned violent, the federal government declared a state of emergency and arrested
suspected leaders.239 The root cause of the conflict, including the protests of 1981, was
that Kosovo did not believe it possessed the recognition and political status that it desired
and deserved.

According to Julie Mertus, the demonstrations were initiated by an

educated group of Kosovo Albanians which demanded greater political autonomy for
Kosovo.240 The main grievance was Belgrade’s unwillingness to bestow republic status
on Kosovo.241 Dennison Rusinow notes that Serbia feared that recognizing Kosovo as a
republic would set a precedent for the other federal units and would ultimately lead to the
collapse of the federation.242
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Kosovo’s increased resistance, protests, and demands for republic status and, at
times, independence only heightened Serbian insecurity about its position in the
confederation and its territorial integrity.
should not be understated.

Kosovo’s historical significance to Serbia

After all, Serbians fervently believe that Kosovo has

historically been Serbian land and must remain so.

Serbia’s president, Slobodan

Milošević, exploited the historical beliefs and the political crisis in the former Yugoslavia
to fuel Serbian nationalism by arguing that Serbia deserved more power within
Yugoslavia.243 Academics generally agree that Milošević was a political opportunist who
exploited the Kosovo issue for his personal power.244
Political and ethnic tensions between Kosovar Albanians and Serbs increased
from the mid-1980s to the late 1980s. The Albanian population was accused of using
terror tactics, including murder, rape, and the desecration of Serbian churches and
cemeteries to drive out the Serbian population from Kosovo.245 In addition, the Kosovar
Albanians targeted Yugoslav administration and Serbian officials as retaliation for
Serbia’s repression against Kosovo. In response to the violence, Serbia, under Milošević,
continued policies that Kosovar Albanians viewed as oppressive and intended to weaken
Kosovo’s autonomy.

Beginning in the late 1980s, Slobodan Milošević replaced

Kosovo’s provincial leadership with his own representatives, undertook reforms that
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rescinded Kosovo’s right to pass legislation, and finally in 1990, placed Kosovo directly
under Serbian rule.246 In effect, Kosovo’s autonomy was constitutionally abolished by
Serbia in 1989.247 Miranda Vickers notes that this measure was accompanied by “strong
police and legal repression by the Serbian state” as well as Serbian oversight of political
and economic decisions in Kosovo. 248 Instead of furnishing Kosovo with political
autonomy and economic development, Belgrade under Milošević imposed further
centralization and thereby pushed Kosovo to either accept its position or respond in some
way.249
Kosovo responded to Serbia’s policies by shifting its preference from autonomy
to independence. This is evidenced by the emergence of the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK or Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës in Albanian). Founded in 1989 as a
Pan-Albanian nationalist movement, the LDK initially called for ‘full’ autonomy for
Kosovo and by 1990 demanded equal status to the other republics.250 The leader of the
LDK, Ibrahim Rugova, was a former Paris-trained academic and Gandhi-like figure to
the Kosovar population for his unrelenting but peaceful efforts to secure Kosovo’s
independence.251 He would become the first president of Kosovo from 1992 to 2000 and
again from 2002 to 2006. As a Kosovar nationalist and political leader, Rugova sought to

246

Sabrina P. Ramet, Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, Second Edition
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 78.
247
Heribert Franz Koeck, Daniela Horn and Franz Leidenmuehler, From Protectorate to Statehood: SelfDetermination v. Territorial Integrity in the Case of Kosovo and the Position of the European Union
(Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009), 36.
248
Miranda Vickers, Between Serb and Albanian, 235.
249
Ibid., 241.
250
Aydin Babuna, “The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia,” 76.
251
David L. Phillips, “Comprehensive Peace in the Balkans: The Kosovo Question,” Human Rights
Quarterly Vol. 18, No. 4 (1996), 823.

84

establish ties with Western Europe and the US and established a non-violent movement to
achieve Kosovo’s independence.252
Rugova and other Kosovo political leaders, including elected officials in
Kosovo’s provincial assembly, responded to Serbian policies by unilaterally declaring
Kosovo a republic within Yugoslavia (separate from Serbia but still a constituent of
Yugoslavia) in 1990. 253 In a subsequent referendum on the issue of sovereignty and
independence over 99 per cent of voters supported independence.254 This was followed
by the 1991 declaration of independence by Kosovo’s parliament from Serbia, a move
that was rejected by Serbia and Belgrade.255 All of this was unfolded in the midst of
Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991. Following the secession of Croatia, Macedonia,
Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
collapsed and was succeeded by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (renamed SerbiaMontenegro in 2003). Even the new republic, formed by Serbia and Montenegro, refused
to recognize Kosovo’s former autonomous status.256
In 1992, Kosovo organized and held parliamentary and presidential elections and
under the leadership of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), it began to establish its
own political and social institutions. 257

Kosovo’s attempt at independence went
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unrecognized by the international community, however, as it required Serbia’s
cooperation for resolving the Balkan wars and the EU did not want to further destabilize
the Balkans by recognizing Kosovo’s independence.258 Despite being rebuffed by the
international community, the Kosovar Albanians began to view independence as the only
viable solution.259 The disintegration of Yugoslavia further heightened Serbia’s unease
and, at the same time, intensified Kosovo’s desire to follow the path of Croatia,
Macedonia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina towards independence. In response to the
deteriorating situation in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, an ‘International Contact Group’
(comprising the US, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, and the UK) was established to
manage the disintegration of the republic. This same Contact Group would later mediate
the final status negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia between 2004 and 2008.
Despite the violence and unrest in the Balkans, the situation in Kosovo and Serbia
was largely contained in the early 1990s. There are perhaps two reasons for peace in
Kosovo at a time when war was raging in most of Yugoslavia. First, Serbia was far too
strong militarily for Kosovo to mount an effective challenge. Kosovo did not possess the
military capabilities to seriously challenge the Serbian military. Second, as mentioned
above, the Kosovars were inspired by the notion of democracy and peaceful resistance
taking hold of Eastern Europe at the time and in particular Poland’s Solidarity
movement. 260 As a result, Kosovo’s political parties, led by the LDK, adopted nonviolence as a means for achieving their political objectives.261
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The peace did not last, however. The Dayton Accords, signed in 1995, ended the
war in Bosnia, but ignored Kosovo’s demands for a political resolution. Many Kosovar
Albanians viewed this as unacceptable and did not believe that the status quo (i.e.,
Serbian oppression) could be overcome with Rugova’s peaceful approach. James KerLindsay suggests that Kosovo resorted to violence in part to highlight the international
community’s unwillingness to consider its call for statehood in the early 1990s.262 By the
mid-1990s, therefore, ethnic and political tensions turned violent in Kosovo and sparked
the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or Ushtria çlirimtare e Kosovës,
UÇK in Albanian). 263 In 1996, the KLA attacked Serbian security forces stationed in
Kosovo and sparked the onset of violence between Kosovo and Serbia.
The fragile peace was broken largely because many Kosovar Albanians no longer
believed that peaceful resistance could work and therefore supported the KLA, while
neighbouring Albania also supported and encouraged Kosovar Albanians to resist against
Serbia. Two additional factors contributed to the KLA’s emergence and its use of
violence. First, Serbia’s oppressive policies in Kosovo radicalized and forced many
Kosovar Albanians to seek refuge in European countries where they formed organizations
to resists Serbia’s policies.264 Many of these individuals did not believe that peaceful
resistance could work. 265

Second, the ability of the refugees to form anti-Serbia

organizations was largely unimpeded in Western Europe where they enjoyed the freedom
of expression and association.266
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The KLA escalated its activities in 1998 as a response to the killing of Adem
Jashari and his clan by Serbian police.267 Jashari was a founding member of the KLA and
a popular figure amongst the Kosovar Albanians. The killing of Jashari and his family
incited the Kosovar Albanians to support the KLA and led to backlash from the
international community.268 Serbian retaliation against the KLA’s activities only served
to rally and unite the Kosovar population to bolster its support for the KLA and its violent
tactics.269 The KLA’s strategy was to gain support from the Kosovar Albanians and to
draw international attention to Kosovo by inciting military action from Serbia. The
effectiveness of the KLA, according to Elena Pokalova, was that the international
community viewed it as a “legitimate representative of the Kosovo Albanians,” rather
than a terrorist organization.270 James Pettifer supports this notion. Pettifer describes the
KLA as rather unsuccessful as a fighting force, but highly skilful and savvy political
strategists.271
One of the primary aims of the KLA was to lobby the West to intervene in the war
between the Kosovars and Serbia. The political and ethnic tensions quickly turned into
military confrontations. Following attacks from the KLA, the Serbian army retaliated by
launching attacks against Kosovar civilians and in one particular incident the Serbs

267

Aleksandar Pavkovic, “Seceding by force of Arms: Chechnya and Kosovo,” 103.
Cathie Carmichael, “Brothers, Strangers and Enemies: Ethno-nationalism and the Demise of Communist
Yugoslavia,” in Dan Stone (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Postwar European History (Oxford University
Press, 2012), 55.
269
Julie A. Mertus, Kosovo, 308-309. Mertus estimates that between 300,000 and 500,000 Kosovars were
displaced in 1998.
270
Elena Pokalova, “Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo,” Studies in Conflict &
Terrorism Vol. 33, No. 5 (2010), 443.
271
James Pettifer, The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency, 1948-2001
(Columbia University Press, 2012).

268

88

launched attacks against several villages killing 80, many of whom were civilians.272 The
war between the KLA and Serbian authorities was marred by accusations of ethnic
cleansing by the Serbian forces against the Kosovar population.273 Serbia’s error in its
fight against the KLA, argues Henry Perritt, was the ethnic cleansing against the
Kosovars. 274 Some political parties within Serbia voiced their willingness to provide
Kosovo with extensive rights and even autonomy, but Slobodan Milošević was unwilling
to make such concessions to Kosovo. As Miranda Vickers notes, “Milošević’s central
aim was to avoid really weakening Serbia and the federation through either serious
autonomy or independence.”275
On the international front, in 1998 the UN passed resolution 1160, which stated
that the Kosovo conflict posed a threat to international peace and security and condemned
both sides for their use of violence. 276 This move was followed by NATO’s call for
Kosovo’s autonomy and the cessation of violence. While much of the international
community’s focus was turned to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the situation in Kosovo
continued to deteriorate to the point where Kosovo accused the Serbian military of
massive human rights violations and war crimes.
The growing civilian casualties (and in particular the Račak massacre of 1999)
and a large-scale refugee exodus prompted a response from the international
community.277 Key EU members and the US held the Rambouillet Conference, which
resulted in the Rambouillet Agreement signed in 1999 by the UK, the US, and Albania,
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but did not include Russia or Serbia. Under the framework of the accords, Kosovo would
become a NATO-administered province within Serbia. Milošević and Belgrade rejected
the proposal as a violation of Serbia’s territorial integrity and instead called for the
presence of unarmed UN observers. 278 Serbia’s refusal to accept the NATO mandate
prompted military action to end the war between the KLA and Serbian forces. The goal
of the three-month NATO campaign was to expel Serbian forces from Kosovo and bring
in international peacekeepers. The end of the bombing campaign brought with it UN
Security Council Resolution 1244, which established a joint body – the Kosovo Force
(KFOR) and UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), to maintain peace in the province.279
Resolution 1244, passed in 1999, effectively suspended Serbian administration in
Kosovo in favour of the internationally mandated UNMIK and KFOR. Resolution 1244
included a clause outlining the long-term resolution of Kosovo’s status. The resolution
was also contradictory as it simultaneously supported Kosovo’s right to selfdetermination while calling for the preservation of Serbia’s sovereignty.280 Russia and
Serbia argued that Kosovo’s secession would be a violation of both international law and
Resolution 1244, which called for Kosovo’s autonomy and self-determination but not
independence.281 Kosovo, on the other hand, argued that Serbia had forfeited its right to
sovereignty over Kosovo by systematically directing violence against the civilian
population. In addition, the proponents of independence argued that Resolution 1244 and
its calls for autonomy and self-determination referred to the interim arrangements
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following Serbia’s expulsion from Kosovo and not the future status of Kosovo.282 From
1999 to 2008 there was little progress regarding the status of Kosovo and instead, during
that period, both sides became further entrenched in their respective positions.283
Similar to South Sudan and Iraqi Kurdistan, Kosovo’s early and modern history
has been characterized by political conflict and, occasionally, violence with the parent
state. The political conflict mainly revolved around Kosovo’s demands for republic
status. From the 1960 to the 1980s, Serbia refused to grant Kosovo the autonomy it
desired and indeed undertook policies to rescind the existing political autonomy Kosovo
possessed. Republic status, from Kosovo’s perspective, was essential for Kosovar
Albanian security, the preservation of its language and culture, and political recognition
to which it was entitled. Belgrade’s behaviour during this period demonstrated to Kosovo
that increased autonomy was necessary to check Serbia’s increasingly oppressive policies
and tendencies. Even after the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1991, academics have noted that
Kosovar Albanians were willing to accept autonomous status as coequals along with
Serbia and Montenegro until the mid-1990s.284 However, the preference for autonomy
shifted to independence in 1996. The emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)
and the onset of large-scale violence in 1996 marked the point of no return for Kosovo.
As of 1996, therefore, Kosovo would not settle for anything short of independence.285
What explains Kosovo’s desire for independence? Realist assumptions argue that
Kosovo’s desire for independence can be best explained by examining the security
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dilemma that emerged in the Balkans following the collapse of Yugoslavia. The common
security no longer existed and each group in the former Yugoslavia became responsible
for its own security. Self-help and the security dilemma compelled each ethnic group to
mobilize militarily in order to provide security against potential threats. Furthermore, the
independence of former Yugoslav republics, including Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia,
demonstrated to Kosovo that the best form of security is independence. Independence,
therefore, is a fixed preference that derives from the structure of anarchy, self-help, and
survival. These realist assumptions provide strong insights into the preferences and
behaviour of Kosovo, yet they are incomplete. In addition to concerns over security,
Kosovo’s preferences were shaped by Serbia’s unwillingness to adopt the appropriate
political institutions and its poor economic development.
Constructivists also provide some insights into the preferences and emergence of
Kosovo. In particular, the constructivist notion that ethnic identity and violence are not
predetermined, but rather tools employed by ethnic entrepreneurs for political or
economic ends. As mentioned earlier, Slobodan Milošević is described as an ethnic
entrepreneur who used the idea of Serbian nationalism for his own political ends and to
expand Serbia’s powers. Kosovar leaders also exploited Kosovo’s ethnic identity for
political ends and used violence as a strategy to garner support for independence. The
onset of ethnic violence in the 1990s was not a result of fixed and enduring ethnic
differences, but rather produced by certain actors with political and/or economic
objectives.
Liberalism provides perhaps the most compelling explanation for the emergence
and behaviour of Kosovo until 1999. The historical narrative demonstrates that Serbia
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rebuffed Kosovo’s decades-long request for republic status and in fact rescinded
Kosovo’s autonomous status in 1989. Yugoslavia’s flawed political institutions and
nonexistent economic incentives compelled Kosovo to intensify its demands. In addition,
the role of agency was important in shaping Kosovo’s preference for independence.
Specifically, domestic groups in Kosovo, the LDK and Rugova and the KLA, promoted
independence as a viable option for Kosovo. From the early to the mid-1990s Kosovar
Albanians largely supported a peaceful approach to the resolution of the conflict. It is
possible that Kosovo would have accepted an autonomous framework until the mid1990s. The emergence of the KLA in 1996, however, dramatically altered the domestic
landscape in Kosovo. The KLA persuaded Kosovar Albanians to support a militant
approach to the conflict with Serbia. Serbia’s unwillingness to provide Kosovo with
political autonomy pushed the Kosovar Albanians to demand independence.

Capabilities
The military intervention by the international community established a de facto state in
Kosovo in 1999. Kosovo possessed limited capabilities in the mid to late 1990s with the
emergence and growth of the KLA. Such capabilities, however, were insufficient for
mounting an effective military challenge against a larger and superior Yugoslav army
(comprised of Serbia and Montenegro). Much like the Iraqi Kurds in 1991, Kosovo was
the beneficiary of an international intervention that removed the Serbian military threat
and created a de facto state in Kosovo. Following the international intervention in 1999,
Kosovo fulfilled all the criteria of de facto statehood as defined in this project. Recall
that a de facto state controls a defined territory, provides an array of services to the
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population, and enters into diplomatic and economic relations with other states, but it
does not possess de jure recognition. Although Kosovo was under the administration of
UNMIK, it also held elections for the Kosovo Assembly and formed a unity government
to oversee Kosovo.
Although Kosovo did not possess the internal capabilities to achieve de facto
statehood and independence, it was successful at building international support from the
EU, the UN, and NATO.

The actions and agency of the KLA garnered sufficient

international support to establish a de facto state but not independence. Despite this
perceived failure, the international administration allowed Kosovo to build and
administer political and economic institutions that would ultimately serve as the
foundations for an independent Kosovo.

In addition, the presence of international

organisations prevented Serbia from taking any political or military action against
Kosovo.

These events lend support to the realist assumption that capabilities are

important. Without capabilities – albeit in the form of support from the international
community – Kosovo could not have established a de facto state in 1999.
Realism provides a strong explanation for this period of Kosovo’s history.
Kosovo’s behaviour and preferences were largely dictated by security imperatives and
capabilities. As Barry Posen and Chaim Kauffmann would argue, the security dilemma
in the Balkan region compelled Kosovo to strengthen its military capabilities in the face
of the Serbian threat. With limited military capabilities, Kosovo, and in particular the
KLA, petitioned the international community for support.

In doing so, Kosovo’s

capabilities were substantially bolstered when the US and the UN responded by providing
it with military backing against Serbia.

Capabilities, therefore, were significant for
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establishing a de facto state in Kosovo. Constructivism, meanwhile, argues that notions
of security dilemma are largely a result of the interaction between actors and not a
product of anarchy or self-help. Kosovo’s preference for independence, therefore, was
shaped by Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia and neighbouring groups that successfully
achieved independence.

The Behaviour of Kosovo
Preferences
Kosovo’s decision to pursue independence since 1996, and especially post-1999, is partly
explained by the agency of the leadership, including Ibrahim Rugova and the KLA. The
Kosovar leadership overwhelmingly preferred independence to de facto statehood or a
federal arrangement with Serbia following repeated breaches of trust on the part of
Belgrade. In a 2000 interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, Rugova indicated
that Kosovo would not settle for a political arrangement short of independence and that
Resolution 1244 did not prohibit Kosovo’s independence. He said: “In it [Resolution
1244], the independence of Kosovo is not excluded. The door to this remains open.
Anything other than independence is inconceivable for us.”286 When asked how Kosovo
would respond if the international community preserved the territorial integrity of
Yugoslavia with Kosovo as an autonomous province, Rugova replied that “there will be
another war. All of us, the entire population of Kosovo, will go take up arms.”287 It is
clear that Kosovo’s political leadership now viewed independence as the ultimate goal.
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This preference is largely a reflection of the flawed political institutions created
by Serbia, which, from the Kosovar Albanian perspective, were created to oppress
Kosovo. In addition, Kosovo’s political and economic requests were not met by Serbia.
The combination of these factors coalesced and encouraged Kosovo to demand
independence. Once this preference was set, there was no turning back despite Serbia’s
newfound efforts to persuade Kosovo with significant autonomy. Kosovo received few
economic benefits from the union with Serbia and its requests for economic development
were ignored for decades.

As a result, seceding from Serbia would not pose any

economic costs to Kosovo and its economic viability did not depend on Serbia.
Kosovo’s preferences following its de facto status were also shaped by the
international community’s tacit support for its independence bid. Academics have
demonstrated that the international community’s willingness to provide Kosovo with
military and political support encouraged Kosovo to insist on secession from Serbia.
Spyros Economides, for one, argues that the decision of the international community to
intervene in Kosovo and establish a protectorate region helps to explain Kosovo’s
intransigence on the independence issue. 288 According to Economides, the Kosovar
Albanians interpreted the West’s intervention and subsequent actions in Kosovo as tacit
support for their right to self-determination. 289 For instance, during a 2005 Senate
Committee hearing, then Senator of Delaware, Joe Biden indicated that a solution to
Kosovo would require difficult negotiations and compromises from both sides. Biden
noted that, “Serbia…will find a future of frustration and isolation if it persists in clinging
to the territorial artifacts of its bloody past. Serbia does not have the political stature or
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practical ability to govern Kosovo…Independence for Kosovo, when it comes, will come
because of Kosovars’ willingness to seek compromise.”290 In other words, Serbia would
have to accept the secession of Kosovo, but at the same time Kosovo must be willing to
negotiate with Serbia.
It was believed that negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo would help to settle
Kosovo’s uncertain status following a few years of UNMIK’s administration. However,
no such progress was made. Instead UNMIK turned to improving the internal conditions
of Kosovo while waiting for negotiations to begin. 291 In its search for a permanent
solution, the international community initiated the Kosovo status process in 2005 led by
former Finnish President and UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari. Negotiations were led
by the UN, but largely controlled by the Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, the
Russian Federation, the UK and the United States), which provided Russia with the
ability to play an important role in the final settlement. It was clear that Serbia’s main
objective was to reaffirm its territorial integrity even to the point that it was willing to
accept Kosovo’s autonomy and the aforementioned Rambouillet accords that called for
the presence of NATO in Kosovo.292
Serbia’s position, during the negotiations, was that Kosovo will be furnished with
significant autonomy, but it should remain within a united Serbia. Indeed, Serbia was
willing to equip Kosovo with all the prerogatives of a state except national defence and
foreign policy. 293 By this point, however, Kosovo was no longer willing to settle for
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autonomy and insisted on its right to full independence. Although Kosovo willingly
participated in the negotiations, it did so regarding issues related to its internal
governance and especially the presence of the Serbian population in Kosovo. The
opening rounds of negotiations concentrated mainly on technical issues such as minority
rights and the powers of municipalities, with little progress related to the status of
Kosovo.294
Belgrade pushed for talks on the status of Kosovo and offered “wide-ranging
autonomy for 20 years.” 295 A July 2006 meeting scheduled for negotiating Kosovo’s
status illustrated the hardened positions taken by Belgrade and Pristina. The former
insisted on a decentralized framework and the latter maintained that progress could be
achieved through independence.296 Facing a deadlock, the Contact Group requested the
Special Envoy to prepare a ‘comprehensive proposal’ regarding the status of Kosovo in
order to encourage the negotiations to move forward.

Kosovo’s status settlement,

therefore, was largely decided by the work of UN Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari.
Ahtisaari was tasked with presenting an acceptable solution to the conflict and, on
March 2007, the UN forwarded the findings entitled the ‘Comprehensive Proposal for the
Kosovo Status Settlement’ (also referred to as the ‘Ahtisaari Plan’). In it, Ahtisaari
provides a framework for Kosovo’s political, social, and economic future and provides
the international community with oversight regarding the implementation of the
settlement. 297 Although the Plan required Kosovo to create a Constitution that recognized
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its multi-ethnic population and adherence to the rule of law, the proposal also conferred
Kosovo with “supervised independence.” In the proposal, Ahtisaari states that:
I have come to the conclusion that the only viable option for Kosovo is independence, to
be supervised for an initial period by the international community. My Comprehensive
Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement, which sets forth these international
supervisory structures, provides the foundations for a future independent Kosovo that is
viable, sustainable and stable, and in which all communities and their members can live a
peaceful and dignified existence…The international community shall supervise, monitor
and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this
Settlement.”298

The Ahtisaari Plan called for the “international community [to] supervise, monitor
and have all necessary powers to ensure effective and efficient implementation of this
Settlement.”299 Unsurprisingly, of course, the plan was rejected by Serbia and Russia and
created an impasse at the UN Security Council. Ahtisaari defended his recommendations
for Kosovo’s eventual independence by arguing that:
Kosovo is a unique case that demands a unique solution. It does not create a precedent for
other unresolved conflicts. In unanimously adopting resolution 1244 (1999), the Security
Council responded to Milošević’s actions in Kosovo by denying Serbia a role in its
governance, placing Kosovo under temporary United Nations administration and
envisaging a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future. The combination of
these factors makes Kosovo’s circumstances extraordinary.300

He added, “A return of Serbian rule over Kosovo would not be acceptable to the
overwhelming majority of the people of Kosovo. Belgrade could not regain its authority
without provoking violent opposition. Autonomy of Kosovo within the borders of Serbia
– however notional such autonomy may be – is simply not tenable.” 301 Ahtisaari’s
recommendation for ‘supervised independence’ satisfied Kosovo’s short-term demand for
independence given that full independence was merely a matter of time. The period of
international supervision was meant to provide Kosovo with the time to develop its
298
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political institutions and to allow for Kosovo and Serbia to negotiate the transition to
Kosovo’s full independence.
Few analysts and policymakers were surprised when Kosovo moved ahead with a
unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in February 2008. Although the Ahtisaari
Plan did not provide a definite timeline regarding Kosovo’s ‘supervised independence,’ it
was understood that Kosovo and Serbia would engage in negotiations to find some
middle ground before Kosovo’s secession.

From Pristina’s perspective, however,

Belgrade would never agree to Kosovo’s secession and therefore a mutually acceptable
outcome was never within reach. Kosovo’s leadership was undoubtedly buoyed by
Ahtisaari’s recommendations and must have been confident that the US and major EU
powers would recognize its declaration of independence. In its UDI Kosovo accepted the
conditions of the Ahtisaari Plan. Many of the states that conferred recognition did so
based on the notion that Kosovo is a unique case or sui generis.302 The Assembly of
Kosovo official declared independence 17 February 2008 by noting that:
Kosovo is a special case arising from Yugoslavia’s non-consensual breakup and is not a
precedent for any other situation…We, the democratically-elected leaders of our people,
hereby declare Kosovo to be an independent and sovereign state. This declaration reflects
the will of our people and it is in full accordance with the recommendations of UN
Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
Settlement.303

Serbia responded by pressuring the UN General Assembly to refer Kosovo’s secession to
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to provide an advisory opinion on the legality of
Kosovo’s UDI under international law. The ICJ determined that its task was to resolve
only “whether or not [Kosovo’s] declaration of independence is in accordance with
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international law.” 304 The ICJ made clear that its decision was about the legality of
secession and not the political implications attached to the UDI. It stated:
In the present case, the question posed by the General Assembly is clearly formulated.
The question is narrow and specific; it asks for the Court’s opinion on whether or not the
declaration of independence is in accordance with international law. It does not ask about
the legal consequences of that declaration. In particular, it does not ask whether or not
Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the
recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognized it as an independent
State.305

By a ten to four majority, the ICJ concluded that “the adoption of the declaration of
independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security
Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework. Consequently the
adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law.”306 In
making its decision, the ICJ does not compel any state to recognize Kosovo and therefore
leaves the political act of recognition to the government of each state.
Kosovo’s first month of independence highlighted the major issues confronting
Pristina to this day. Kosovo has not received recognition from some of the world’s major
powers, including China and Russia, and tensions between Pristina and Belgrade
continue. The major domestic issues include a poor economy, weak political institutions,
and the Serb minority (approximately 70,000) in north Kosovo (this issue will be
discussed later in this chapter).307 Serbia’s unwillingness to recognize Kosovo ensures
that Russia and China will also withhold recognition and thereby block Kosovo from
joining the UN. Serbia’s objective is to prevent Kosovo from gaining UN recognition
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and to continue to stall recognition from other states.308
In the meantime, Kosovo is pursuing recognition from other governments and
building institutions while trying to rebuild its relations with Serbia.

Russia also

continues to be a major barrier to Kosovo’s status. As Serbia’s strongest ally, and with
its own separatist region, Russia is staunchly opposed to Kosovo’s independence. Russia
is concerned that Kosovo’s secession could set a precedent for other secessionist groups
to follow. But, as a permanent United Nations Security Council member, Russia’s veto
blocks Kosovo’s entry into the UN. As a reaction to the recognition of Kosovo by
Western states, Russia recognized the secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
in Georgia. Ironically, Russia referenced the Kosovo case as justification for its
recognition of the breakaway territories of Georgia. China has also opposed Kosovo’s
independence. China’s decision is explained by Taiwan’s immediate recognition of
Kosovo. It also faces its own domestic sources of secession, and has a strict policy of
non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states.
As of early June 2015, more than 110 states have recognized Kosovo, including
108 UN member states and 23 EU member states. At the same time, more than 80 states,
including Russia, China, Spain, Brazil, Argentina, and Greece, have withheld recognition.
Given the recognition from the large number of governments, one could argue that
Kosovo’s secession and its subsequent recognition has been a success. However, one
could also argue that Kosovo’s diplomatic efforts have largely failed. Gordon Bardos
argues that the US and the EU’s diplomatic efforts to bring Kosovo into the international
community of states has been a diplomatic failure given that over 80 states have withheld
recognition.
308
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unilateral declaration of independence is a clear violation of the territorial integrity of
Serbia.309 Additionally, James Ker-Lindsay notes that the sui generis argument has not
been accepted by much of the international community.310
Realism offers strong insights into Kosovo’s preferences and behaviour since
1999. The ethnic differences, a history of animosity, and the security dilemma between
Kosovar Albanians and Serbs heightened following Yugoslavia’s disintegration. Kosovo
viewed Serbia’s expansionist rhetoric as a threat to its security. In turn, Serbia – believing
independence to be imminent – viewed Kosovo’s desire for increased autonomy as an
existential threat to Serbia. The ensuing civil war was in many ways a consequence of
the uncertainty and security threats facing both groups. Chaim Kaufmann argues that the
only way to mitigate the effects of the security dilemma on ethnic groups is physical
separation. Kosovo adopted such a position by arguing that only independence would
provide it with security and political autonomy from Serbian oppression.
Constructivism also provides some insights into the preferences and behaviour of
Kosovo. Constructivists argue that elites exploit ethnic differences to advance their own
political and economic ends. This notion can be applied to the behaviour of Rugova and
the KLA who exploited Kosovar Albanian nationalism for their own ends. After all,
Rugova was effectively the first president of Kosovo from 2002 to 2006 and one of the
founders of the KLA, Hashim Thaci, was the first prime minister of the Republic of
Kosovo from 2008 to 2014 and was succeeded by another KLA founder Isa Mustafa.
The point is to demonstrate that the Kosovo leadership benefitted economically and
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politically from an independent Kosovo.

On the other hand, constructivism cannot

explain why the international community broke international norms by violating the
territorial integrity of Serbia. As mentioned earlier, there is a strong norm of territorial
integrity and preference for state sovereignty in the international system. However, in the
case of Kosovo, the international community ignored these norms and laws in favour of
recognising Kosovo’s independence.
Finally, from a liberal perspective, Kosovo’s independence was not inevitable, but
rather a consequence of flawed institutions and a regime in Belgrade that refused to adopt
the appropriate institutional measures. I argue that the institutional and economic factors
outlined by liberal theory provide a strong explanation for Kosovo’s decision to declare
independence. First, Belgrade could have made a more concerted and genuine effort to
bring Kosovo back into the fold. Rather than conciliatory and meaningful dialogue,
Belgrade vacillated and at times refused to negotiate with Kosovo and the international
community. The case of Kosovo is further explained by the importance of the domestic
context and the economic factors. As mentioned earlier, Kosovo’s leadership failed to
seriously consider alternatives to independence post-1996.

Instead, the leadership

persuaded the population that independence was the best route for Kosovo and, in turn,
the domestic population pressured the leadership to move towards independence, even
though it may not have been the best option for Kosovo. Finally, a union with Serbia did
not offer Kosovo any economic incentives. In fact, Kosovo stood to lose very little by
seceding from Serbia.
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Capabilities
How did a militarily, institutionally, and economically weak Kosovo successfully secede
from Serbia? Without sufficient capabilities, de facto states should not be able to secure
independence and yet Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008 and has
garnered widespread international support. The Kosovo war from 1998-1999 revealed
the Kosovar Albanians, led by the KLA, did not possess strong military capabilities.
However, Kosovo acquired the capabilities necessary for seceding from Serbia through
international support. Kosovo’s internal weakness, therefore, was inconsequential given
that powerful states, including the US and key EU members, provided Kosovo with
military, economic, and diplomatic support.
From 1999 to 2008, Kosovo’s leadership lobbied and worked with the
international community to provide Kosovo with the support necessary for independence.
Kosovo pursued this policy on two tracks. First, Kosovo was clear to the international
community that a union with Serbia was not an option. The leadership convinced the
international community, including the UN and its special envoy Martti Ahtisaari, that
independence was the only real solution to the conflict in Kosovo. Second, Kosovo
cooperated with the international community and participated in the negotiations intended
to solve Kosovo’s uncertain status. In doing so, Kosovo demonstrated its commitment
and willingness to participate with the international community’s efforts at resolving the
longstanding issue and that independence was morally justified and strategically
preferable to a return to violence.
The Kosovo case partially upholds both hypotheses. Hypothesis one states that a
de facto state will pursue independence when the parent state is unwilling to offer
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‘sufficient accommodation’ in the form of political institutions, such as autonomy and
federalism (or in this case, republic status). Secession, therefore, becomes a last resort
following the parent state’s unwillingness to provide the minority group with autonomy.
This hypothesis is supported by the Kosovo case. Kosovar Albanians declared their
desire for independence, but also indicated that they would settle for republic status in a
united Serbia. This was true even after Serbia rescinded Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989.
However, following a decade of Belgrade’s repressive political and economic policies,
Kosovo viewed independence as the only way to attain political and economic rights.
The notion of autonomy for Kosovo was unacceptable given that Serbia had
previously revoked its autonomous status. 311 In the late 1980s and the early 1990s,
Kosovo was struggling for autonomous status and then republic status within Yugoslavia,
but Belgrade appeared to be pushing for control over Kosovo. Belgrade’s rhetoric and
actions regarding Kosovo’s status emboldened Kosovo to demand independence.
Following Serbia’s decision to revoke Kosovo’s autonomy in 1989 and its subsequent
decisions to further alienate it, Kosovo could not trust Serbia to uphold its promise of
furnishing the Kosovars with political autonomy.
At the same time, the Kosovo case opposes hypothesis one if we consider
Kosovo’s behaviour post-1999. Serbia earnestly offered Kosovo broad autonomy within
a federal Serbia in the negotiations following 1999.
compromise and rejected Serbia’s offers.

Kosovo was unwilling to

But as discussed above, Kosovo gained

significant leverage over Serbia following the international intervention and
administration of Kosovo. From Kosovo’s perspective, it did not make sense to forgo
independence and settle for autonomy within Serbia when the US and major EU powers
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were willing to support Kosovo’s bid for independence.

Politically, therefore,

independence was more appealing than extensive autonomy within Serbia.
Hypothesis two contends that material factors, including economic incentives and
political benefits, can persuade a de facto state to forgo independence. That is, de facto
states will forgo independence if it has secured autonomy from the parent state and the de
facto status offers more economic and political benefits than full independence. De facto
independence and the offer of autonomy were insufficient for convincing Kosovo to
forgo independence. The political and economic benefits under an autonomous
framework would not have benefitted Kosovo in any meaningful way. Although Serbia
offered significant political autonomy to Kosovo, independence always seemed more
reassuring especially given Serbia’s past willingness to revoke Kosovo’s autonomy.
Additionally, there were few economic incentives for remaining with Serbia. Appendix I
presents the economic performances of Kosovo and Serbia from 1990 to 2012 using data
collected from the UN and the World Bank.312 In terms of economic benefits, therefore,
Kosovo stood to gain little from a union with Serbia. Based on the data, Serbia has
experienced modest growth to its economy and did not possess any economic means with
which to entice Kosovo to remain with Serbia.
There were also two contributing factors that shaped Kosovo’s decision. The first
factor is the government and regime in Belgrade. Kosovo felt uneasy that, although the
old regime of Milošević was removed from power in 2000, his party survived and by
2003 it was gaining popularity among Serbian voters. 313 Furthermore, Milošević’s
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successors could not be trusted as key officials in the secret police and military,
responsible for the war against Kosovo, maintained their positions.314 In short, although
moderates replaced the Milošević government, the Kosovars were uneasy about an
administration they felt was “little different from the previous regime.”315 Milošević and
his Social Party of Serbia (SPS) were succeeded by Vojislav Kostunica as president and
Zoran Djindjic as the prime minister in 2000.316 Kostunica’s Democratic Party of Serbia
(DSS) and Djindjic’s Democratic Party (DS) formed a coalition government in 2000
under the banner of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).317 Although Kosovar
Albanians were pleased with the removal of Milošević in 2000, they did not believe there
was much difference between Milošević and Kostunica on the Kosovo issue.318
The second contributing factor was the role of the international community,
especially that of the US and key members of the EU (UK, France, and Germany).
International support provided Kosovo with the assurance that it would be economically
and militarily viable against a recalcitrant Serbia.

International support, however,

appears to be less significant than the conditions of autonomy and economic benefits.
That is, Kosovo’s leadership had decided that independence was the only viable option
for Kosovo as early as 2000 (refer to Ibrahim Rugova’s interviews above). In the case of
Kosovo, therefore, it would be more accurate to claim that international support is an
important but not necessary condition for de facto states to declare independence. The
point is that the presence or absence of international support alone does not determine a
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de facto state’s decision for declaring independence. After all, as mentioned in previous
sections, de facto states have declared independence despite the lack of international
support.
Recent events in Kosovo suggest that independence may have been a political and
economic miscalculation. Since January 2015, Kosovar Albanians have been migrating
en masse to neighbouring countries to escape Kosovo’s failing political institutions and
high unemployment rates.319 Some estimates claim that approximately 100,000 Kosovar
Albanians have fled Kosovo since January 2015 and that unemployment is over 30
percent (55 percent for people aged 15-24).320 The underlying assumption of this project
is that independence may not be the best outcome for de facto states. An independent
Kosovo will face a difficult process in developing effective political institutions and
providing economic growth for the population.

Kosovo and Serbia: Looking Forward
Kosovo and Serbia’s intransigence exacerbated the divisions between the two sides and
likely fostered the secession of Kosovo. The strained relationship will not be easily
repaired but there are positive developments. After all, Kosovo has seceded from Serbia
and it is not coming back. Serbia will have to accept this reality if normal relations are to
be established. The Kosovo-Serbia relationship faces many challenges as both sides try
to manage the issues between them. On the one hand, for example, the two sides have
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come to an agreement on border management and Serbia recognizes Kosovo’s vehicle
license plates. On the other hand, tensions remain due to the presence of the Serbian
minority and the Serbian Orthodox churches and monasteries in Kosovo.321 In resolving
Kosovo’s status, the US and the EU had hoped it would lead to stability in the Balkans.322
Yet Kosovo’s borders remain unstable and this will continue to impede Kosovo’s
economic and political development.323 Ultimately, Kosovo’s independence may create
more problems than it solves.
Much of the tension between the two sides is related to the Serb populated area of
north Kosovo. While it tacitly concedes the areas south of the Ibar River to Kosovo,
Belgrade hopes to maintain influence over, and if possible to annex, the north. Kosovo,
meanwhile, wants to consolidate its control over the north and secure its border. 324
Kosovo’s northern municipalities, therefore, represent one of the most serious areas of
contention and insecurity between Pristina and Belgrade. Kosovo does not practice
effective control over the north and its Serb-majority population rejects integration into
Kosovo. As it is, the north possesses parallel institutions from Serbia and Kosovo.
Belgrade’s influence in the north is largely maintained by its financial support for the
Serb-led institutions in the region. 325 Serbs in northern Kosovo determinedly reject
Kosovo’s independence and any form of integration.326 The social, economic, political,
and legal issues in the north are a consequence of the parallel institutions. The existing
institutions do not effectively deliver services or maintain law and order. Any attempt to
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integrate the north into Kosovo’s institutions would likely exacerbate the issues.
The 2011 violent clash between the Kosovo police and Serbs in the north
demonstrate the potential for instability and further violence between Kosovo and Serbs.
The violence was sparked by clashes at the Kosovo-Serbia border, but it is largely a
symptom of the Belgrade-Pristina dispute over sovereignty and territorial integrity. 327
The EU, for its part, has offered Serbia candidate status in exchange for concessions
towards Kosovo.

Despite discussions and meetings aimed at improving bilateral

relations, Belgrade and Pristina remain divided over the issue of sovereignty and the
northern area. The EU-facilitated bilateral talks led to Belgrade’s willingness to open its
borders to Kosovar documents and goods. In practice, however, Belgrade did little to
change its behaviour vis-à-vis Kosovo until December 2012. 328 The EU continued to
push for high-level talks between Belgrade and Pristina in an effort to resolve the
political impasse. The central issue in these talks will be Kosovo’s status (and its north)
and its ability to join regional and international organizations.329 The concern for the EU
and the region is that the isolated incidents of violence in northern Kosovo could spark
widespread ethnic conflict between the Serbs and Albanians. Kosovo’s status and the
uncertainty hanging over it contributes to the disputes between Kosovar Albanians and
the Serb minority.
From Kosovo’s perspective, the political dialogue is meant to complete the
process of independence by achieving membership in the UN and obtaining recognition
from more states. In addition, Pristina hopes to integrate the northern municipalities into
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its administration and receive recognition from Belgrade.330 Serbia, meanwhile, is willing
to accept Kosovo’s administration of the northern territories, which would be furnished
with “broad self-governing powers” within a de facto Kosovo.331 Belgrade’s approach
continues to view Kosovo as an autonomous region within Serbia.332 In effect, Serbia is
seeking to weaken Pristina’s sovereignty by demanding the establishment of autonomous
communities where Serb-majorities exist in Kosovo. According to Serbian officials,
Belgrade is unwilling to recognize Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.333
Despite the challenges, there has been progress. On 19 April 2013, following
meetings chaired by the EU’s foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton, Kosovo’s Hashim
Thaci and Serbia’s Ivica Dacic signed a historic agreement. The agreement is aimed at
normalizing relations between Pristina and Belgrade and is a precondition for Serbia’s
EU accession and Kosovo’s partnership with the EU. 334 As a result of the landmark
agreement, the EU will open accession talks with Serbia January 2014. Although the
EU’s enlargement commissioner Stefan Fuele indicated that the Kosovo factor would not
be a roadblock, it is largely understood that one of the conditions for Serbia’s admission
into the EU will be its recognition of Kosovo.335 EU membership may prove to be the
game changer for this relationship.

Serbia’s desire to join the European bloc may

ultimately shift its stance on Kosovo’s independence or at least provide a basis from
which normal relations can be forged.
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In the meantime, Kosovo’s status will continue to be contested, as it exists on the
“margins of the international community.” 336 Kosovo’s uncertain status is likely to
persistent into the foreseeable future but it is not a feasible solution in the long term.337
The international community cannot provide economic and military backing indefinitely
and the Kosovars want a final solution to the issue. Economically, Kosovo faces hurdles
to growth as a consequence of its past and present uncertain status. Daniel Silander and
John Janzekovitz argue that the decades of unrest and violence, the poor infrastructure,
and Kosovo’s unresolved political status has meant that the “overall economic and social
situation is very fragile.”338 As a result, the economy is rampant with a black market and
relies heavily on the international community for aid. For example, about 30 percent of
Kosovar Albanians live below the poverty line and the unemployment rate is in the
region of 45 percent.339
Another major challenge is political development.

In addition to a weak

economy, Kosovo’s political system is fragile and unable to achieve fundamental
institutional competence and quickly losing the confidence of the population.340 A 2009
Gallup Poll shows that perceptions of independence were less positive following the first
two years since Kosovo’s declaration. The Gallup Balkan Monitor survey shows that 75
percent of Kosovo Albanians believe that independence is a good thing, down from 93
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percent a year earlier. 341 And though over 60 percent of Kosovars are satisfied with
Kosovo’s progress since independence, large numbers of Kosovar Albanians have
relocated or plan to emigrate out of Kosovo. 342 Finally, over 90 percent of Kosovar
Albanians and Serb minorities are dissatisfied with the economy and especially the lack
of employment in Kosovo.343 This is hardly a sign of support for Kosovo’s economic and
political progress since independence.344

Conclusion
This chapter relied on empirical and theoretical research to argue that Kosovo’s decision
to declare independence from Serbia was the product of Serbia’s unwillingness to make
concessions to Kosovo. Empirically, the chapter demonstrated that the decision-making
of Kosovo and Serbia and the flawed political institutions ultimately resulted in Kosovo’s
independence. The chapter outlined Serbia’s unwillingness to provide Kosovo with
sufficient political autonomy until it was too late. Furthermore, Kosovo’s relationship
with Serbia was the product of decades of conflict for power and control over Kosovo.
From the perspective of Kosovo, Serbia could not be trusted to administer Kosovo given
Belgrade’s track record of broken promises and repressive policies. Belgrade refused to
assuage Kosovar Albanian fears regarding Kosovo’s relationship with Serbia.

In

addition, Kosovo’s demands for political autonomy were not met until Kosovo was in a
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position to become an independent state. Following de facto statehood, autonomy within
a federal Serbia was less attractive than full independence for Kosovo. The chapter
argued that Kosovo’s ultimate decision to declare independence was not inevitable.
Instead, the decision was a result of the culmination of a series of political decisions
taken by Serbia that pushed Kosovo to the point of no return.
Theoretically, the chapter argued that realism and constructivism provide strong
insights into the preferences and behaviour of Kosovo, but that liberalism offers the most
complete and compelling explanation. Realism’s emphasis on security and capabilities
explains how Kosovo, although weak, acquired international support to secure de facto
statehood and subsequently, independence. Constructivism also provides insights into
the role of ethnic elites in mobilising support for a particular political objective.
Liberalism and the emphasis on political institutions, economic factors, and the
importance of agency provide the final pieces to the explanation. The chapter outlined
the ways in which political institutions and economic incentives influence the preferences
and behaviour of actors.

Kosovo’s declaration of independence was a response to

Serbia’s unwillingness to develop a political system that would meet Kosovo’s requests
and provide it with economic development. These theoretical ideas will be pursued in the
next chapter, which will examine the case of South Sudan.
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Chapter 4:

South Sudan

The existing literature argues that de facto states are a way station towards the ultimate
goal of independence and that all de facto states want independence and all parent states
want to reintegrate the de facto entity.

According to this literature, the potential

outcomes for de facto states are limited to secession from or reintegration (peaceful or
forceful) into the parent state. Existing research takes the preference for independence as
a given, overlooking the possibility of status quo option (i.e., de facto statehood). This
research asks if there are conditions under which de facto states may forgo independence
in favour of the status quo.
In 2011, South Sudan held a referendum to ask its citizens whether they should
continue in a union with Sudan or become an independent state. The South Sudanese
overwhelmingly voted for independence. One would assume that South Sudan’s
secession substantiates the notion that de facto states always want independence. A
closer examination of the historical and political dynamics, however, demonstrates that
South Sudan was willing to maintain the unity of Sudan on the condition of a democratic
and federal constitution and economic development for the South. For decades the South
requested autonomy and a federal structure for a united Sudan. The South’s decision to
secede, therefore, requires a careful reading of Sudan’s historical and political turmoil
and the relationship between North and South. The following questions will guide the
historical analysis: What precipitated the two civil wars between Khartoum and the
South? What were the South’s political demands and why did Khartoum ignore the
South’s appeals?
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Based on a cursory glance, one could conclude that realism provides a full
explanation for the case of South Sudan. However, a thorough examination of the case
reveals that realist notions of security and capabilities, although insightful, do not provide
a complete explanation. This chapter argues that the secession of South Sudan was
neither a consequence of the security dilemma nor an inevitable outcome. Instead, the
chapter will argue that the South’s secession is best explained by examining Khartoum’s
failure to provide the South with sufficient political autonomy, the lack of economic
incentives, and the role of domestic, regional, and international actors. To this end, the
project adopts liberal theory to account for the behaviour South Sudan and this chapter
situates the case of South Sudan within the broader aims of this dissertation.
The objective of this project is to identify if there are conditions under which a de
facto state will forgo independence and accept a framework that furnishes it with broad
autonomy but also preserves the territorial integrity of the parent state. In other words,
are there conditions under which a de facto state will maintain the status quo and shelve
the goal of independence? The case of South Sudan will further demonstrate that de facto
state preferences are not fixed or predetermined. It will argue that, in addition to political
institutions and economic incentives, domestic, regional, and international dynamics
shape de facto state preferences and decision-making.
South Sudan shares important parallels with Kosovo. First, South Sudan has also
experienced a turbulent and bloody history under a central government that has often
been oppressive and unresponsive to political requests.

Second, it is poor and

underdeveloped and, although South Sudan does possess vast oil reserves, it does not
possess the infrastructure yet to reap the benefits of its oil. Third, like Kosovo, South
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Sudan is landlocked and politically weak. South Sudan’s political institutions are neither
effective nor stable enough to administer a volatile population. Finally, South Sudan also
seceded from the parent state following decades of conflict and civil war. Yet there is an
important difference: South Sudan made a genuine effort to preserve the unity of Sudan.
One of the goals of this chapter, therefore, is to identify the reasons for South Sudan’s
willingness to stay in a united Sudan.
South Sudan shares similarities with Iraqi Kurdistan. Historically, the South
Sudanese and Kurds endured successive oppressive regimes and undertook military
action to gain political and economic rights in their respective states. More recently,
South Sudan and Iraqi Kurdistan both agreed to constitutional arrangements with their
parent states in 2005. Much like the Iraqi constitution, Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA) outlined broad political and economic autonomy for South Sudan and
provided the South with representation in Khartoum. South Sudan emerged as a de facto
state in 2005 with the signing of the CPA that ended the second civil war between
Khartoum and the South Sudan.

The CPA delineated South Sudan, much like the

Kurdish region of Iraq, as an autonomous region with a government, army, and
administrative jurisdiction.
However, whereas the Iraqi constitution has preserved the unity of Iraq, the CPA
failed to maintain Sudan’s unity. One reason for the failure of the CPA is the key
difference between South Sudan and Iraqi Kurdistan. The post-2005 Iraq is governed by
a new group of political officials following the complete removal of the old regime. In
Sudan, however, the old regime persists. To be sure, the Iraqi Kurds are uneasy about a
political partnership with officials in Baghdad. However, the removal of the old regime
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has made partnership between the Kurds and Arabs a reality that would have otherwise
been impossible. The South Sudanese did not have the luxury of forging a political union
with new officials in Khartoum. Instead, the South was expected to forge a partnership
with a regime that was responsible for the oppression and violence targeted against the
South Sudanese. The presence of the old regime in Sudan contributed to the secession of
South Sudan.
The chapter will begin with a brief description of Sudan’s early history until it
gained independence from Britain and Egypt. It will then discuss the events that preceded
the two civil wars. By identifying and discussing the root causes of the civil wars, I will
demonstrate that the civil wars were a direct result of Khartoum’s unwillingness to
address the South’s political and economic grievances. The objective is to provide
context for the secession and to identify the factors that influenced the South’s decision to
declare independence. In addition, identifying the root causes of the two civil wars will
shed light on the South’s preference formation and its relationship with the government in
Khartoum.

It is important to note that the Southerners were demanding federalism

throughout Sudan’s tumultuous political history.

Indeed, South Sudan was always

willing to function within a democratic and federal Sudan, one that recognized the
South’s unique historical, cultural, linguistic, and religious differences. The final sections
will provide an explanation for South Sudan’s behaviour post-2005. The discussion will
highlight Khartoum’s unwillingness to uphold a federal Sudan, one that would guarantee
the South’s autonomy. It will also reveal that domestic factors, both within Sudan and in
the South, shaped South Sudan’s decision to declare independence. Finally, the
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explanation will discuss the role of regional and international actors in contributing to the
South’s successful secession.

Sudan and South Sudan’s Early History
The Sudan is geographically and politically divided between two distinct parts – the
North and the South – and it is culturally and religiously divided between the Arab and
Islamicized North and the African and largely traditional South.345 Today, the official
language of South Sudan is English, but the people can be categorized into three
linguistic groups known as the Sudanic, Western Nilotes, and Eastern Nilotes.346 The
South is described as self-contained tribes based on linguistic and traditional ties. The
1956 population census of Sudan, conducted by the British, found that 39 percent of the
population had Arab ancestry, while 30 percent were Southerners, 13 percent were
Westerners (including Darfur and Kordofan), and the remaining 18 percent comprised of
Nuba, Beja, Nubians, and foreigners.347
Southern Sudan is often described as a case of ‘regional nationalism’ as opposed
to a movement based on linguistic and ethnic similarities or a shared history.348 That is,
the key difference between Northerners and Southerners is that “one group looks
primarily towards the Arab Middle East [Egypt] and the other mainly towards Africa
south of the Sahara. And yet, although the division between North and South is mainly
cultural, differences of culture are not by themselves a complete explanation.” 349
345
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Northerners and Southerners are distinguished by “a sense of belonging which has its
roots in history and is conferred by birth.”350 Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed
note that the perception of the Sudan conflict as a struggle between the ‘Arab-Muslim
North and the Christian/animist South’ is incorrect.351 Instead, they argue that the origins
of conflict lie in socioeconomic disparities between the North and the South and the
relationship between the Sudanese state and the population in the South.352
Sudan became a Turko-Egyptian colony in the nineteenth century when
Muhammad Ali Pasha, the viceroy of Egypt and later Sudan, conquered much of what is
modern day Sudan. Ali Pasha, motivated by the slave trade and finding the source of the
Nile, discovered the South late and therefore was unable to thoroughly control it during
his reign.353 From the early to the mid-nineteenth century, Egypt and Europeans vied for
influence over the South as both established trading forts and military and commercial
networks in the South. 354

European missionaries (e.g., Austrians and Italians) and

traders, for example, became disillusioned with the South and had to use force and tribal
divisions in order to maintain their economic interests. 355

Ultimately, Europeans

abandoned the South and were replaced by Northern Sudanese and Arabs.356 The South
has historically been mistreated relative to the North. For example, although Ismail
Pasha, Ali Pasha’s successor, eventually abolished the slave trade following an agreement
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between Egypt and Britain in 1877, it was largely ignored in the South because they were
viewed as ‘infidels.’357
European powers entered the struggle for South Sudan when Great Britain,
France, and Belgium competed for control over the White Nile. Britain’s conquest of
Egypt in 1882 meant that it also inherited Sudan.358 Britain hoped that by conquering
Egypt it could control the Suez Canal and prevent its European rivals from gaining
passage to India and the Far East.359 The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1899 outlined joint
authority over Sudan and effectively divided the region between the North and the
South.360 The British administration divided the South into three administrative states:
Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile, which were further divided to form the ten
states in South Sudan.361
Under British administration, the North developed considerably in economic,
political, and educational terms while the South languished in underdevelopment. 362
British policy in the South focused on “maintaining law and order,” rather than on
education and economic development.363 During this period, the North and South existed
as almost two separate entities under British rule. Beshir Mohammed Said, a journalist
from the North, suggests that unrest in the South has been a feature of the region since the
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presence of European traders and missionaries.364 Said contends that British policy in the
South was to “build up a series of self-contained racial or tribal units based upon
indigenous customs, traditional usage and beliefs.” 365 Such a policy ensured that the
South remained politically and economically behind the North, including in political
activism and nationalism.
By the 1940s Sudanese nationalists, particularly from the North, demanded
Sudanese independence from Britain. Spearheaded by the intelligentsia, Sudanese
nationalism first manifested itself in the 1920s and became a powerful force by the end of
World War II.366 Britain faced tremendous pressure from Northern Sudanese political
parties such as the National Unionist Party (NUP) and the Umma Party to grant Sudan
independence. 367

Britain eventually acquiesced to Sudanese nationalists, partly to

prevent Egypt from regaining control of Sudan.368 Initially the British envisioned two
separate Sudans due to the differences in culture and development between the North and
the South. However, pressure from both Egypt and Northern Sudanese nationalists, in
addition to geographic and economic considerations,, compelled the British to preserve
the unification of the South and the North.369
The British Civil Secretary of the Sudan held a conference in Juba in 1947 to
ascertain the position of Southerners regarding its position in an independent Sudan.370
Southern representatives were persuaded to assent to the proposed Legislative Assembly
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of an independent Sudan with little information about the nature of the arrangement and
without any “special safeguards for the South.”371 Southern hopes for special safeguards
were reinforced when the North agreed to “specific safeguards for the South” following
the Juba Conference.372 Southerners, therefore, were misled as they were made to believe
that certain safeguards (i.e., a federal status for the South) would be included in the
creation of Sudan’s Legislative Assembly. With the belief that federalism would be
constitutionalized, the South’s representatives willingly agreed to a union with the North
at the Juba Conference. 373 Abel Alier, a Southern lawyer who was instrumental in
pushing the peace agreement between the North and the South in 1972, argues that
Southern representatives at the Juba Conference asked that the South be given the
“opportunity to prepare herself before joining hands with the North.” 374 Rather than
providing the South with an opportunity to consider its options, the proposed union
moved ahead at a rapid pace with the formation of a 93-member legislative assembly,
thirteen of which were from the South.375
During the 1951 Constitutional Amendment Commission, the South had a single
representative (Buth Diu Thung of the Liberal Party) whose proposals for Southern
safeguards were rejected and, although a provision for safeguards was included in the
Draft Constitution, Northerners deleted it at a later conference held in Egypt. 376 The
agreement between Egypt and Sudan excluded Southern representatives on the grounds
that only organized political parties could be invited. Parties such as the NUP and the
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Umma Party insisted on the removal of the special safeguards to ensure a strong and
centralized Sudan would emerge from independence.377 Elections were held in 1953 to
elect the first governing parliament and to implement the Sudanization policy (the
process of replacing all foreign governmental and military officials with Sudanese
officials) in the lead up to Sudan’s independence. Among the parties to compete in the
elections were the newly formed Liberal Party, the Umma Party, and the National
Unionist Party (which advocated union with Egypt).378 The Liberal Party won a majority
of the seats in the South, but the NUP won the largest number of seats and was able to
form the government led by Ismail al-Azhari.379 The Liberal Party maintained its calls
for the federalization of Sudan throughout the negotiations in the lead up to Sudan’s
independence.380 Only six months after Sudan’s independence, the NUP-led government
of al-Azhari was overthrown by a coalition of the Umma Party and the People’s
Democratic Party (PDP).
The new government was not any more inclusive of the South than the previous
government.381 For example, the Umma-PDP government passed the federalism issue to
a subcommittee of a parliamentary committee (only three members were Southerners)
responsible for drafting a constitution. In January 1956, Sudan officially gained
independence from Britain without a permanent constitution and with a discontent South.
The North repeatedly refused to implement a federal system claiming that federalism
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would be the first step towards the breakup of Sudan.382 This encouraged the South to
become better politically organized and, as a first step, the Southern Federal Party (SFP)
was established and competed in the 1957 election. 383 With a growing political
consciousness and improved organisation, the South demanded a federal constitution that
recognized both Christianity and Islam as state religions and Arabic and English as
official languages.384 In the next election, the SFP won a majority of the seats in the
South and immediately began to push for federalism.385
The unwillingness of Khartoum to accommodate Southern appeals for special
safeguards in the form of federalism contributed to growing tensions between North and
South. This was exacerbated by the implementation of the Sudanization policy wherein
Khartoum appointed an overwhelming majority of Northerners as officials and
administrators – even in the South. This policy prompted the South to view Sudan’s
independence as the start of its subjugation by the North. 386 These developments
increased the uneasiness and discontent brewing in the South and resulted in violent
demonstrations from Southerners who feared economic and social exploitation.387 The
combination of Khartoum’s repressive policies and Southern fears resulted in the first
civil war between the regime in Khartoum and the South.
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The Origins of South Sudan as a De Facto State
Preferences
South Sudan’s preferences were clearly laid out by its political representatives before and
immediately after the independence of Sudan. The South Sudanese insisted on federalism
and economic development for the South as a precondition for its union with the rest of
Sudan. The civil wars between South Sudan and the government in Khartoum were a
direct result of Khartoum’s unwillingness to equip the South with federalism and
economic development. Realist interpretations, however, would frame the general
conflict between the South and Khartoum in terms of security and survival. From this
perspective, the conflict is a result of the fixed and enduring ethnic differences between
the South and the North. The conflict can be explained by the collective fears of the
future on both sides. For instance, David Lake and Donald Rothchild argue that conflict
occurs when groups fear for their survival and view the other as a threat thereby creating
a security dilemma.388 Institutional and economic imperatives are secondary concerns to
security and survival. The empirical record outlined below, however, will demonstrate
that South Sudan’s primary objectives were to obtain political autonomy and economic
development within a united Sudan.
From a constructivist perspective, civil wars are a means for ethnic entrepreneurs
and elites to advance their particular political and economic interests.

Identity and

preferences are not inherently given, but rather constructed and exploited for certain ends.
This perspective emphasizes the role of agency in promoting and intensifying ethnic
differences and the onset of conflict. Based on this approach, officials from the South
and Khartoum hijacked ethnic identities and used them to advance their interests. There
388
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is little empirical support for this position. South Sudan’s preferences were not shaped by
ethnic entrepreneurs and politicians, but rather by a collective belief that the South
required federalism. The historical record reveals that there was a general consensus
amongst the South Sudanese that political autonomy and economic development were
imperative for protecting their identity.
Liberalism provides the best account for South Sudan’s preferences prior to its
emergence as a de facto state. The emphasis on political institutions and economic
factors explains the preference formation of the South and provides an explanation for the
conflict. Although security is an important consideration, South Sudan’s preferences
were formed during the negotiation process for independence with the British and the
North. Khartoum’s unwillingness to provide the South with a federal framework pushed
the South to adopt violence. Indeed, the South was effectively shut out from political
positions in Khartoum and it was economically underdeveloped.

The historical

examination will reveal that the South repeatedly and steadfastly requested federalism
and economic development as preconditions for a unified Sudan. The historical record
will further demonstrate that the civil wars and South Sudan’s emergence as a de facto
state were not shaped by fixed interests, but rather by unresponsive political institutions
and poor economic development.

The First Sudanese Civil War (1955-1972)
One of the root causes of the First Sudanese Civil War was the role of European traders
and the presence of the British in the Sudan. Richard Gray argues that “much of the
violence which afflicted the Southern Sudan in the nineteenth century was caused
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originally not by Northern slavers but by European traders – some of the present
difficulties also stem not from Northern attitudes but from British policy.” 389 Beshir
Mohammed Said argues that missionaries were expelled from Southern Sudan in 1964
because of their tendency to “encourage separatism, inflate racial and religious
difference, interfere in politics and, in particular, raise funds and give food and shelter to
outlaws. From the very start they were the instrument and tool of the colonialist policy of
divide and rule.”390 Said portrays the missionaries as political activists who took it upon
themselves to represent the interests of the South because they were unwilling to accept a
unified Sudan ruled by the Muslim North.391
The British administrators adopted parallel policies of development for the two
regions. In the South, tribalism was reinforced and education was offered in the various
mother tongues along with English. In the North, Islam and Arabic prevailed.392 Such a
policy reinforced the economic and political gap between the South and the North.393
Because the British believed they had plenty of time to create a more equal basis before
unifying North and South, little was done to mitigate the differences and the antagonisms.
Instead, the North developed with Islamic and Arabic traditions while the South acquired
Christianity and English in addition to its traditional religions and languages.
Additionally, the onset of WWII and the pressure from Egypt and the Northern Sudanese
for independence prevented the British from achieving some level of equality between
North and South.394
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A second cause of the conflict was the creation of an independent Sudan without a
political framework that accommodated Southern demands. During the months leading
up to Sudan’s independence, it became increasingly clear to the South that it would not
obtain federal status. In protest, Southern politicians boycotted Sudan’s first parliament
by vacating their posts in the Legislative Assembly. As a consequence, Northerners, who
viewed the North as “inherently superior to the South,” dominated Sudan’s governmental
apparatus.395
The immediate cause of the civil war, however, was the North’s unwillingness to
provide the South with safeguards in the form of a federal framework and the
appointment of Southerners to administrative positions in the South. As an example, of
the eight hundred administrative positions recommended for Sudanization, only six minor
positions were given to Southerners, which naturally fostered an environment of mistrust
and hostility. 396 From Khartoum’s perspective, Southerners were “not qualified and
experienced enough for these posts” and the ‘responsibility’ for the South’s lack of
qualification, according to Beshir Mohammed Said, must be placed on the shoulders of
the European missionaries and the British administration. 397 Said believes that the
“political elements” in the South used Khartoum’s Sudanization policy as propaganda to
‘agitate’ and instil fear in the Southern population.398 Dunstan Wai, however, notes that
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Southerners viewed their exclusion from administrative posts as a “deliberate and
malicious plot” to maintain Northern superiority over the South.399
The two root causes laid the foundations for conflict and several specific incidents
sparked violence and a rebellion in the South. First, in July 1955 newly appointed
Northern officials dismissed three hundred textile workers in Yambio, Equatoria, which
led to widespread protests and incited gunfire from Northern officials.400 Second, there
appeared a telegram, allegedly from the Prime Minister al-Azhari, that outlined his plans
for the South. (The authenticity of the telegram has not been verified.) It read: “To all my
administrators in the three Southern provinces: I have just signed a document for selfdetermination. Do not listen to the childish complaints of the Southerners. Persecute
them, oppress them, ill-treat them according to my orders. Any administrator who fails to
comply with my orders will be liable to prosecution. In three months’ time all of you will
come round and enjoy the work you have done.”401 Third, the events in Yambio and the
distressing telegram contributed to suspicion and apprehension in the South and in
particular at the military garrison in Tori, Equatoria. Suspicious and fearful, soldiers of
the Equatorial Corps refused to board lorries to ship them North. The mutiny resulted in
the killing of Northern officers in August of 1955. 402 At the same time, there were
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mutinies in the Southern towns of Juna, Yei, Yambio, and Meridi resulting in the deaths
of 75 Southerners and 361 Northerners.403
The mutinies were eventually settled and many of the Southern soldiers
surrendered (and were subsequently tried and killed), but many fled to the bush or
crossed international borders.404 Britain also played a role in deescalating the conflict.
Although it refused to intervene militarily, British officials assisted al-Azhari in restoring
order in the South. 405 Joseph Oduho and William Deng, former South Sudanese
politicians and leaders of the Sudan African National Union (SANU) during the First
Sudanese Civil War, place a large burden of the blame for the civil war on British
shoulders. Oduho and Deng reveal that Southern grievances towards the British stem
from two events: first, Britain’s intervention in the 1955 mutiny did nothing to resolve
the longstanding issues and second, British planes transported Northern troops to the
South, which Southerners interpreted as British approval of Khartoum’s actions.406
This last incident sparked the civil war between the North and the South.
Khartoum’s decision to occupy the South with Northern troops only exacerbated
hostilities following the mistreatment of Southerners at the hands of Northern soldiers.407
In addition to political disenfranchisement, the South suffered economically in favour of
the North.408 The bulk of academic work presents Khartoum as oppressive and brutal in
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its treatment of the Southern Sudanese from 1955 to 1972.409 According to academics,
Khartoum’s actions took the form of arbitrary arrests, torture, the destruction of homes,
forced migration of Southerners to the North, and a general policy of subjugation.410
The political tension and violence undermined al-Azhari’s NUP government,
which faced an open political challenge from the opposition. In response, al-Azhari
moved to officially declare Sudan’s independence, but his government continued to face
stern opposition from the other parties who sought a ‘national government.’411 A PDPUmma union led by new Prime Minister Abdallah Khalil replaced al-Azhari and his NUP
party.

Shortly after the 1957 election, all Southern Federal Party (SFP) members

resigned from the assembly in protest against the government’s unwillingness to meet the
South’s federal demands. Their spokesman, Saturnino Ohure, addressed the assembly
with the following remarks:
The South has no intention of separating from the North for had that been the case
nothing on earth would have prevented the demand for separation. The South claims to
federate with the North, a right that the South undoubtedly possesses as a consequence of
the principle of free self-determination, which reason and democracy grant to a free
people. The South will at any moment separate from the North if and when the North so
desires, directly or indirectly, through political, social and economic subjection of the
South.412

In short, although the South was asking for federalism, policies of exclusion would push
the South to make separatist demands. By the summer of 1958, however, Sudan’s
parliament faced dissolution as a consequence of factions within the coalition
government. In anticipation of the collapse, Prime Minister Khalil had arranged for the
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military to take over the government.413 Joseph Oduho and William Deng argue that
Khalil’s decision to relinquish power to the military was a result of Khartoum’s inability
to implement a unitary constitution and therefore relied on the military to do so.414 On 17
November 1958, General Abboud declared a state of emergency. He announced that the
parliament and all political parties would be dissolved and gatherings and the media
would be banned until order was restored in the country.415
According to academics, General Abboud’s objective was to Arabize and Islamize
the South through education and social policies and to eliminate demands for
federalism.416 In response to the state of emergency and oppression of the South, highprofile politicians, including Saturnino Ohure, Joseph Oduho, and William Deng, and
large numbers of students fled the South to join other exiles in the bush from 1960 to
1962.417 These exiles, led by Ohure, Oduho, and Deng, formed the Sudan African Closed
Districts National Union (renamed the Sudan African National Union – SANU) to
represent the South’s economic and political interests.418 Its main objectives, according
to Dunstan Wai, were to publicize Southern Sudan’s oppression to the international
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community, in particular the US and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and to
organize a guerrilla movement against Khartoum’s oppressive policies.419
The SANU did not openly voice its desire for the South’s independence and
instead, it proclaimed ‘self-determination’ as its objective in order to avoid political
backlash from neighbouring states and regional organisations that wanted to maintain the
existing borders for stability. 420 In 1963 the SANU announced the formation of the
“Anya-Nya,” bands of freedom (and separatist) fighters whose aims were to educate and
free the South from the North.421 Amidst the military regime, strict political censorship,
and Khartoum’s repression of the South, the Anya-Nya began its assaults on the
government’s posts in the South in 1962.422
The Anya-Nya’s activities proved effective at disrupting Sudan’s political and
economic progress thereby prompting Abboud to launch an inquiry into the conflict.423
The instability and violence led to increased criticism and dissatisfaction with the military
regime, triggering mass demonstrations (especially by students) and a general strike,
which ultimately brought down the military regime.424 The Revolution of 1964 forced
General Abboud to step down and he was replaced by a transitional national government
comprised of the NUP, the PDP, the Umma, and the Islamic Charter Front (ICF), a
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student organization group formed in the 1960s. The fall of the military regime marked
the founding of the Southern Front Party by Southern intelligentsia living in Khartoum.425
The new government of Sudan felt compelled to resolve the conflict with the
South by offering amnesty to all Sudanese in exile and called for a conference to settle
Sudan’s political issues.426 The Round Table Conference of 1965 included all Southern
political parties and associations, Northern political parties, and observers from
neighbouring states. Its objective was to “discuss the Southern Question with a view to
reaching an agreement which shall satisfy the special interests of the South as well as the
general interests of the North.”427 However, due to intractable differences regarding the
status of the South and the actions of the Anya-Nya, the conference abruptly ended in two
weeks. In addition, and although both sides agreed that there must be devolution of
powers between Khartoum and the South, there was disagreement regarding the
prerogatives of each government.428
In 1965 Saturnino Ohure and Joseph Oduho broke away from the SANU, then led
by Aggrey Jaden, and established the Azania Liberation Front (ALF). 429 However,
pressure from South Sudanese intellectuals and students (i.e., Southern Sudan Students
Union) compelled the ALF and the SANU to merge into a single entity under the ALF
banner and to be led by Oduho and Jaden.430 In 1967, Jaden toured the Equatoria to rally
and secure support from the chiefs of the region and other influential South Sudanese
officials. Jaden then convened a meeting of three hundred delegates from the South in
425
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order to form a new government that would lead South Sudan. 431 It produced the
Southern Sudan Provisional Government (SSPG) and merged all the rebel factions under
a single entity called the Anya-Nya National Armed Forces (ANAF).432
The formation of the SSPG was soon followed by the second national convention
to discuss the way forward for South Sudan.

The SSPG was renamed the Nile

Provisional Government (NPG) to be elected in a democratic manner and to protect and
advance Southern interests. 433 The election of Gordon Muortat as president led to
divisions due to the inequitable distribution of cabinet posts across the three Southern
states. 434 Despite the progress however, internal divisions and rivalries – this time
between Muortat and Joseph Lagu – continued to weaken South Sudan’s liberation
movement.435 Ultimately, Muortat dissolved the NPG to make way for Lagu’s Southern
Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) in 1970.436
North-South relations further deteriorated following the failure of the conference
and the inability of the North and the South to come to terms on a political settlement.
Following general elections in Sudan, the Umma party and the NUP formed a coalition
government led by Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub. 437 The government of Mahgoub
adopted a policy of force aimed at “annihilating” the South’s educated class.438 This
policy, however, only encouraged more Southerners to migrate into the bush and into
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neighbouring countries to join the other refugees. The continued violence and political
instability in Khartoum once again compelled the military to overthrow the government.
The bloodless coup d’état of 1969 was led by to the formation of the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) and Colonel Jaafar Mohammed Numayri.439
Colonel Numayri subsequently banned all political parties, suspended the
constitution, and dissolved the Supreme Court.440 Abel Alier, a member of the Southern
Front in Khartoum, advised Numayri that local autonomy for the South would end the
violence and create stability. 441 Despite peaceful overtures and calls of amnesty for
Southerners abroad from the Numayri government, few Southerners trusted Khartoum.
These suspicions were heightened by the delay in the implementation of the local
autonomy policy and political instability in the capital. Numayri’s regime faced an
unsuccessful coup d’état from the Communist Party largely as a result of an intervention
from Libya and Egypt.442 The failed coup against Numayri’s regime and the general
unrest in the North, however, pushed the Numayri regime to consider a peace settlement
with the South to avoid a two-front war.443 Furthermore, it became increasingly clear to
Khartoum and the SSLM that a military victory was unlikely for either side.444 In this
context, Numayri appointed Abel Alier as the minister responsible for Southern Affairs
and in charge of initiating the peace settlement.
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The peace talks were held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia beginning in 1971 between
the SSLM and representatives of Sudan’s central government.445 Negotiations were to be
conducted with a united Sudan as a precondition. The Southern representatives sought a
federal Sudan that would grant the South a regional government and control over other
policy areas such as education and trade. 446 Khartoum, meanwhile, was unwilling to
grant such extensive autonomy to the South. Despite the differences, the Addis Ababa
Agreement was signed March 1972 and included the following terms.

The three

Southern states were recognized as a “self-governing” region with legislative and
executive bodies. The legislative organ, the People’s Regional Assembly (PRA), was to
be elected by Southerners and would be responsible for legislating issues outlined in the
Addis Ababa Agreement. The executive organ, the High Executive Council (HEC), was
to be led by a President appointed by the President of Sudan on the recommendation of
the People’s Regional Assembly.

Juba was the capital of Southern Sudan and the

location for the PRA and the HEC and English was the “principal” language of the
Southern Region. Finally, the South would host 12,000 officers represented equally by
soldiers from the South and the North. This allowed for the integration of Anya-Nya
fighters into the Sudanese army.447
Prominent Sudanese and South Sudanese experts reacted to the Addis Ababa
Agreement with hopeful but cautious optimism.

Mohamed Omer Beshir, Sudanese

intellectual and chair of the 1965 Round Table Conference, acknowledged that both sides
were looking for peace, but warned that the Agreement “was just the beginning of a more
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difficult and complex task – the promotion of economic and social development in the
South and the consolidation of the political unity of the Sudan.” 448 Writing in 1976,
Nelson Kasfir, highlighted the North and South’s commitment to the agreement, but also
noted that Southerners remained distrustful of Khartoum and that the “advantages of the
Addis Ababa Agreement are withering away, and its legitimacy disappearing.”449
Bona Malwal, a Southerner and Numayri’s Minister of Culture and Information,
was less optimistic and cited three issues in the Sudan. He argued that the role of Islam
in the government could not work in the long-term, that Sudan must allow for a multiparty political system, and that the economy was not benefitting the whole of Sudan.450
Douglas Johnson criticized the Agreement for furnishing the South with “qualified
legislative authority, poorly defined economic powers, and an ambiguous understanding
of the security forces.” 451 Furthermore, the Agreement was unpopular with Northern
elites who thought it granted too much autonomy and would encourage separatism in the
South.
Despite some reservations, there can be no doubt that the Agreement was
welcomed following a costly civil war. Abel Alier, the architect of the Agreement,
reveals that the civilian population suffered a majority of the deaths during the first civil
war. Alier estimates there were 170,000 to 500,000 civilian casualties compared to 500
to 600 killed soldiers on both sides.452 The Addis Ababa Agreement ended the civil war
and provided an opening for settling the North-South conflict with a political settlement.
448
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Instead, however, the 1972 Agreement turned out to be a temporary solution that failed to
address the fundamental and root problems in the Sudan. This is demonstrated by the
resumption of the conflict in the 1980s with the onset of the second civil war. The period
following the Agreement was expected to provide the South with autonomy and to
provide economic development. 453 Instead, the autonomy was limited and the South
received only fractions of the development budget promised from Khartoum.454 Rather
than fostering reconciliation and progress, therefore, the period following the 1972
Agreement was characterized by more broken promises and the unwillingness of
Khartoum to adhere to the agreement. These issues were exacerbated by the discovery of
oil in the South, which contributed to the onset of the second civil war.455
The above narrative is intended to demonstrate that South Sudan’s primary
objective was to attain federalism. Although the 1972 agreement outlined selfgovernment for the South, it did not meet the South’s requests and Khartoum reneged on
most of the terms outlined in the agreement.

Rather than reconciliation, the 1972

Agreement further marginalized the South and fostered an environment of mistrust
between the South and Khartoum. Despite its collapse and a second civil war, South
Sudan maintained that federalism would be the solution to the conflict. Khartoum’s
unwillingness to address the South’s political and economic grievances resulted in the
second civil war and the South’s ultimate secession.
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The Second Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005)
The discovery of oil in Southern Sudan in 1978 heightened Khartoum’s fears regarding
the breakup of Sudan. Soon thereafter, President Numayri paid a visit to the US where he
also met with Chevron officials to discuss the construction of a pipeline, connected to
Port Sudan, to transport the oil from South Sudan to the international markets.456 This
sparked demonstrations in the South, which believed that the pipeline ought to be
connected to Mombasa Port in Kenya. Numayri and the North were infuriated and
viewed the issue in terms of North-South divisions.457 Abel Alier notes that “oil became a
considerable factor in Sudanese politics and contributed in no small way not only to the
intensification of North-South conflict but also the internationalization of that
conflict.”458
The discovery of oil and the issues associated with its extraction and revenues
contributed to the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement and the resumption of violence
between Khartoum and Southern rebels in 1983. The issue can be traced back to the
financial details outlined in the Addis Ababa Agreement. In the Agreement, all central
government revenues from the South, including those generated from natural resources,
would fill the Southern government’s coffers.459 Alier believes that Khartoum could have
requested the South to revisit the issue of revenue sharing, but instead it chose to pursue a
dishonest policy by altering boundaries so as to annex the oil fields into the North’s
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jurisdiction. 460

Sudan began to export oil in 1999 and significantly increased its

production by 2002.461
The main grievances from the South were Khartoum’s interference in the South’s
political affairs (including the selection of the South’s leadership and meddling in the
regional assembly), neglecting the South’s economic development and connecting the oil
pipeline to Port Sudan, and the redrawing of the South’s boundaries. 462 Another
contributing factor was Numayri’s decision to implement sharia (Islamic law) in the
midst of an economic crisis in Sudan.463 It is at this time that we witness the rise of John
Garang, a US-educated Southerner and a former Anya-Nya officer, who was integrated
into the Sudanese army following the 1972 Agreement. As early as 1982 John Garang
and other Southern officials began assisting the Anya-Nya II rebels by providing them
with weapons.464 Soon thereafter Garang fled to Ethiopia following a clash between the
Sudanese army and Southern soldiers in 1983 in the city of Bor, South Sudan.465
Like the original Anya-Nya, the new movement faced internal divisions. 466
Garang’s bid to lead the SPLM/SPLA, his Marxist undertones, and commitment to a
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united Sudan was supported by Ethiopia and prominent Southern officials in exile.467
Garang’s leadership was opposed by the old order, which believed that the movement
ought to have a political wing and a military wing. Douglas Johnson reveals that the
Anya-Nya II initially referred to different rebel groups operating in the South in the early
1980s and it would not have an impact on North-South relations until 1983.468 Anya-Nya
II was originally comprised of the soldiers who were suspicious of Khartoum and
strongly opposed to integration into a common army with Northerners.469 As such, many
of these ex-Anya-Nya fighters went into exile and by 1983 Southern police and soldiers
abandoned their units to join the rebels.470 It is important to note that Garang and the
SPLM were not demanding independence, but rather the ‘liberation’ of the whole of
Sudan.471 The second civil war began in April of 1983 with clashes between the SPLA
and the Sudanese army along the Sudan-Ethiopia border.472
John Garang outlined the primary cause of the second civil war during his speech
following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Garang said,
In our view the attempt by various Khartoum-based regimes to build a monolithic ArabIslamic state to the exclusion of other parameters of the Sudanese diversity constitutes
the Fundamental Problem of the Sudan and defines the Sudanese conflict. The Sudanese
state has excluded the vast majority of the Sudanese people from governance, and
therefore their marginalization in the political, economic and social fields. This
provoked resistance by the excluded.473
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These unfavourable conditions were exacerbated by Sudan’s stagnant economy, ongoing
political repression, and the escalating civil war. As a consequence, Numayri’s regime
was overthrown in a military coup d’état that installed Sawar El Dahab.474 The military
established the Transitional Military Council to rule for a one-year transitional period to
be followed by elections.

The SPLM, however, refused to end its activities or to

participate in the scheduled elections without a constitutional conference.475 John Garang
explained the South’s position with the following words:
…the Central Problems in the Sudanese war are the dominance of One Nationality; the
Sectarian and Religious Bigotry that dominated the Sudanese political scene since
Independence; and the unequal development in the country…unless the Nationality
Question is solved correctly, the Religious bigotry is destroyed and a balanced
development for all the regions of the Sudan is struck, war is the only invited option in
the Sudan.476

Garang and the South were promised a constitutional convention but it never
materialized. The frequent broken promises fostered an environment of mistrust between
the South and Khartoum and, as we will see, this mistrust was one of the factors that
made secession more appealing than a union with Khartoum. The elections of 1986
propelled Sadiq al-Mahdi to power following the formation of a coalition government
comprised of the Umma party, the National Islamic Front (NIF), the Democratic Unionist
Party, and other smaller parties. Al-Mahdi failed to convene the constitutional
convention, refused to repeal Numayri’s sharia policy from 1983, and in fact moved
closer to the creation of an Islamic state.477 It should be noted, however, that the SPLA’s
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actions contributed to al-Mahdi’s decision to suspend the peace negotiations. In August
1986, the SPLA shot down a Sudan Air airplane and killed all 60 civilians.478
Like previous governments before him, al-Mahdi’s government was fraught with
corruption and came under increased criticism by the Sudanese population. Despite its
weakness, however, Johnson notes that in 1989 al-Mahdi and the SPLM were moving
towards negotiating a peace settlement that was thwarted by the National Islamic Front
(NIF) and a group of army officers who staged a coup against al-Mahdi and installed
Omar al-Bashir as president.479 The new regime was characterized by strong Islamist
leanings and sought to implement sharia in Sudan. 480 Bashir formed the National
Congress Party (NCP) following a split with the NIF in 1999, but preserved the NIF’s
ideology for continuity.481
In the meantime, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) resorted to force in
order to maintain the movement’s internal order and to prevent a breakup. Douglas
Johnson argues that Garang’s control over the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
(SPLM) and SPLA relied heavily on support from Ethiopia.482
The fall of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, therefore, had severe consequences
for SPLA’s unity and its ability to wage a war against Khartoum.483 The consequences
were felt immediately as rival factions (i.e., the SPLA-Nasir led by Riek Machar and Lam
Akol) within the SPLA began to break away and challenge Garang’s movement. Machar
and Akol disagreed with Garang’s objective of securing Southern autonomy within a
478
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united Sudan and instead called for South Sudan’s independence. In addition, Garang
faced opposition from factions who perceived the SPLA as Dinka-dominated and a threat
to their tribes.484 To this end, the Nasir faction allied itself with Khartoum in order to
defeat Garang’s SPLA and move towards independence. The factionalism within the
SPLA resulted in tribal rivalries and violence between the Nuer and Dinka ethnic groups
with the Dinka supporting Garang and the Nuer supporting Machar.485 As a consequence
of its alliance with Khartoum and for its tribalistic structure however, the Nasir
movement’s support waned.486
The peace process stalled due to the instability and the wavering of successive
governments in Khartoum.487 For example, during negotiations held in Nigeria in 1992,
Khartoum rejected Garang’s proposal for a secular Sudan and a referendum on the
South’s future.488 One year later, Khartoum offered a federal constitution that did not
explicitly refer to Islam as the state religion, but the SPLM rejected this proposal and
instead asked for a secular and confederal framework. 489 The issues of religion and
autonomy appeared to be the main obstacles to a permanent solution. Sudan’s civil war
and the threat it posed to regional security prompted the regional organisation InterGovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to initiate peace talks between the two
sides in 1993.490 IGAD’s initial resolution was accepted by the SPLM but eventually
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rejected by Khartoum on the grounds that its principles were unacceptable.491 Four years
later Khartoum signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement with Riek Machar’s South Sudan
Independence Movement and the Fashoda Agreement with Lam Akol’s SPLM-United
under the auspices of the “peace from within” initiative. Both agreements recognized the
South’s right to self-determination and would serve as the basis for the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement.492
The peace process was then taken up by the US, Britain, Norway, and Italy
(referred to as the ‘Quartet’) with the appointment of US Senator John Danforth as a
special envoy.493 IGAD, however, maintained its participation and continued to push for
a settlement.

Danforth’s involvement sparked immediate results beginning with a

ceasefire agreement that paved the way for negotiations and greater US involvement.494
This was soon followed by the 2002 meeting in Machakos, Kenya wherein the two sides
came to an agreement on the role of religion in Sudan and the issue of selfdetermination.495 Under this protocol, the North would adhere to Islamic laws and the
South would be secular.496
Although some have argued that US and international involvement was driven by
the increased production of oil and the desire to isolate Sudan from terrorist
organizations, it nonetheless encouraged negotiations and mediated the peace
agreement. 497 The Machakos Protocol on the role of religion was followed by the
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Agreement on Wealth Sharing of 2004 and other protocols, including the Power Sharing
Protocol, were finalised and signed into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in
Nairobi, Kenya in 2005.498 The CPA was to be monitored by the United Nations Mission
in Sudan (UNMIS). The CPA provided for a six-year interim period that was intended to
convince Southerners that Sudanese unity was the best option for moving forward. 499
Since 2005, therefore, South Sudan can be categorized as a de facto state.
South Sudan’s status from 2005 to 2011 fits the definition of de facto state as an
entity that controls a defined territory, provides an array of services to the population, and
enters into diplomatic and economic relations with other states, but it does not possess de
jure recognition. During this time, the Government of South Sudan exercised
administrative authority over the political and economic affairs of three historically
Southern provinces (i.e., Bahr al-Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile), which were divided
into ten states.500 The CPA granted South Sudan autonomy for a six-year transitional
period that was intended to convince the South that a federation with Sudan was the most
attractive option for the future.
The CPA included six protocols (or chapters) that outlined the political,
economic, and security arrangements of Sudan, South Sudan, and other conflict areas
including Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile. The Machakos section of the CPA called on
all parties to defend the unity of Sudan under a democratic framework that would lead to
a ‘comprehensive solution’ to the political and economic crises in the Sudan and to
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address the grievances of the South.501 The two subsequent clauses, however, equipped
South Sudan with self-government and the right to self-determination in the form of a
referendum to decide its future.502 This process was to be undertaken and implemented
during the six-year interim period. Under the power sharing arrangement, Sudan was to
establish the Government of National Unity with a “decentralized system of government
with significant devolution of powers.”503 The chapter on wealth sharing outlined the
principles for distributing Sudan’s wealth and in particular the revenues generated from
the South’s oil reserves. Sudan was entitled to 50 percent of the oil revenue generated in
the South and the remaining 50 percent belonged to South Sudan.504
Ultimately the CPA was a failure. 505 Explanations for the failure of the CPA
include the lack of mutual trust between Khartoum and the South, the exclusion of other
groups in the negotiation process (e.g., the negotiations were conducted exclusively with
the National Congress Party and the SPLM), and the inability to properly implement the
CPA.506 For example, the interim period from 2005 to 2011 was marred by “hostility
between Sudan and southern Sudan,” including military clashes and political boycott in
the National Unity Government by the South.507 It should also be noted that the Darfur
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war, which broke out in 2003 shortly after the Machakos Protocol, disrupted the peace
process and took away the international community’s attention from the implementation
of the CPA.508 For these reasons, in 2011 South Sudan was on the brink of seceding from
Sudan.
From a theoretical perspective, South Sudan’s behaviour and preferences are best
explained by liberalism. First, institutional factors and economic incentives played a
significant role in shaping the South’s preferences and behaviour from the first civil war
to 2005. South Sudan repeatedly requested federalism and economic development as
conditions for its continued participation in the union. Instead of meeting these requests,
Khartoum further marginalized and oppressed the South, a policy that led to two civil
wars. Realism and constructivism also offer some insights into the behaviour of South
Sudan. First, realist assumptions about the importance of security and survival shed light
on the behaviour and preferences of Khartoum and the South. Both actors may have been
influenced by security imperatives given the environment of mistrust and the brutal civil
war and violence. Finally, constructivism and its emphasis on ethnic entrepreneurs help
to explain the behaviour of South Sudanese officials competing for power and influence
in South Sudan.

Capabilities
Sudan’s two civil wars demonstrate that South Sudan did not possess the power or
capabilities to achieve independence. The civil wars were long and drawn out conflicts
that pitted South Sudanese armed groups against the regime in Khartoum. Although
Khartoum found it difficult to defeat the armed groups, the South Sudanese found it
508
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equally difficult to extract any meaningful concessions from the central government. The
ensuing stalemate culminated in a negotiated settlement to the conflict. South Sudan
ultimately became a de facto state through the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
in 2005. However limited, therefore, South Sudan possessed sufficient capabilities for
bringing Khartoum to negotiate and agree to a peace agreement. This achievement
supports realist claims about the importance of capabilities for survival. At the same time,
South Sudan’s decision to accept the CPA was shaped by the promise of autonomy,
economic development, and a more democratic Sudan. The CPA contained political
institutions and economic incentives that were appealing to the South and which
ultimately could have preserved the union of Sudan.
Liberal assumptions related to political institutions and economic factors provide
valuable insights into South Sudan’s decision to negotiate and accept the CPA. As
outlined above, the CPA furnished South Sudan with extensive political and economic
autonomy within a united Sudan. This arrangement was sufficient for appeasing the
South to maintain de facto status rather than immediately push for independence.
Liberalism, with its emphasis on institutional design and economic factors, thus provides
the most thorough explanation for the emergence of South Sudan. The next section will
further demonstrate the importance of political institutions and economic incentives. The
section will reveal that South Sudan held an independence referendum not because it
possessed the capabilities or because independence is inherently preferable to de facto
statehood, but because Khartoum failed to abide by the rules of the CPA.
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The Behaviour of South Sudan
Preferences
South Sudan declared independence 1 July 2011 following a referendum that
overwhelmingly supported secession from Sudan. The January 2011 referendum asked
the voters of South Sudan to “confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the
system of government established under the Peace Agreement; or vote for secession.”509
The results of the referendum, monitored by the UN and African Union, demonstrated
that Khartoum had failed to convince the South that unity was the best way forward.
Approximately 98.8 percent of voters voted in favour of secession and about 97 percent
of eligible voters cast a ballot. South Sudan’s secession is viewed as a failure of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which was intended to give unity another
chance. 510
Secession was not inevitable. Indeed, contrary to the conventional wisdom in the
extant literature, South Sudan supported federalism as a way to maintain the unity of
Sudan. John Garang, for one, believed that the solution was an inclusive political system
that provided the various regions with autonomy. Garang and the SPLM’s demands
indicate that the South was willing to forgo independence and maintain Sudan’s unity
under the right conditions. Since the 1980s and the 1990s, Garang and the SPLM called
for economic and political equality for all the people of Sudan.511 In his speech following
the CPA signing in 2005, Garang said:
The solution to the fundamental problem of Sudan is to evolve an “all-inclusive Sudanese
state” which we have called the New Sudan, a “new Sudanese political dispensation” in
which all Sudanese are equal stakeholders irrespective of their religion, race, tribe or
gender, and if this does not work, then look for other solutions, such as splitting the
509
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country…As is the case in the South, the events in Darfur, Eastern Sudan and elsewhere
have made it clear that we must have an “all- inclusive Sudanese state” at the national
level and full devolution of power to the various regions of the Sudan, for otherwise it is
unlikely that the country would stand any chance of remaining united.512

Given that Garang and his SPLM were willing to settle for autonomy within a united
Sudan, what explains the secession of the South?
The South’s decision to secede from Sudan was strongly influenced by the
domestic politics of Sudan and the South Sudan. On the domestic front, Khartoum’s
inability or unwillingness to implement the important provisions of the CPA contributed
to the secession of the South. Key provisions included the implementation of a federal
system, the allocation of resources, a more representative civil service, and a functioning
democracy with free and fair elections.513 Few of these reforms were implemented and
ultimately the CPA functioned as a ceasefire rather than a constitution.514 Khartoum’s
vacillation on implementing democratic practices and the continued violence deepened
the mistrust and convinced the South that unity would not work.

Asteris Huliaras

contends that the breakup of Sudan can be attributed to Khartoum and the NCP’s
unwillingness to democratize. 515 This is supported by the SPLM’s suspicions about
Khartoum’s ability to democratize and establish a federal and pluralistic Sudan. 516
Brendan O’Leary says, “In Sudan, the South’s potential federalists became committed
secessionists because they (correctly) estimated that they faced a central power unwilling
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to make the necessary accommodations to make unity attractive.” 517 This issue was
highlighted by the failure of both sides to form a coalition Government of National
Unity.518
The condition of autonomy or a federal framework presupposes that the political
system in question is democratic or will transition to a multi-party democracy. There has
been little chance for democracy to thrive in Sudan since independence. According to
Sidahmed, “there are serious doubts about the NCP’s [National Congress Party]
democratic credentials and its commitment to advancing a democratic transformation of
the country.”519 After all, a military regime overthrew a democratic government and has
committed human rights violations against the people of Sudan ever since.520 In addition,
the historical account of Sudan illustrates its troubled history and unstable political
system. Since independence in 1956, Sudan has witnessed three civilian parliamentary
administrations (1956–58, 1965–69, and 1986–89) all preceded by a transitional period
and three military regimes (1958–64, 1969–85, and 1989–present). As a consequence,
say Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed, the government in Khartoum was not
able to implement policies that could encourage social, political, and economic
development.521
Furthermore, the parliamentary governments were plagued by internal disputes
that compelled governments to focus on their resources on survival rather than
implementing effective governance.522 In addition, the frequency and ease with which
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military coups occurred displays the weak democratic institutions in Sudan. These facts
support the notion that Sudan’s post-independence experience is understood as a state of
“perpetual turbulence” as it grappled with unstable political regimes and two long civil
wars in the South.523
A second domestic factor that shaped the South’s preference for independence
was the accidental death of John Garang. 524 John Garang, a committed federalist,
promoted federalism and the unity of Sudan under the auspices of a ‘New Sudan’
following the signing of the CPA. Garang believed that South Sudan could prosper in a
united, federal, and democratic Sudan that treated all regions and groups fairly. His death
paved the way for those, such as Garang’s successor Salva Kiir, the former head of the
SPLA, who favoured independence. 525 Kiir became the leader of South Sudan and
Sudan’s first Vice-President, but he showed little interest in the unity of Sudan and
instead focused on the development of the South.526
Kiir and others, such as Atem Garang, promoted South Sudan’s independence to
ensure the protection of the South’s religious, economic, and political rights. On the
domestic front, South Sudan’s government urged Southerners to vote for independence in
order to end Northern domination.

For example, in a 2009 speech in Juba, Kiir

proclaimed: “When you reach your ballot boxes the choice is yours: you want to vote for
unity so that you become a second class in your own country, that is your choice…If you
want to vote for independence so that you are a free person in your independent state, that
523
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will be your own choice and we will respect the choice of the people.”527
A final factor that shaped South Sudan’s preference for independence and
decision to secede from Sudan is the presence of the old regime. The case of South
Sudan demonstrates that political autonomy is insufficient if the ‘old regime’ (i.e., the
regime responsible for oppressing the de facto state and with which the de facto entity has
fought a war) holds power at the national level. The presence of the old regime is a bitter
reminder of the past, which prevents obstacles to the development of trust between the de
facto state and the parent state. For instance, the notion of an autonomous framework for
the South was not attractive under the Bashir regime given that it repeatedly disregarded
promises of autonomy.528 The presence of the Omar al-Bashir regime contributed to the
South’s uneasiness regarding the CPA and the South’s position in Sudan. After all,
Bashir was in power for much of the second civil war.
From this perspective, it is not difficult to understand why the South could not
trust the regime in Khartoum. There was a certain level of mistrust between the South
and the regime in Khartoum that would have been difficult to overcome. Cecil Eprile
best sums up the issue of mistrust. He says, “Southerners were to say – with justification
– that the North did not keep any promise or give real consideration to the South’s desire
for federation. Northerners were to say – also not without justification – that it was never
quite clear what was meant by ‘federation’ in the Sudanese context.”529
Realism would argue that South Sudan’s decision to hold a referendum and
subsequently declare independence is a response to the security dilemma facing ethnic
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groups in multiethnic states. The two civil wars and the uncertainty of Khartoum’s
intentions compelled South Sudan to move towards independence rather than settle for
autonomy or de facto statehood. The peace settlement could not attenuate the competition
for security and the enduring ethnic differences between North and South and, as a result,
the preference for independence is fixed. The concept of self-help further compelled
South Sudan to pursue independence in order to survive in a system wherein states cannot
rely on others for survival. South Sudan demonstrates, however, that an actor’s decisionmaking is influenced by considerations other than security and capabilities. Regional and
international factors, domestic politics, and the nature of the parent’ state’s regime also
play a significant role in shaping de facto state preferences.
A constructivist explanation would emphasize the role of elites in pushing South
Sudan towards independence. This notion has some support from South Sudan’s
behaviour from 2005 to 2011. Elites such as Salva Kiir and Atem Garang shifted South
Sudan’s preference after seizing power. Kiir and Atem Garang believed that
independence was the best policy for South Sudan. Certainly elites such as Kiir and
Atem Garang benefited from the South’s independence. Kiir has been the president of
South Sudan since independence and Atem Garang has held various high-ranking
governmental positions, including the position of Chief Whip of the South Sudan
parliament. Still elites, however, operate within and are constrained by the domestic,
regional, and international systems.
Although realism and constructivism provide valuable insights, they cannot fully
explain the secession of South Sudan.

Liberalism’s focus on the role of political

institutions, economic incentives, and the domestic political system provides a better
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explanation for the South’s decision to secede from Sudan. The secession of South
Sudan can be explained by three primary factors. First, although the CPA furnished the
South with political autonomy, Khartoum’s ‘history of bad acts’ (i.e., violence against
and oppression of the South and broken promises) and its unwillingness to undertake
meaningful democratic reforms did little to assuage the South’s mistrust and suspicions
of Khartoum.

Second, the internal divisions within South Sudan demonstrate that

domestic politics and the struggle for influence and power between actors can shape the
preferences and behaviour of actors. Finally, the union with Sudan did not present the
South with meaningful economic incentives (This point will be further examined in the
next section.)

Capabilities
Like Kosovo, South Sudan did not possess the internal military or political capabilities to
secede from Sudan. However, South Sudan did not require military capabilities given
that it possessed the legal framework, in the form of the CPA, to secede from Sudan.
Still, South Sudan required some degree of capabilities to make the secession successful
and peaceful. The South found such capabilities in the form of support from regional and
international actors, including neighbouring governments and the US.

This support

bolstered the South’s capabilities and provided the international support necessary for
independence.
Neighbouring states played a role in shaping and influencing Sudan’s political
trajectory since its independence.

In the early stages of the first civil war, the

international community largely supported the government in the North.
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Both the

Organization of African Unity and the Arab League supported Khartoum, which they
recognized as the legal and legitimate representative of Sudan. These organisations were
particularly invested in maintaining the territorial integrity of Sudan: The former had an
interest in discouraging other secessionist and nationalist groups, which were quite
prevalent in Africa; while the latter remained loyal to its Arab brethren in the North. The
major powers also sided with Khartoum in the early stages of the conflict. For instance,
the Soviet Union provided substantial military aid to Khartoum. The US publicly stated
that it would refrain from becoming directly involved in the conflict, but privately
provided support to Khartoum in the form of economic and military aid.530
Although most states openly supported Khartoum, the South also received
clandestine support from neighbouring states sympathetic to its cause.531 For example,
the Sudan African National Union (SANU) was successful in establishing branches in
neighbouring Kenya, Ethiopia, and the Congo and an office in the United Kingdom.532
The base in Ethiopia became the most effective. Once it was formed, the SANU initiated
a diplomatic effort to garner support from neighbouring African countries and established
lobbies in Europe to procure political and financial assistance.533 When a Soviet-backed
military junta, the Derg (Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and
Territorial Army), came to power in Ethiopia in 1974, the United States took a stronger
interest in preserving the stability of Sudan, which it viewed as a regional counterweight
to bordering Ethiopia.534 By the 1980s, the US saw Sudan as an important strategic ally
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against Soviet interests in Africa.535 However, by the late 1980s Sudan’s importance for
Washington declined, as Soviet interests in Africa waned.536
Under the George W. Bush administration, Washington became heavily involved
in negotiating a peace settlement during the Second Civil War, in part because doing so
was related to the broader war on terror.537 During these negotiations, headed by John
Danforth, the irreconcilable differences between the two sides became apparent, as both
had become entrenched in their respective positions. Though Asteris Huliaras argues that
there “is no evidence that Washington’s involvement was accompanied by an agenda
favouring partition,” American involvement in the conflict is widely seen (especially by
the Northern Sudanese) to have facilitated the eventual dissolution of Sudan.538
African governments were more supportive of South Sudan’s secession. Uganda
openly supported Sudan’s breakup in response to Khartoum’s support for Uganda’s
separatist Lord’s Resistance Army.539 Ethiopia also responded to Khartoum’s support for
Eritrea by supporting the SPLM/A. According to Belete Belachew Yihun, Ethiopia
played a significant role in contributing to the breakup of Sudan.540 Sudan’s support for
the Eritrean secessionist movement pushed Ethiopia to adopt policies aimed at
destabilising Sudan, including “unconditional support to the SPLM/A.” 541 In short,
Ethiopia’s involvement in Sudan’s internal affairs and support for the South Sudan
contributed to the instability and the secession of the South. Regional and international
535
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actors contributed to the secession of the South.
As a result of the tremendous support for the South from regional and
international governments, Khartoum had few options for preventing the South from
holding the referendum and seceding. Three factors in particular impeded Khartoum
from taking action against the South. First, under the CPA, the South was entitled to hold
a referendum on independence in January 2011. Second, the regime in Khartoum was
under intense pressure from the international community for its human rights abuses (e.g.,
in 2010 the International Criminal Court issued charges of genocide against Omar alBashir) and for its support of terrorism.542 Finally, US and broader international support
for the South meant that Khartoum had few options in responding to the secession.543
The behaviour of South Sudan also lends support to the hypotheses outlined in
this dissertation. Hypothesis one declares that a de facto state will pursue independence
when the parent state is unwilling to provide ‘sufficient accommodation’ in the form of
political institutions (e.g., autonomy and federalism). The case of South Sudan offers
some new insights regarding this hypothesis. The presence of the old regime is a major
roadblock to progress and unity for the de facto state and the parent state. In addition,
without democracy, the parent state has little chance of convincing the de facto entity to
forgo independence.
Hypothesis two states that a de facto state will stop short of independence when it
has secured autonomy from the parent state and the de facto status offers more economic
and political benefits than full independence.
542
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O’Ballance notes that Khartoum appeared to be willing to grant autonomy under the
auspices of the 2005 CPA to the South along the same lines as the 1972 Agreement.
However, the South believed that such an agreement was inequitable given that it would
have allowed the North to reap economic benefits from the South’s natural resources.544
As mentioned above, a continued union with Sudan was a political risk that the South
was no longer willing to make. In terms of the economic benefits, the South concluded
that the union with Sudan would in fact hurt the South’s economic development. The
South was endowed with vast natural resources, and in particular oil, that it could export.
In other words, South Sudan did not believe the CPA advanced its economic and political
interests and the union, therefore, did not present the South with any meaningful
economic incentives from a weak Sudanese economy.
Appendix II presents the economic performance of Sudan (1994-2012) and South
Sudan (2008-2012). The strong growth Sudan experienced from 1999 to 2010 was
largely fuelled by oil exports from the South. Since the secession of the South, the World
Bank estimates that “oil production has fallen by three quarters, revenues have more than
halved and the economy is in recession.” 545

The South also incurred significant

economic costs related to its secession following the shutting down of the oil pipelines.
However, South Sudan has rebounded strongly in 2013 and its economic outlook is
positive for the coming years as oil production resumes to post-shutdown levels.546
Khartoum, therefore, offered Juba little economic incentives for maintaining the
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union. For instance, the CPA stipulated that revenues generated from oil production were
to be divided equally between South Sudan and Khartoum following a ‘payment of
stabilization.’ That is, as the oil-producing region the South was entitled to an initial two
per cent of the oil revenue and the remaining revenue was then to be divided equally
between the Government of South Sudan and Khartoum. In addition, the South was
entitled to 50 percent of all non-oil revenue collected in Southern Sudan by Khartoum.547
The issue is that the South sits atop large quantities of oil reserves. Therefore, a union
with the South is economically attractive from Khartoum’s standpoint, but certainly not
from Juba’s perspective. The CPA, in effect, took away 50 percent of the South’s oil
revenue.
Ultimately, South Sudan’s secession was not inevitable. Indeed, the breakup of
Sudan was a direct result of Khartoum’s actions and unwillingness to accommodate the
South’s political and economic needs. In other words, the appropriate political institutions
and economic incentives would have contributed to the unity of Sudan. The South’s right
to secession was grounded on Khartoum’s refusal to make concessions to the South and
its failure to uphold the 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the 2005 CPA. One could
counter argue that the CPA provided the necessary political and economic framework for
South Sudan, and yet it failed to stop the South’s secession. However, one of the primary
reasons for the collapse of the CPA was the presence of the old regime. The presence of
the Bashir regime contributed to a sense of mistrust between Khartoum and the South.
The South found it difficult to participate in a union with a regime it could not trust.
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Conclusion
This chapter has argued that South Sudan’s secession from Sudan was the product of
political miscalculations from successive regimes in Khartoum. Since independence, the
South’s requests for political and economic autonomy within a federal Sudan were
rejected by oppressive regimes in Khartoum. Decades of political repression and civil
war ultimately pushed the South to secession. The chapter relied on empirical and
theoretical grounding to make the argument that South Sudan’s decision to secede from
Sudan was the result of decades of political conflict due to Khartoum’s unwillingness to
make concessions to the South.

Empirically, the chapter outlined the political

relationship between the South and Khartoum since Sudan’s independence.

This

historical and political account demonstrates that a political solution was viable in the
Sudan, but that instability in Khartoum and the unwillingness of successive governments
to furnish the South with autonomy, ultimately led to Sudan’s breakup.
Theoretically, the chapter outlined the central assumptions of realism,
constructivism, and liberalism in order to explain South Sudan’s preferences and
behaviour. The chapter concluded that South Sudan’s preferences and behaviour were
shaped by the absence of political institutions, poor economic development, and the
regional and international contexts.

The chapter further argued that South Sudan’s

behaviour was not the product of security imperatives or capabilities, as realists would
argue. The explanatory power of realism was strongest in the Kosovo case. Still, realist
assumptions also offer some useful insights into the case of South Sudan. At the same
time, the two cases demonstrate that the explanatory power of liberalism is increasingly
stronger from Kosovo to South Sudan. Where we can really see this explanatory power
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of liberalism, and the weakness of realism, is in the Iraqi Kurdistan chapters. Iraqi
Kurdistan demonstrates that realism provides a rather weak explanation, while liberalism
provides a very powerful explanation. These findings and theoretical ideas will be
examined and substantiated in the next chapter with a case study looking at Iraqi
Kurdistan.
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Chapter 5:

Iraqi Kurdistan I

According to the existing literature, the ultimate objective of de facto states is
independence. At the same time, parent states want to reintegrate the de facto entity into
its territory. The potential outcomes of de facto states, therefore, are limited to secession
or reintegration (peaceful or forceful).

Existing research takes the preference for

independence as fixed and gives little consideration to de facto statehood as a long-term
solution. This research asks if there are conditions under which de facto states may forgo
independence in favour of the status quo. The primary objective of this chapter is to
provide the historical context for the case of Iraqi Kurdistan. The case of Iraqi Kurdistan
will further demonstrate that de facto state preferences are neither fixed nor
predetermined.
The chapter will proceed as follows. Section one will trace the history of Iraqi
Kurdistan beginning with the creation of modern Iraq and the turbulent political
relationship between Baghdad and the Kurds. Section two will examine the origins of
Iraqi Kurdistan as a de facto state by tracing the history of the Kurds in Iraq, including
the two rebellions of 1961 and 1974 and the Kurdish role in the Iran-Iraq War. In order
to understand Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour during this period (1960s to 1990), the section
will identify Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and capabilities before it gained de facto status
in 1991. The objective is to determine Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference formation and the
degree to which capabilities influenced its decision-making (i.e., did Iraqi Kurdistan stay
with Iraq because it wanted to or because it had to?).
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Iraqi Kurdistan’s Early History
Iraq was cobbled together at the end of World War I from three former Ottoman Empire
provinces of Mosul, Basra, and Baghdad. According to one source, the British seized
control of Basra and Baghdad from the Ottomans and devised an arrangement with Sharif
Hussein of Mecca to destabilize the Ottoman Empire. In return for orchestrating an Arab
revolt against the Ottomans, Sharif Hussein was promised an Arab state.548 Mosul was
not mentioned in this agreement.549 There is speculation regarding Britain’s decision to
include Mosul in the Iraqi state. Academics argue that British policymakers did not
believe a nascent Iraqi state would be viable without the predominantly Kurdish Mosul
province. Mosul province was significant for two reasons. First, its population would
counteract the majority Shiite population in Baghdad and Basra, and second, Mosul’s oil
provided Iraq with economic viability and Britain with a source of oil. 550 Iraq was
comprised of a majority Shiite population in the south, a large Sunni minority in the west,
a large Kurdish minority in the north, and other minority groups (i.e., Christians, Jews,
and Turkoman) throughout the country. Control over the government apparatus was
given to the Sunni minority for its loyalty to the British, which also allowed the British to
retain influence in Iraq’s policymaking.
From the beginning, therefore, there was little in common between the three major
groups in Iraq. In fact, King Faisal of Iraq lamented the lack of an Iraqi identity in the
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early 1930s. Faisal believed that the missing Iraqi identity and the divisions between the
Shiites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds would make governance difficult. In his words:
This government rules over a Kurdish group most of which is ignorant and which
includes persons with personal ambitions who call upon this group to abandon the
government because it is not their race. [It also] rules a Shia plurality which belongs to
the same ethnic group as the government. But as a result of the discriminations which the
Shiis incurred under [Sunni] Ottoman rule which did not allow them to participate in the
affairs of government, a wide breach developed between these two sects. Unfortunately,
all of this has led Shiis…to abandon a government which they consider to be very bad…I
say with my heart full of sadness that there is not yet in Iraq an Iraqi people.551

These divisions presented problems for King Faisal immediately following the creation of
Iraq, a process that had failed to satisfy the political needs of the Shiites and the Kurds.
For example, the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres between Britain and Turkey contained two
articles relevant to the Kurdish question. Articles 62 and 64 outlined the provisions for
the creation of an independent Kurdish state carved out of territory from modern-day
Turkey and including “areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary
of Armenia…and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia.” 552
However, these were never honoured. A three-member delegation from Europe was to
draft a treaty in order to implement this article. The 1920 treaty, however, was replaced
by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which made no mention of the Kurdish question. An
effective Kurdish response to the post-World War I developments was impossible due to
the geographically divided and tribal Kurdish society. The educated and politically
conscious groups in Kurdish society emerged only after Britain had committed Mosul,
and the Kurds, to Iraq.553 Since its inception, Iraq has been divided by what Ofra Bengio
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calls “a clash between two national movements – the Iraqi Arab and the Kurdish.”554
Whereas Baghdad preferred a centralized Iraq, the Kurds, from the beginning, demanded
self-government.
Kurdish opposition to a centralized Iraqi state manifested as early as 1918 with
Shaikh Mahmud Barzanji, the British appointed governor of the Kurdish areas around
Sulaymaniya.555 Barzanji attempted to extend his power, against British directives, over
the whole of Mosul province, only to be defeated by the British. 556

Although

unsuccessful, Barzanji’s rebellion provided fodder for Kurdish nationalists in Iraq. In
particular, the Kurds did not welcome an Arab government that would attempt to impose
its will on Kurdish tribes. Indeed, David McDowall recounts a clash from 1927 between
Baghdad and Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan who resented governmental intrusion into his
territory and tribal affairs.557 Following two unsuccessful military incursions into Barzan,
Iraqi forces, along with British air support, finally occupied Barzan in 1932. Shaikh
Ahmad fled to Turkey, but his brothers Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, continued
the Barzan rebellion against Baghdad and the British. 558 Although this battle was
between the Barzan tribe and Baghdad, it set the stage for the Barzanis to take up the
Kurdish struggle.
Baghdad believed it could ignore the Kurds and their demands for linguistic and
political rights because of their apparent disorganization and division.559 This was largely
true until the 1930s when a class of educated Kurdish professionals actively promoted
554
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Kurdish nationalism. 560

Baghdad’s oppressive policies encouraged young Kurdish

professionals to organize into groups and societies.561 The educated class, however, was
small and its societies were unable to attract the larger tribal and rural Kurdish
populations. Iraqi Kurds became increasingly vociferous in the 1930s and 1940s to
oppose Baghdad’s policies and expressed their right to self-determination. 562 These
developments coalesced in the early 1940s with a conflict between the Barzani tribe and
the government in Baghdad.

Mulla Mustafa Barzani’s escape from detention in

Sulaymaniya prompted Baghdad to issue an ultimatum for Barzani to turn himself into
Baghdad. 563 Following several failed attempts at rapprochement from 1943 to 1945,
Baghdad decided to launch a military assault against Mustafa Barzani and his alliance of
tribes.564 The government was unable to capture Barzani, but it did succeed in driving
him out of Iraq and into exile in Mahabad, Iran.
Barzani’s two years in exile in Iran were formative for his personal development
and for Kurdish nationalism. Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP – originally
called the Kurdish Democratic Party) of Iraq was established as a branch of the KDP-Iran
after the collapse of the Mahabad Republic in 1946.565 Mahabad, a city in Iran with a
majority Kurdish population, fell to Kurdish nationalists of Iran with Soviet backing
following the Soviet’s occupation of northwestern Iran. 566 The Kurds of Mahabad
established the KDP-Iran in 1945 and with Soviet support, the Kurdish Republic of
560
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Mahabad was declared in 1946.567 Although Mahabad’s independence was short-lived
(less than one year), its establishment was nonetheless significant for Kurdish
nationalism. First, the struggle for Mahabad encouraged the formation of the KDP in
Iran and subsequently in Iraq. The KDP has been one of the principal political parties,
along with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), for advancing Kurdish nationalism in
Iraq. Second, Mulla Mustafa Barzani emerged as a key figure during the struggle to
defend the republic, whereby he established himself as a hero and the leader of the
Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq.
However, Barzani’s time in Mahabad revealed that Kurdish nationalists would
find it difficult to organize under one umbrella. For example, Barzani’s relationship with
Qazi Muhammad, the leader of the KDP-Iran, became increasingly strained and
eventually resulted in an uncooperative alliance.568 The discord between Barzani and the
KDP-Iran encouraged Barzani to create the KDP in Iraq.569 The emergence of the KDP
provided Iraqi Kurds with a voice for their political and economic grievances.570 The
Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq held its first congress in Baghdad on 16 August 1946
and elected Mustafa Barzani as its president-in-exile.571

The KDP grew in popularity

and attracted a large membership, including leftist elements, under the leadership of
Ibrahim Ahmed.572 The party functioned with Barzani in exile for the better part of a
decade.
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For his involvement in the Mahabad Republic, the government in Iran wanted to
capture and punish Barzani for treason. As a result, Barzani and his close followers were
forced into exile in the Soviet Union.573 Despite his absence, Barzani always maintained
a strong grip on his position as the president of the KDP. It is not clear how Barzani
spent his time in the Soviet Union, but he became increasingly popular in Iraq and his
movement gained significant support during his absence.574 In fact, he gained legendary
status among the masses and solidified his dominant position as the leader of not only the
KDP, but also the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq.575
During Barzani’s exile in the Soviet Union, intellectuals such as Ibrahim Ahmed
led the newly formed KDP-Iraq.576 Initially, Barzani faced some internal opposition from
top party officials, but his reputation and strong following allowed him to consolidate
control over the party. Individuals such as Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani eventually
acquiesced to Mustafa Barzani’s tight control. Barzani’s desire for total control over the
KDP, however, would lead to discontent and ultimately a split between those who
supported Barzani and those who supported Ahmed and Talabani. At the time, however,
Barzani needed an organization and the KDP needed a strong leader, which led to a
“marriage of convenience” between the intellectuals on the one hand, and Barzani and the
masses, on the other.577 The KDP seized upon the economic discontent of the 1950s to
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increase its size and support base.578 Although Iraq benefitted from oil revenues, little of
it reached the lower segments of society. 579 Hoping to improve their socioeconomic
welfare, many Kurds from the rural areas joined the KDP. Barzani returned from exile to
a transformed KDP in 1958.
On 14 July 1958, the Free Officers, a group of military officers, overthrew the
Iraqi monarchy in a coup d’état and established a republic. The Free Officers, led by
Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassem, hoped to rebuild a democratic and more tolerant Iraq
that was no longer subservient to British influence. Although the group was mostly
Sunni, its members cut across ethnic and religious lines in an effort to promote pan-Arab
nationalism in line with the pan-Arabists in Egypt and Syria. Despite their apparent panArabism, the Free Officers were also in contact with the KDP before the coup to further
their support base.580 Kamiran Berwari, academic based in Iraqi Kurdistan, notes that
Kurds were hopeful that the republic would provide Kurds with the political space
necessary to participate in Iraq. He says, “The 1958 revolution changed the Kurdish
situation in Iraq. Iraq transformed from a monarchy to a republic and this change opened
the political space for the Kurds to openly debate political issues, Kurdish officials
returned to Baghdad, and Mulla Mustafa Barzani returned to Iraq from the Soviet
Union.”581 Indeed, the Iraqi republic recognized the Kurds and Arabs as partners and, as
a sign of goodwill, Qassem pardoned Mustafa Barzani and released many Kurds from
prison.582
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The period of cooperation between Baghdad and the Kurds was short-lived, as
relations between the KDP and Qassem soon deteriorated. Perhaps the main reason for
the fallout was Qassem’s uneasiness about Barzani’s and the KDP’s growing popularity
and Kurdish demands for autonomy.583 By 1960, Qassem sought to undermine Mustafa
Barzani’s growing strength by arming Barzani’s tribal enemies and encouraging conflict
between them.584 In 1961, when Barzani requested autonomy for the Kurdish region,
Qassem rejected Barzani, pushing the Kurds and Baghdad to the brink of war.585 The war
between Baghdad and its Kurdish population was the first outbreak of large-scale
violence between the two groups and set the stage for decades of conflict and on-again,
off-again violence. The next section will outline the wars and their significance in
shaping the Kurdish relationship with Baghdad.

The Origins of Iraqi Kurdistan as a De Facto State
Preferences
This section will outline Iraqi Kurdistan’s position in Iraq from the early 1960s to the
early 1990s in an effort to identify Kurdish preference formation. More specifically, the
section will explore the following question: What accounts for the preference formation
of the Kurds during this period? The September 1961 revolt was initially sparked by
clashes between tribes and the Qassem government.

Landowners and tribal aghas

(leaders) opposed Qassem’s Agrarian Reform Law, which was aimed at reducing the
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wealth and power of the land owning tribes.586 Landlords and aghas in the Kurdish areas
rebelled against the reform law in order to maintain their advantageous position. Barzani
and the KDP were eventually pulled into the conflict following inter-tribal fighting
between the Barzanis and government-backed tribes, but also due to Qassem’s decision to
bomb the Barzanis.587 Barzani’s involvement in the revolt was more circumstantial than
calculated. 588 Mustafa Barzani attacked Qassem’s weakened tribal allies and secured
control of the Kurdish region. In response to an ambush on an Iraqi military convoy by
one of Barzani’s allies, Qassem retaliated with airstrikes against Kurdish rebels, including
Barzani and his village.589
On September 24 Qassem banned the KDP and thereby forced it into rebellion.
The war between the rebels (comprising tribes and the KDP) and Baghdad was
characterized by intermittent clashes over a period of three years without a decisive
winner. In an effort to break the deadlock, Qassem offered full amnesty for the rebels
and economic development for the Kurdish region. 590 Barzani countered that Kurdish
autonomy must be entrenched in the Iraqi constitution as a precondition to a ceasefire.591
In fact, Barzani publicized his demands in order to demonstrate that the Kurds were
demanding autonomy, not independence.592 Qassem refused Barzani’s demands.
The war continued until the Baath party overthrew Qassem’s regime in 1963.
The Baath party in Iraq was an offshoot of the Baath party in Syria, founded by Michel
Aflaq, a Syrian Christian, and Salah Baitar, a Sunni. The party was founded on the
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ideology of pan-Arab nationalism and socialism and it sought to unite all Arabs
regardless of their religion or ethnicity. It emerged in Iraq in the late 1940s and grew
significantly in the early to mid-1950s. Its first major political undertaking was a small
part in the 1958 revolution that overthrew the monarchy. The Baathists disapproved of
Qassem’s policies and turned their efforts to assassinate him. David McDowall notes that
the KDP agreed not to attack the Iraqi army while the Baath concentrated its efforts on a
coup against Qassem in Baghdad.593 The 1963 coup propelled the Baath party into power
with Ahmad Hasan al Bakr as the Prime Minister and Saddam Hussein as an emerging
figure of the party. The Baathist government was short-lived, as Abdul Salam Arif
ousted it from power in November of 1963.594
During this time, Barzani unilaterally negotiated a ceasefire with Arif that
worsened the divisions between Barzani and Ahmed and Talabani.595 Barzani’s decision
not to consult with other party leaders, especially the likes of Ahmed and Talabani, split
the KDP between Barzani’s faction and those who wanted more consensus in the party’s
decision making. These disagreements highlighted the internal divisions within the KDP.
The divisions were exacerbated by disagreements between the tribal elements, led by
Barzani, and the urban intelligentsia, led by Ahmed and Talabani.596 Barzani and his
supporters hoped to create a party that was loyal to the leader and therefore could not
tolerate individuals such as Ahmed and Talabani who hoped to create a party that was
more modern and consensual.

The split was a consequence of the power struggle
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between traditional (Barzani) and the modern (Ahmed and Talabani) elements in the
KDP. The rift was serious enough that Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani attempted to
remove Barzani as party leader.597 By that time, however, Mulla Mustafa Barzani had a
firm hold on the KDP to the point that he expelled Ahmed and Talabani and their
followers from the party.598
Barzani was unable to reach an agreement with Arif and as a consequence the
Kurds and Baghdad engaged in skirmishes throughout the 1960s. Arif died in a plane
crash and was succeeded by his brother Abdul Rahman Arif in 1966. With help from
military officials, the Baath party removed Rahman Arif from power in a bloodless coup
in 1968.599 It should be noted that although the Baath party in Iraq came to be dominated
by Sunnis, it was not always the case. In fact, the early Baath party in Iraq included
members of all religious and ethnic groups, but became Sunni-dominated over time as
Shiites associated pan-Arabism with Sunni Arabs. As a result, there is a tendency to view
the Baath rule in Iraq in terms of Sunni ideology, but this is not completely accurate.
Although it is true that the Baath party came to be controlled by Sunnis, the party’s
official ideology was always pan-Arabism and socialism.
The Baathists believed that their socialist, humanitarian, and non-ethnic and nonsectarian principles provided the foundations for negotiating peace with the Kurds. 600
More practically, however, the Baath Party understood that it had to settle domestic
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issues in order to effectively confront regional threats (i.e., Iran and Israel) and to
promote its vision of pan-Arab nationalism.601 Following several rounds of negotiations
and provisional agreements, the KDP and the Baath government signed an accord that
ostensibly met the demands of the Kurds.
The 1970 March Manifesto, negotiated by KDP officials and Saddam Hussein,
outlined the political and social rights of the Kurds in Iraq. The most important articles
of the agreement included the linguistic rights, governmental posts for the Kurds,
governmental officials in Kurdish areas would be Kurdish, the Iraqi constitution would
recognize the Kurds as an official nationality, and the Kurds would be furnished with
self-government in areas with a majority Kurdish population.602 In short, the agreement
provided the Kurds with political autonomy – in addition to economic development – and
assurances of cultural and linguistic protection.
Despite the promise of a lasting peace, broken promises from both sides
ultimately led to the collapse of the March Manifesto of 1970. Barzani demanded
increased military and political freedom for the Kurds and demanded the removal of all
Iraqi army contingents from the Kurdish region.603 The Baathists refused to implement
the Manifesto due to disputes over the Kurdish region’s territorial delineation.604 The
most significant dispute centered on the city of Kirkuk. Kirkuk, then as now, is a main
source of tensions between the Kurds and Baghdad. For instance, in the 1970s the
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Baathists altered the demographics of Kirkuk to increase the Arab population so that it
would not fall under Kurdish control.605
In addition, Edgar O’Ballance notes that while Baghdad accused Barzani of
collaborating with Iran, Barzani, in turn, accused Baghdad of increasing its army
presence in the Kurdish region, which contravened the agreement.606 Edmund Ghareeb
argues that the prospect for a permanent peace and the implementation of the 1970 accord
did not come to fruition partly due to the meddling of Iran, Israel, and the US, all of
whom aided and encouraged Barzani to capture all Kurdish territories and to secure
further concessions from Baghdad.607 The US, with encouragement from its ally the Shah
of Iran, supported the Kurds against the Baathist regime, which was hostile to US
interests in the region and receiving support from the Soviets. Iran, in particular, was
heavily involved in aiding the Kurds against Iraq to weaken the regime in Baghdad. Iran
and Iraq shared a mutual animosity for each other and Iran hoped to use the Kurds as a
proxy to destabilize Iraq. The animosity had more to do with geopolitical factors and
regional competition rather than the religious differences between the Sunni-dominated
regime in Iraq and the majority-Shiite Iran.
Iran’s suspicions increased when the Baathists, who wanted to spread their idea of
pan-Arabism in the Persian Gulf, seized power in Baghdad.608 Iran sought to establish
itself as the major power in the region and therefore aided the Kurds to weaken Iraq.609
Iran’s support to Barzani and the Kurds angered Baghdad and engendered a fear amongst
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the Baathists that the Kurds would secede from Iraq.610 Academics agree that military aid
and diplomatic support from these governments likely influenced Barzani’s decision to
jeopardize the peace with Baghdad in favour of more concessions.611
In an effort to salvage the peace, Baghdad offered Barzani and the Kurds the
Autonomy Law in 1974, which Barzani rejected as it effectively stripped the Kurds of the
self-rule promised to them in the 1970 accord. 612 The 1974 accord did not include
control over Kirkuk and it omitted important articles outlined in the 1970 agreement.613
Barzani later revealed that the Kurdish decision to reject Baghdad’s offer of autonomy
was the promise of weapons from the US. Barzani said, “without American promises, we
would not have acted the way we did. Were it not for the American promise, we would
never have become trapped and involved to such an extent.”614 Barzani and the Kurds
believed they could secure further concessions from Baghdad with more military
capabilities supplied by the US and Iran. However, as it was, the Kurds were left to their
own devices and were militarily weak compared to Baghdad.
It is in this context that Baghdad offered Barzani and the Kurds the 1974
Autonomy Law, which reduced Kurdish political, cultural, and economic authority. 615
With assurances from Iran and the US, Barzani rejected Baghdad’s offer and instead,
chose war.

The Kurds were easily defeated when, in March 1975, Iran and Iraq

negotiated the Algiers Agreement on border issues and other disputes between the two
sides, including an end to the Shah’s aid to the Iraqi Kurds in exchange for Iran’s control
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of the Shatt al-Arab boundary.616 Without support from Iran and the US, the Kurds were
easily defeated by Baghdad.
Several consequences followed.617 First, the defeat allowed Baghdad to establish
and extend its control over the Kurdish region.

Second, Barzani’s health quickly

deteriorated to the point that he was no longer able to lead the KDP and the Kurds.
Barzani later died in March 1979 in a hospital in Washington, D.C.. Finally, the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), co-founded by Jalal Talabani, Nawshirwan Mustafa (current
leader of Gorran), and others, emerged as a key political party in Iraqi Kurdistan. Jalal
Talabani and his supporters formally established the PUK on 1 June 1975. 618 The
emergence of the PUK initiated a long period of competition for support and resources in
the Kurdish region between the KDP and the PUK. Although both parties were fighting
for the same cause against a common adversary in Baghdad, they refused to unite. The
Iraqi Kurds were rather quiet and under control until the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in
1980. Baghdad effectively maintained control over the Kurds from 1975 to 1980 and
attempted to assimilate the Kurds in order to prevent a future rebellion.619 To this end,
Baghdad attempted to assassinate the Barzanis, including Massoud Barzani, to weaken
the Kurdish leadership. In addition, Baghdad moved large numbers of Kurds from the
Kurdish region to Arab villages to indoctrinate them with a sense of Iraqi identity.620
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran ushered in significant changes in Iran and
which greatly affected Iraq and the Kurds. First, it replaced the Iranian monarchy with an
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Islamic government. Second, it altered the dynamics between Tehran and the Kurds of
Iraq.

Finally, Saddam Hussein viewed the turmoil and instability in Iran as an

opportunity to retake the Shatt al-Arab territory that Iraq had relinquished in the 1975
Algiers Agreement.

To this end, in September 1980, Saddam Hussein launched a

surprise attack against Iran with the hope of scoring a swift victory.621 Instead, Saddam
became embroiled in a drawn out and bloody war. Kurds, both in Iran and in Iraq,
viewed the onset of the Iran-Iraq War as an opportunity to exploit weakened governments
and militaries in Tehran and Baghdad. In turn, Iran encouraged Iraqi Kurds to fight
Baghdad and, Iraq, likewise, used the Iranian Kurds to fight Tehran.

Rather than

focusing on their objective of securing political and economic rights from their respective
governments, the Kurds became pawns in a proxy war. By 1982 the Kurds were able to
liberate and seize control of Kurdish areas from the Iraqi military.622 At the same time,
the KDP and the PUK were fighting each other for influence in the Kurdish areas of Iraq.
The infighting between the KDP and the PUK pushed Jalal Talabani and his PUK to
negotiate a ceasefire agreement with Baghdad and Saddam Hussein.623 In exchange for
Kurdish autonomy, which never materialized, Baghdad called on the PUK to cease its
assault against the Iraqi army and instead to battle the KDP.624
The Iran-Iraq War was a brutal war of attrition that dragged on for eight years.
The 1987 UN Resolution 598 called for a ceasefire with little effect. Then unexpectedly,
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in July 1988, Iran and Iraq accepted the ceasefire and ended the war.625 The peace with
Iran allowed Saddam to focus his attention on the Kurdish insurrection. Prior to the
implementation of the ceasefire, Saddam Hussein had launched an operation, known as
the Anfal Campaigns, against the Kurdish region of Iraq. His objective was to reclaim
control of Kurdish territories and to punish the Kurds for treason.

The operation

culminated in the gassing of the town of Halabja on 16 March 1988. 626 Exact casualty
figures of the campaign are difficult to ascertain; conservative estimates range from
50,000 to as many as 100,000, while others place the figure well over 150,000 victims.627
Middle East Watch, the authoritative source on the Anfal Campaigns, notes that
over 4,000 villages were destroyed to ensure that security and support for the Kurdish
Peshmerga (military) were not possible.628 Although there was little condemnation from
the international community at the time, it was cited by the George W. Bush
administration as one of the reasons for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In addition to a high
death toll, the campaign resulted in the displacement of over 100,000 Kurds, who sought
refuge in Turkey and Iran. 629 Baghdad’s assault on the Kurds, and in particular the
gassing of Halabja, gave impetus to the KDP and the PUK, and other political parties in
the Kurdish region, to form the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) to more effectively challenge
Baghdad.630
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Throughout the struggle against Baghdad, the Kurds maintained a preference for
autonomy rather than independence. Although independence is the dream of Kurdish
nationalists, the Kurds noted that they would be satisfied with political and economic
autonomy as they would be sufficient for protecting Kurdish political interests and
culture and language. A realist explanation would frame the conflict between Iraqi
Kurdistan and Baghdad in terms of security imperatives and survival. The conflict,
according to realist assumptions, is a result of the fixed and enduring ethnic differences
between the Kurds in the north and the Arab-controlled Iraq. That is, the Kurdish fear for
their survival and Baghdad’s concern for Iraq’s territorial integrity created a security
dilemma that triggered the outbreak of war between the two sides.
In this light, institutional and economic imperatives are secondary to security and
survival.

The empirical record outlined above demonstrates that Iraqi Kurdistan’s

primary objectives were to obtain political autonomy and improve the Kurds’ economic
conditions within a united Iraq. It is true that there were collective fears on both sides,
but the overriding concern from the Kurdish perspective was the institutional makeup of
Iraq and the unwillingness of Baghdad to meet Kurdish requests.
Constructivists, meanwhile, downplay the role of structure or security
considerations in explaining civil war and ethnic conflicts. Instead, constructivists view
civil wars as a way for ethnic entrepreneurs and elites to advance their particular political
and economic interests. The seemingly fixed and conflictual ethnic identities are in fact
constructed and exploited by elites. The conflict between the Kurds and Baghdad is not a
consequence of security concerns, but rather a result of elites mobilizing and using ethnic
identity to achieve particular political and economic ends.
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There is little empirical

support for this approach.

Ethnic entrepreneurs did not shape Iraqi Kurdistan’s

preferences. Instead, Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference formation was a culmination of several
factors that included flawed political institutions, oppressive policies from Baghdad, and
political and economic grievances. What is more, the historical record demonstrates that
there was a general consensus amongst the Kurdish population that political autonomy
and economic development were necessary for Iraqi Kurdistan to thrive in Iraq.
Liberalism provides the best account for Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences from the
early 1960s to the early 1990s.

Liberalism’s emphasis on political institutions and

economic factors explains the preference formation of Iraqi Kurdistan and the outbreak of
the violence between the Kurds and Baghdad. Although security considerations should
not be overlooked, the Kurds clearly outlined their preferences throughout the 1960s and
the 1970s. From this perspective, it was not the structure and security concerns that led
to the outbreak of conflict, but rather Baghdad’s unwillingness to deliver on meaningful
political autonomy for the Kurds. Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences were the result of a
Kurdish desire for political autonomy, a desire for economic development, and a Kurdish
population that pressed its leadership and political parties for increased political rights in
Iraq.

Capabilities
Realist explanations would argue that Iraqi Kurdistan’s willingness to settle for autonomy
rather than full independence was due to insufficient capabilities. The following section
will address the extent to which capabilities and power influenced Iraqi Kurdistan’s
decision to demand autonomy rather than independence. That is, did the Kurds settle for
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autonomy because they did not possess sufficient capabilities to secede from Iraq?
During the first revolt in 1961, the Kurds possessed little military capabilities. Edgar
O’Ballance reveals that the Kurdish fighters (the Peshmerga) were poorly organized and
their weapons were “small arms, mortars, bazookas, grenades, and light machineguns.”631 The Iraqi military, on the other hand, possessed air power and modern weapons
against the weaker Kurds. The Kurdish position was marginally improved in the 1970s
during the 1974 revolt. The Kurds now possessed more light artillery and some heavier
arms.

Still, Kurdish military capabilities were considerably weaker than the Iraqi

military’s capabilities.

In addition, the Kurds possessed little organizational and

communications capabilities through the 1950s to the 1960s.
The above narrative demonstrates that the Kurdish population was organized
along tribal rather than nationalistic or political lines.

Given the Kurds’ deficient

capabilities, independence was not an option. However, the Kurds have consistently
maintained that independence is not their objective. Instead, the Kurds have consistently
requested political and economic autonomy within a federal Iraq. This preference has
changed very little since the early 1960s and late 1970s. That is, although the Kurds
desire independence, they have always maintained their willingness to stay in a unified
Iraq under the right conditions. Capabilities, therefore, did not shape Kurdish preferences
for independence.
The Kurdish preference for autonomy over independence is further substantiated
by Kurdish actions in the early 1990s.
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unilaterally declared the Kurdish area a federal region of Iraq.632 Moreover, in 1992 the
Kurds hosted the Iraqi National Congress (an umbrella organization that included most of
the groups that opposed Saddam Hussein) at a conference in the Kurdish region. During
the conference, Barzani and Talabani signaled that the Kurds would settle for federalism,
which would furnish the Kurds with autonomy and preserve Iraq’s territorial integrity.633
The Kurds, therefore, strived to acquire political and economic autonomy within a federal
Iraq. According to liberal assumptions, political institutions and economic incentives
influence actors’ behaviour. This is true of the Iraqi Kurds. The Iraqi Kurdish leadership
has always maintained that the Kurds will work in a unified Iraq under the right political
institutions and economic development. More capabilities, therefore, will not change
Kurdish calculations regarding independence.
The Kurds have clearly articulated their position and objectives since the 1940s
with the creation of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). From the 1940s through the
1980s, Kurdish leaders – including Mustafa Barzani, Massoud Barzani, and Jalal
Talabani – frequently outlined political autonomy and economic development as Kurdish
objectives. Indeed, they overtly stated that independence was not their objective even
though it was the Kurdish dream. The demand for autonomy was a result of Baghdad’s
oppressive policies against the Kurds who did not share a common identity with the Arab
majority. From the Kurdish perspective, therefore, political autonomy was essential for
protecting not only the Kurdish identity, but, more importantly, the Kurds’ political and
economic interests.
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The Iran-Iraq War took a heavy financial toll on Iraq. In an effort to recuperate
the financial losses, Saddam mistakenly believed he could occupy Kuwait and control its
vast oil reserves. 634 Saddam believed the US would acquiesce to his annexation of
Kuwait, as the US public could not tolerate a long war and incur casualties.635 However,
Saddam’s decision to invade and occupy all of Kuwait instead of only the Rumaila oil
field prompted a quick response from the US and the international community.
Sanctioned by the UN, a US-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm to end Iraq’s
invasion of Kuwait on 17 January 1991. Security Council Resolution 687 ended the war
and imposed UN provisions on Baghdad. The Kurds believed they could extract political
and economic benefits from a weakened Baghdad. The Kurds were further encouraged
by George H. W. Bush to rise up against Saddam in order to overthrow his regime. 636
Ultimately, the Kurds secured autonomy but at a considerable cost to the civilian
population. The first two weeks of the uprising were successful, as the Kurds reclaimed
control of Kurdish territory, namely the provinces of Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniya,
from the Iraqi military. 637 A counteroffensive from Baghdad was certain.

Saddam

initially hesitated because he believed, like the Kurds, that the US would provide the
Kurdish uprising with assistance.638 Baghdad countered the Kurdish uprising with brutal
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force once it was certain that the US would not support the Kurds.639 Saddam was able to
put down the Kurdish uprising with relative ease and following the exodus of over two
million refugees into Iran and Turkey and facing an imminent massacre, the international
community, led by the US and the UK, implemented a no-fly zone over the Kurdish
region of Iraq.640 The US and the UK, therefore, inadvertently furnished the Kurds with
autonomy and provided the opening for the Kurds to establish a de facto state. The Kurds
benefitted from the newfound autonomy and in 1992 the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF) held
elections, with the support of Barzani and Talabani, for the formation of a parliament to
govern the Kurdish region.641
Following these events, Iraqi Kurdistan fulfilled all the criteria of de facto
statehood as defined in this project. Recall that a de facto state controls a defined
territory, provides an array of services to the population, and enters into diplomatic and
economic relations with other states, but it does not possess de jure recognition. Post1992 Iraqi Kurdistan certainly met all the criteria outlined in the definition.

Iraqi

Kurdistan was abandoned by Saddam Hussein’s regime and thereby handed the newly
formed Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) a defined territory. The KRG then setup
a functioning government that provided the population with services, including education
and health care, and established diplomatic relations with foreign governments. Yet,
Iraqi Kurdistan did not declare independence or seek recognition as an independent state,
and therefore, did not possess de jure recognition.

639

Ibid. David McDowall reveals Turkey, an important US strategic ally in the region, pressured the US to
withhold support for the Kurds.
640
David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, 373; Edgar O’Ballance, The Kurdish Struggle, 192094, 186-187; Ofra Bengio, The Kurds of Iraq, 200.
641
Michael Gunter, The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis, 67.

190

Following the elections, Baghdad condemned the Kurds for conspiring to
breakaway from Iraq, but Barzani and Talabani were quick to deny the accusation.
Talabani, for example, declared that the Kurds “do not want to break away from Iraq; we
want a democratic Iraq.”642 The KDP and the PUK agreed to share power following
elections that resulted in 50 seats for each party.643 Despite issues of corruption and voter
fraud, the process was considered “fair and free.”644 Following the elections, the Kurdish
parliament unilaterally proclaimed the Kurdish area a federal region of a unified Iraq.645
Following this declaration, Massoud Barzani explained that the Kurds were not moving
towards secession, but rather securing federalism for the Kurds.

He did note that

independence was on the table but only if Iraq were to revert back to its old policies
against the Kurds. He said, “what leads to partitioning Iraq is the use of chemical
weapons, genocide campaigns, racial discrimination and similar racist and chauvinistic
(blind ethnic bigotry) measures.”646 This continues to be the policy of Barzani and the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The KRG has frequently maintained that it is
content with its de facto status.647 Despite the assurances from Barzani and the KRG,
neighbouring Iran, Syria, and especially Turkey were on high alert following the
emergence of a de facto Kurdistan and the first elections. The United States also voiced
its opposition to an independent Kurdistan.
642
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The official US position, then as is it now, is a united Iraq. The policy, at least in
the official sense, has remained unchanged in this regard. The KRG, for its part, has
always maintained that it will not break away from Iraq. 648 The US has regularly
maintained that it prefers a united Iraq for at least two reasons. First, US officials are
concerned that a partitioning of Iraq will lead to instability in the Middle East and in
particular with Iraq’s neighbours Turkey and Iran. The fear is that an independent
Kurdistan will destabilize Iran and Turkey’s sizable Kurdish populations, which could
potentially create more unrest and violence in the region. In addition, the secession of
Iraqi Kurdistan will further strengthen the Shiites in Iraq and this will increase Iran’s
influence in Baghdad. Second, the US supports a unified Iraq in line with the policy and
interests of its historic ally Turkey. Although the Turkey-US relationship has become
strained at times over the past decade, the two continue to share a strong interest in
maintaining stability in Iraq.

The Evolution of Iraqi Kurdistan: 1994-2003
KDP-PUK Civil War649
This section will examine Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference formation following its emergence
as a de facto state. Specifically, the section asks: Did Kurdish preferences changed from
autonomy to full independence following the creation of a de facto state?

Before

proceeding to discuss its preferences, however, the section will provide a brief outline of
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Iraqi Kurdistan’s evolution following its de facto statehood. Not all was well inside the
Kurdish region following the establishment of a de facto state and the first elections to
form a government. The internal divisions within the KRG between the KDP and the
PUK exacerbated the already complicated historical relationship between the two parties.
By 1994 tensions between the KDP and the PUK over the administration of the Kurdish
region boiled over into armed clashes. The longstanding divisions between Barzani and
the KDP, on the one hand, and Talabani and the PUK, on the other, engulfed the Kurdish
into a civil war that lasted four years. The root causes of the civil war can be traced back
to the early divisions within the KDP.
From its inception until the consolidation of control by Barzani, the KDP was
divided between the urban and educated intelligentsia, led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal
Talabani, from the Sulaymaniya region on the one hand and the largely traditional and
tribal members, led by Barzani, from the Duhok region on the other hand. Harvey Morris
criticizes such reductionist characterizations and instead argues that both parties are at the
same time ‘modern political movements’ and hold ‘quasi-tribal’ tendencies.650 Although
Morris’ description of the KDP and the PUK may not be inaccurate, there is some truth to
the characterization of a tribal KDP and a more modern PUK; a notion that is
corroborated by academics and analysts in Iraqi Kurdistan.651
The 1994 civil war was sparked by a minor dispute between the Barzanis and a
tribe allied with the PUK, which led to large scale fighting between the two parties.652
650
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Gareth Stansfield, however, argues the civil war was a ‘premeditated’ act on the part of
both parties. 653 In response to PUK victories and control over the capital of Erbil,
Massoud Barzani called on Saddam Hussein for military support to retake Erbil from the
PUK.654 The offensives and counteroffensives continued until a 1998 agreement, which
originated in the Kurdish region and was ultimately mediated by Washington. At the root
of the conflict is control over administration of the Kurdish region of Iraq. The PUK and
the KDP continue to vie for power and control over their respective territorial
jurisdictions.
Analysts in Iraqi Kurdistan criticize the KDP and the PUK for initiating the civil
war and erecting a corrupt political system that perpetuates their dominance.

In

particular, critics accuse the KDP and the PUK of using Kurdish nationalism to advance
their personal interests. During an interview with the author, Kamiran Berwari, professor
at the University of Duhok, noted that the civil war of the 1990s seriously undermined
and debilitated the Kurdish nationalist movement. “If these parties represent the Kurdish
people and genuinely want to advance the Kurdish cause then why did they initiate a
Civil War that killed thousands and destroyed the Kurdish region?” asks Berwari.655 He
contends that the interests of the Kurdish population are secondary to the interests of the
KDP and the PUK and their leadership.
Kameran Mentik, professor at Salahaddin University – Hawler, echoes Berwari’s
sentiments in labeling the political parties corrupt and tribalistic. He notes that, “We
have two families [Barzani and Talabani] who rule Kurdistan and who advance their
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interests first; it is clear for everyone. The positions of the parties make this clear. His
son [Massoud Barzani’s son Masrour] is the head of security and his nephew [Nechervan
Barzani] is the Prime Minister.”656 Mentik goes on to suggest that the Kurdish regional
elections are fraught with ‘cheating and fabrication.’657
Mentik and Berwari noted that the main political parties often buy or pressure
individuals to vote for them. The 2005 and 2009 Kurdish region elections were fraught
with irregularities and widespread cheating. The 2013 election, however, was mostly free
and fair. As international observer for the Iraq High Electoral Commission during the
Kurdish region’s parliamentary election, I did not witness any forms of pressure or
irregularities. However, there were accusations of cheating and irregularities, but these
were not substantiated and most observers, including myself, concluded that the election
was the freest and fairest in the Kurdish region’s history.658
From the late 1990s until the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Kurds were left
to their own. During this period, the Kurdish region developed effective, although at
times corrupt, political institutions for administering the Kurdish territory and population.
Economically, however, the Kurds had little success as they faced a double embargo: one
from the central government in Baghdad and a second from the UN sanctions against
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Iraq. Economic issues continue today, as Iraqi Kurdistan is increasingly becoming a
rentier state characterized by corruption and nepotism.659
Kurdish political and economic fortunes changed dramatically in 2003 with the
US invasion of Iraq. As noted by Adeed Dawisha, the reason behind the invasion of Iraq
was to overthrow Saddam’s regime for possessing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
and its links to international terrorism, both of which posed a direct threat to the US and
its allies.660 Colin Powell, the US Secretary of State, made the case for invading Iraq and
removing the threat Saddam posed to the US and the international community to the UN
Security Council in February 2003. Following the invasion, it was discovered that Iraq
did not possess WMDs thereby undermining the US’s purported reasons for invading.
However, it is beyond the scope of this project to evaluate the legitimacy of the US
motivations for invading Iraq. The point here is to simply outline the events that took
place in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq. There were certain elements both within the
US and outside that encouraged war against Iraq.
Many academics and analysts have rightly emphasized the significant role of the
neoconservative elements in the US and within the George W. Bush administration for
orchestrating the war against Saddam Hussein.661 The terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, provided the Bush administration and the neoconservatives with the pretext for a
war with Saddam.662 The neoconservative ideology is strongly committed to the spread
of democracy as a means of promoting peace and, for these ideologues, Iraq would serve
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as the model for spreading democracy throughout the Middle East.663 Neoconservatives
such as Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld were influential in the Bush administration
and encouraged the removal of Saddam Hussein.
The invasion of Iraq was also supported by Iraqi exiles. The Bush administration
and the neoconservatives were encouraged and lobbied by Iraqi dissident and leader of
the Iraqi National Congress, Ahmed Chalabi. The Iraqi National Congress, formed with
US assistance in the early 1990s with the express purpose of supporting groups opposed
to Saddam Hussein, lobbied hard for Saddam’s removal. Chalabi was a wealthy and
influential Shiite who was actively lobbying the US to remove Saddam Hussein since
1991.664 Although Chalabi is a Shiite Muslim, he is portrayed as a liberal and more selfserving than a proponent of Shiite interests.665 There is no doubt, however, that Shiites in
Iraq welcomed the prospect of regime change and a democratic system that would propel
them to power given their demographic superiority. The Shiite Arabs comprise about 60
percent of Iraq’s population, while the Sunni Arabs comprise about 15-20 percent, the
Kurds comprise approximately 18 percent, and the remaining numbers are made of
Turkoman, Assyrian, Yezidi, and other minorities.
Perhaps the Sunni Arabs were one of the few groups that did not look favourably
upon the removal of Saddam Hussein. This is understandable given that they stood to
lose the most and would find themselves as a minority following almost a century in
power. Most worrying for the Sunni Arabs was the uncertainty attached to the removal
of Saddam and the post-invasion Iraq. Sunni trepidations about post-Saddam Iraq were
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seemingly confirmed by the belief that they were excluded from the drafting of the Iraqi
constitution (this will be discussed in greater detail in the coming sections).
The Kurds also hoped and lobbied for the removal of Saddam Hussein. Prior to
the 2003 invasion of Iraq the US approached the Kurds, in a meeting between George W.
Bush and Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, about the possibility of overthrowing
Saddam Hussein.666 Barzani and Talabani offered assistance in the form of providing
intelligence and for the US military to use the Kurdish region as a front against Saddam’s
regime. The Kurdish offer of support became particularly significant when on 1 March
2003, Turkey’s parliament blocked a motion to allow the US to deploy combat ground
troops into Iraq from Turkish territory. Iraqi Kurdistan’s willingness to provide support
for the US invasion strengthened Kurdish-US relations and provided the US with a
northern front. 667 The Kurds presented a united front and declared their intention to
support and participate in the US-led invasion and the rebuilding of Iraq.
Following the swift overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the US took on the difficult
task of rebuilding Iraq’s political system. The US found it difficult to create a political
system that could balance the demands of the three major groups (i.e., the Sunnis, the
Shiites, and the Kurds) in Iraq. Political power was now in the hands of the Shiites who
were historically mistreated by regimes in Baghdad. In an effort to ensure that the Kurds
and the Sunnis were not excluded from the political process in Iraq, the US created a
political system that requires consensus and participation from all major groups. For
instance, the post of president is customarily reserved for the Kurds and the speaker of
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the Iraqi parliament is customarily a Sunni. The Kurds were able to secure many high
positions in Baghdad during the creation of Iraq’s new political system in 2005.
The Kurdish success during the negotiations was largely due to the willingness of
the KDP and the PUK to set aside their rivalry and form a united front during the
negotiations for the post-Saddam Iraq. The improved relations between the KDP and the
PUK allowed the Kurds to provide the US with the support necessary for undertaking the
invasion of Iraq in 2003. 668 The KDP and the PUK signed what they called the
“unification agreement” of 2006, which effectively divided the administration of Iraqi
Kurdistan and the KRG equally between the two parties.669 The unification agreement
originated in 2005 when the Kurdish factions united under a single list for the 2005
elections and captured 26 percent of the overall vote in Iraq.670 By going to Baghdad as a
united front, the Kurds strengthened their position during negotiations for Iraq’s
permanent constitution.
The drafting of the Iraqi constitution is criticized by many academics for its
hastiness, its reification of ethnic and religious divisions, and the exclusion of the Sunni
population. 671 David Ghanim notes that the constitution was “written under highly
charged political atmosphere, sectarian divide, and ethnic animosity, which is hardly a
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proper condition for drafting a constitution that can be considered an anchor for the
future.”672 What emerged, according to the critics, was a constitution negotiated between
the US and the Kurds, which was then imposed on the Arabs.673 Much of the criticism
against the drafting of the constitution is directed at the Kurdish bloc for taking advantage
of their inexperienced and disorganized Arab counterparts.674
Henri Barkey and Ellen Laipson suggest that the Iraqi constitution is a powersharing pact between the Kurds and Shiites given the absence of the Sunnis in the
negotiation process.675 In fact, Barkey and Laipson note that the only demand the Kurds
did not entrench in the constitution was a legal right to secede from Iraq. In particular,
Kurdish demands for federalism exacerbated the position of the Sunnis and, according to
Barkey and Laipson, “their demands have complicated the quest for a unified, stable and
peaceful Iraq.” 676 The issue of federalism is a main source of tension between Erbil
(capital of Iraqi Kurdistan) and Baghdad. Many academics and Iraqis view federalism as
an imposition from the outside. Its legitimacy is questioned given that it was enacted
under US occupation and there was political opposition against the adoption of
federalism.677
The drafting is further criticized for the heavy US influence.678 Critics note that
the constitution has disenfranchised the Sunni bloc and weakened the central government
in Baghdad. Critics also take issue with the adoption of federalism. Feisal Istrabadi, for
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one, describes the notion of federalism as the “most emotionally charged issue, bar none”
in Iraq leading up to the constitutional negotiations and says Kurds were the principle
instigators in pushing for its adoption. Istrabadi suggests that the Kurds could have
continued to practice autonomy as “no one wanted to turn the clock back and reassert
centralized control over Iraqi Kurdistan.”679 Such criticisms, however, fail to consider the
Kurdish perspective. The Kurds were unwilling to participate in a unitary and centralized
Iraq following decades of repression at the hands of Baghdad.
From the Kurdish perspective, a loose federal structure is imperative for their
participation in the post-Saddam Iraq. Even a decade following the overthrow of the
Baath regime, the Kurds remain uneasy about Baghdad’s centralizing tendencies and
rhetoric against Kurdish autonomy. In short, the KRG and the Kurdish population do not
fully trust Baghdad. Entrenching federalism in the constitution, rather than relying on the
goodwill of Baghdad, provides the Kurds with the legal framework with which to
safeguard their rights and protect their interests. Despite criticisms and accusations that
they will secede, the Kurds continue to support a united Iraq.
During interviews with the author, Kurdish officials, from the KDP and the PUK,
clearly indicated that the Iraqi constitution and the notion of a partnership between Arabs
and Kurds are particularly important for Kurdish officials. Most officials identified Iraq’s
unwillingness to view and treat Kurds as partners as a source of tension between the
Kurdish region and Baghdad. Indeed, most Kurdish officials view post-2003 Iraq as a
voluntary union between two nations (i.e., Arabs and Kurds). This point was most
clearly articulated by Omed Sabah, the speaker for the Presidency of the Kurdish region.
“If Baghdad wishes to preserve the unity of Iraq, it must treat the Kurds as real partners.
679
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There is a difference between being a partner and a participant. Currently, the Kurds are
only participants…If Iraq is run like a dictatorship, it will not last. The only reason Iraq
would disintegrate is if it returns to dictatorship. Nothing else.”680 Furthermore, although
Nezhat Hali, Iraqi Kurdistan’s Director of Intelligence, does not believe that Baghdad’s
policies will solve the Kurdish issue, he does indicate that the Kurdish region is willing to
stay with Iraq if Kurdish interests are not marginalized and its interests are protected.681

Conclusion
This chapter has traced the history of Iraqi Kurdistan since the creation of modern Iraq
following WWI. It illustrated that the relationship between the central government in
Baghdad and the Kurdish population has been fraught with political and military
conflicts. The Kurds faced successive regimes that adopted oppressive policies aimed at
debilitating Iraqi Kurdistan’s political and economic development. In response to such
policies, the Kurds requested political and economic autonomy as measures to protect
their interests.

Following decades of conflict and two major rebellions, the Kurds

acquired de facto statehood in 1991 and embarked on political and economic
development in the Kurdish region.
Iraqi Kurdistan’s position was further improved with the 2003 US-led invasion of
Iraq and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein. Given the Kurdish aspirations for
independence and a nonexistent central government in Baghdad, many observers
680
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expected the Kurds to declare independence. Instead the Kurds have fully participated in
the rebuilding of post-Saddam Iraq and have directed their resources on improving the
political and economic situation in Iraqi Kurdistan. The subsequent chapter will explain
Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour and its decision to forgo independence in favour of the status
quo. What accounts for the KRG’s willingness to maintain the unity of Iraq? What were
the factors that shaped the Kurds’ decision to forgo independence and participate in a
united Iraq? The answers to these questions will be provided in two parts in the next
chapter. The first part will provide an account of Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and
capabilities from 2005 to June 2014 and the second part will examine Iraqi Kurdistan’s
position since June 2014 with the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS
also known by its loose Arabic acronym Daesh) in Iraq.
Theoretically, this chapter supports liberal assumptions regarding the importance
of political institutions and economic incentives. In particular, the chapter demonstrates
that Iraq’s political and economic institutions did not reflect the ambitions of the Kurdish
population. As a consequence of political repression and economic underdevelopment,
therefore, the Kurds became increasingly vociferous in their demands for political and
economic autonomy. The post-2003 period confirms the notion that appropriate political
institutions can mitigate grievances on the part of a minority group. The ‘new’ Iraq
possesses the institutional framework to maintain Iraq’s unity.
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Chapter 6:

Iraqi Kurdistan II

During Iraq’s 2005 national elections, an unofficial referendum was held in which voters
in Iraqi Kurdistan were asked if they preferred independence to a union with Iraq.
Approximately 98 per cent of voters voted in favour of independence. This unofficial
referendum demonstrates the degree to which Iraqi Kurds support independence. There
is also near consensus amongst members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) regarding the question of independence. Omar
Hawrami, KDP member of Kurdistan parliament from 2009-2013, declares that
independence is the principal objective of the KRG. Within the Kurdish region, the KRG
is working to establish good governance. But as a grand strategy, revealed Hawrami, the
“objective is to establish an independent Kurdistan. The Kurdish people will always feel
incomplete without a Kurdish state. My belief is that the people will continue to demand
independence.” 682 Given the unequivocal position on independence, why has Iraqi
Kurdistan not declared independence? What accounts for the Kurdistan Regional
Government’s (KRG) decision to forgo independence and maintain Iraq’s unity? The
Kurds have, on more than one occasion, saved Iraq from the brink of collapse. Since the
overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the rebuilding of Iraq’s political system and
institutions, Iraqi Kurdistan has had two openings to secede from a powerless Baghdad.
This chapter will outline the two openings and explain Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision
to champion Iraq’s unity. Section one will examine the first opening that materialized in
2005 following the US-led invasion of Iraq. It will ask the following: What accounts for
the Kurdish decision to maintain the unity of a weakened and militarily powerless
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Baghdad? And to what degree did capabilities influence the Kurdish decision? The
second opening appeared in June 2014 with the incursion of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) into Iraqi territory. Rather than pushing for independence, the Kurds saved
Iraq from collapse. The empirical evidence will demonstrate that Iraqi Kurdistan’s
decision to stay in a united Iraq is deliberate and calculated. Iraq’s political institutions
and economic prospects have convinced Iraqi Kurdistan that the status quo is more
attractive than independence.
The chapter is laid out in two sections. Section one will outline Iraqi Kurdistan’s
preferences and capabilities from 2005 to the summer of 2014. The section will examine
the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan and ask whether its decision-making regarding
independence is influenced by its capabilities or other factors. Section two will examine
Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour since June 2014. The primary objective of this chapter is to
explain why Iraqi Kurdistan turned down two opportunities to secede from Iraq. The
chapter relies on primary data collected from interviews with officials from Iraqi
Kurdistan. The chapter will conclude with an explanation for Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision
to maintain the status quo and therefore preserve the unity of Iraq.

The Behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan as a De Facto State (2005-2014)
Preferences
A survey of the political developments from 2005 to June 2014 will help shed some light
on the Kurdish decision to participate both in rebuilding the political system and
maintaining the unity of Iraq. From 2003 to around 2006, Iraqi officials and the US
focused on the political reconstruction of post-Saddam Iraq. The challenge for the US
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and Iraqis was how to accommodate the demands of the Sunnis, Shiites, and the Kurds.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, many academics have criticized the Iraqi
constitution for being hastily drafted and for disproportionate Kurdish influence.683 Many
Arab politicians and political parties, including Shiites, view the constitution as an
imposition from the outside.684 Feisal Istrabadi, Andrew Arato, and Reidar Visser, for
example, describe the constitutional process as a failure for its hastiness and exclusion of
the Sunni Arabs.685
According to this argument, the drafting of the constitution was largely dictated
by the Kurds, who had found an ally in the Shiite political party, Supreme Council of the
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI, later renamed the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq).
The Kurdish objective, according to Visser, was to “destroy Baghdad as a capital that the
territorial fragmentation of Iraq would become inevitable.”686 Upon closer examination,
however, Kurdish constitutional demands were not aimed at destroying Iraq, but rather
aimed at protecting the Kurdish region’s political development and security. According
to Kurdish officials, the Kurdish objective during the constitutional negotiations was to
safeguard the Kurdish region’s de facto status and autonomy against a centralizing and
aggressive Baghdad. As a Kurdish official noted, the Kurds “decided to be a main pillar,
along with the Sunnis and Shiites, for rebuilding Iraq.”687 Given the Kurds’ history and
experience with brutal regimes in Baghdad, Kurdish constitutional demands were not
unreasonable. The Kurds secured most of their demands, including federalism, the ability
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to maintain their separate standing army, the recognition of Kirkuk as a disputed territory,
and the ability to develop their natural resources.688
Many of the Kurdish successes in post-Saddam Iraq can be attributed to the
organization of the Kurds in the prelude to the constitutional negotiations and subsequent
elections. The KDP and the PUK agreed to set aside their historic differences in order to
secure the political and economic preferences of the Kurds. The Kurds were prepared
and possessed leverage to secure their demands during the drafting of the constitution.
The Kurdish position of power began to change in 2007. The Kurds continued to push a
decentralized agenda, but non-SCIRI Shiites in Baghdad began to push back against
Kurdish insistence on its natural resource development and the issue of Kirkuk.689 The
pushback was initiated by Nouri al-Maliki, the Prime Minister of Iraq from 2006 to
September 2014, who sought to strengthen Baghdad’s powers in governing the oil sector
and resolving the Kirkuk issue. The Kurdish-Shiite alliance was expedient for both
groups for achieving their political objectives in Baghdad. The Kurds could push through
their demands with the support of the Shiites and in turn the Shiites could rely on the
support of the Kurdish bloc to form the government in Baghdad. The alliance began to
unravel between 2008 and 2009 following Maliki’s attempts to extend Baghdad’s powers
over natural resources and the repeated postponement of the Kirkuk referendum.
One of the main sources of conflict between the KRG and Baghdad from 2005 to
2014 was the struggle over constitutional powers. Both sides have been pushing and
pulling for influence in their respective jurisdictions. From the Kurdish perspective, the
Iraqi constitution is a compromise by the Kurds to save Iraq. The Kurds demanded
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certain provisions in the constitution in order to check Baghdad’s powers and proclivity
for centralization. Kurdish officials were clear that their constitutional demands were a
precondition for participating in a unified Iraq. Furthermore, officials are unsatisfied
with Baghdad’s track record vis-à-vis the constitution and insist that the future of Iraq
depends on Baghdad’s adherence to the constitution.690 This idea is best articulated by
Omed Sabah when he says, “If the Iraqi government wishes to preserve the unity of Iraq
it must adhere to the law of the land. The last paragraph of the Preamble [of the
constitution] indicates that the unification of Iraq is voluntary and its preservation
depends on adherence to the constitution. To preserve the unity of Iraq, Baghdad must
implement all articles in the constitution.”691
In particular, the KRG has insisted on its right to develop the Kurdish region’s
natural resources without permission from Baghdad and the KRG has demanded the
implementation of Article 140 to resolve the longstanding Kirkuk issue.692 Iraq, during
this period, became increasingly centralized as Baghdad attempted to broaden its
jurisdiction and increase its influence over the KRG. Another main source of tension
between Baghdad and the KRG since 2005 has been the status of Kirkuk. The disputed
territory was set to be resolved in 2007 but has been indefinitely postponed, as neither
Baghdad nor the KRG is willing to relinquish claims to the territory.

A potential

resolution to the settlement of Kirkuk, which would be amenable to all sides, is to grant
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the territory special status within Iraq. 693 The issue of Kirkuk has become further
complicated following the invasion of ISIS into Iraq and the seizure of Kirkuk by
Kurdish security forces. The issue is beyond the scope of this thesis and will not be
resolved easily.
The KRG’s relations with Baghdad became increasingly strained at the beginning
of 2010. Nouri al-Maliki, the Shiite Prime Minister of the day, and his supporters hoped
to regain much of the political power Baghdad had lost following the drafting of Iraq’s
constitution. One of the areas in which Baghdad hoped to reassert itself is control over
natural resources, and in particular oil, and the revenues generated from them.694 The
Kurds have always maintained that Article 112 of the constitution outlines the regional
government’s supremacy in the development of, and collection of revenues from, oil
extraction.695 The disputes between the two sides have also led to military posturing on
more than one occasion over the disputed territories on the border of the Kurdish
region.696
Academics and analysts expected the disputes between the Kurds and Baghdad to
worsen following the complete withdrawal of US forces.697 Tensions culminated in 2011
when Massoud Barzani and the Kurdish bloc in the Iraqi parliament attempted to remove
Maliki in a vote of non-confidence following accusations from Sunnis and Kurds that
Maliki was consolidating power following the withdrawal of US forces in late 2011.
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This move was ultimately rejected by the then President Jalal Talabani because it did not
have the required number of signatures from parliamentarians.
Despite their differences and the seeming intractability over power and resources,
the KRG understands that it is more beneficial to compromise with Baghdad than to
challenge it.698 The Kurdish preference, therefore, from 2005 to 2014 was to function
autonomously in a united Iraq.

This preference was demonstrated by the Kurdish

willingness to participate in constitutional negotiations and to fully participate in the
formation and functioning of the governments in Baghdad. Throughout the past decade,
the Kurds have maintained that they will continue to support and work within a united
Iraq if Baghdad respects the constitution. Kurdish actions since 2005 demonstrate a
genuine willingness to maintain Iraq’s unity. The Kurds have supported successive
Shiite-dominated governments following elections in 2005, 2010, and most recently in
2014. In return for their support, the Kurds were appointed to various high-profile
portfolios, including the post of president, foreign minister, and other cabinet positions in
the governments formed in 2006 and 2010.
Kurdish officials reasoned that the Kurds have too much to lose by seceding from
Iraq.

Susan Shahab, leader of the governing coalition in the Kurdistan National

Assembly from 2009-2013, believes that this is a golden time for the Kurds and therefore
the question of independence can be shelved. She argues that, “Economic independence
and the ability to reconstruct infrastructure is the first priority. Forging good relations
between the KRG and Iraq and neighbours is a second priority.”699 Shahab understands
that the Kurdish population desires independence, but she also recognizes that it would
698
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not be prudent to jeopardize the Kurdish region’s favourable position. Shahab effectively
lays out the conditions under which the Kurdish region would be willing to stay with
Iraq. She says, “First of all, Baghdad must adhere to the constitution. Second, we must
be treated as partners in Iraq. Third, there are many problems in resolving disputes with
Baghdad and in particular the resolution of Article 140.”700
Abdulsalam Berwari, a long serving member of the KDP and member of the
Kurdistan parliament from 2009-2013, provided interesting insights into the KDP’s
objectives and the Kurdish population’s aspirations. Berwari believes that because the
Kurdish region’s position in Iraq is uncertain, economic and security imperatives
outweigh other issues for Kurdish citizens. 701 Abdulsalam Berwari was adamant that
independence is the end goal of the KDP and that the Kurdish region’s current position is
a reflection of geopolitical realities rather than a willingness to stay with Iraq. “We
believe that the conditions are not yet right for independence,” explains Berwari, “We are
surrounded by three states that have their own Kurdish minorities and the international
community’s (i.e., the US and the EU) interests do not align with Kurdish independence
given the small territory and population.”702 This is a longstanding argument made by
Kurdish leaders. Independence is not practical given the unfavourable environment in
which the Kurds find themselves. The benefits of the status quo, as it were, are too great
to give up for the risks associated with a possible secession.
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Capabilities
According to realist assumptions, de facto states must possess the military power
necessary to secede from the parent state and survive as an independent state. Based on
this approach, the Kurds did not possess adequate capabilities between 2005 and 2014 to
secede from Iraq. Without military capabilities, de facto states stand little chance of
surviving let alone achieving independence. Military power is essential because de facto
states cannot rely on other actors for help in achieving independence.

In short,

capabilities determine whether a de facto state achieves independence or if it is
reintegrated into the parent state. Constructivists, meanwhile, emphasize the importance
of agency and international norms. De facto states must navigate the rigid international
norms against secession and the international preference for state sovereignty. Based on
constructivist notions then, independence is a difficult option for Iraqi Kurdistan given
the inviolability of state sovereignty and the international norms against secessionist
movements.

Such norms, however, have not prevented other de facto states (e.g.,

Kosovo, South Sudan, and Eritrea) from declaring independence and securing recognition
from the international community. Realism and constructivism, therefore, do not provide
a complete explanation for Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour.
Indeed, one could make the case that between 2005 and 2014 the Kurds possessed
sufficient capabilities to secede from Iraq. Following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s
regime the government in Baghdad was weakened politically and militarily, while the
Kurds possessed the political, economic, and military capabilities to establish an
independent Kurdistan. Gareth Stansfield, for one, argues that the domestic and regional
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conditions were suitable for Kurdish independence.703 He argues, “the combination of
local cohesion, popular Kurdish development, Iraqi state weakness, and the overlapping
of economic and geopolitical interests between the Kurdistan Region and one-time
opponents gives the current trajectory more durability than the Kurds have enjoyed in
previous times when it looked as though they could challenge the established state
system.”704 The KRG has established political institutions that furnish Iraqi Kurdistan
with the capacity to administer the region and deliver basic services to the population.
Iraqi Kurdistan is also economically viable, as it sits atop vast oil and gas reserves,
leading some analysts to call it Iraqi Kurdistan’s “most promising asset.”705 Finally, the
KRG possesses a capable military that can provide security and defense for Iraqi
Kurdistan. Yet, we should not expect the Kurds to forsake all their gains for something
uncertain.
Despite a clear preference for the status quo, academics and analysts are often
quick to announce Kurdish independence as imminent any time a KRG official asserts
Kurdish rights to self-determination.706 It is true that Massoud Barzani and other Kurdish
officials (e.g., Nechervan Barzani, President Massoud Barzani’s Chief of Staff Fuad
Hussein, and other high-ranking officials) maintain that the Kurds reserve the right to
determine their political future. However, it is equally true that Kurdish officials have
repeatedly maintained that although independence is the Kurdish dream, the Kurds will
remain in a democratic and federal Iraq. For decades, academics have argued that Iraqi
703
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Kurdistan would declare independence “when they deemed the time propitious.” 707
Michael Gunter, for example, does not believe that a decentralized Iraq, with an
autonomous Kurdish region, is a long-term solution. He maintains that it is only a matter
of time before the majority Arab population of Iraq organizes itself and imposes its will
on the Kurds.708
Kurdish officials, including Massoud Barzani, the president of Iraqi Kurdistan,
and Jalal Talabani, the former president of Iraq, insist that Iraqi Kurdistan will maintain
the status quo under the right conditions. In a 2008 opinion editorial in the Wall Street
Journal, Massoud Barzani called Iraqi Kurdistan a model for the rest of Iraq. Barzani
affirmed that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is “committed to a federal,
democratic Iraq that is at peace with its neighbors.”709 In addition, Barzani responds to
critics who accuse the KRG of operating outside its constitutional limits by developing
the Kurdish region’s oil resources. Barzani argues that the KRG is “proceeding entirely
in accord with the Iraqi constitution, implementing provisions that were brokered by the
U.S.” 710

Jalal Talabani also opposed independence in 2005 because it was not

‘practical.’711
The KRG functions with a high degree of autonomy within a federal Iraq, but at
the same time, the Kurds play a prominent role in the rest of Iraq vis-à-vis their presence
in Baghdad. Indeed, the Kurds have held in the past and continue to hold significant
posts in the Iraqi government. For example, in the 2005 and 2010 cabinets, the Kurds
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held the posts of president, deputy prime minister, and foreign minister and, in the most
recent 2014 cabinet, the Kurds have retained the post of the president, deputy prime
minister, and have been given the minister of finance post amongst other ministries.712
According to some Kurdish officials, capabilities will not determine Iraqi
Kurdistan’s fate. A group of officials, which can be labeled ‘soft-secessionists,’ claims
that Iraqi Kurdistan will secede from Iraq but under the right conditions. This group
includes individuals such as, Abdulkhaliq Bapiri, head of the KDP’s first branch in
Duhok, Bayiz Talabani, KRG Minister of Finance and the Economy from 2009-2013, and
Mohammed Ihsan, KRG Minister of the Kurdistan territories outside the Kurdish region.
There are also more hardline officials among the soft-secessionists.

The hardliners

include Parizad Shaban, Kurdish member of Iraq parliament and Renas Jano, KDP MP in
Baghdad.713 ‘Soft-secessionists’ insist that not only is independence a legal right, but it is
also normatively desirable given the history of the Kurds and the uncertainty regarding
the future of Iraq.

Despite such firmness, however, ‘soft-secessionists’ insist that

separation from Iraq must be achieved in a peaceful and amicable way.
Even this group, however, is willing to work within a federal Iraq for now. 714
Omer Nuradini, KDP member of Kurdistan parliament, aptly outlined the KDP’s (and by
extension the KRG’s) approach to its future in Iraq. He says, “The KDP’s strategy for
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secession is a ‘soft’ secession. It does not want to unilaterally or violently separate from
Iraq. It is working towards a diplomatic and agreeable strategy with which Baghdad will
agree.”715 Nuradini believes that Iraqi Kurdistan hopes to breakaway from Iraq under
mutually acceptable terms to maintain friendly relations. Other KDP officials, including
Abdulkhaliq Bapiri and Mohammed Ihsan, shared these sentiments. (Bapiri serves as a
high-ranking KDP official and as a member of the party’s leadership council.) “We want
our national issue to be solved democratically and peacefully…we don’t want to go
through that avenue [use of force] as much as there is a chance to do it democratically,”
asserts Bapiri.716
The PUK’s strategy is a similar one. Long-serving PUK member and the KRG
Minister of Finance and the Economy from 2009-2013, Bayiz Talabani, indicated that
Kurdish gains should not be risked with imprudent policy based on emotion. He adds,
“We must carefully consider whether or not the Kurdish region is ready to take the step in
becoming a state. We should not rush this decision. We have a territory that has a
parliament, a government, and stability and security to serve the Kurdish region and its
people… We have built a strong foundation for a future state.”717 This faction stresses the
importance of achieving independence in a democratic and peaceful manner in order to
safeguard the Kurdish region’s political, economic, and diplomatic progress.
Many who fall into this camp believe that independence is a natural right of the
Kurds and that the push for independence will not wane. Indeed, even asymmetrical
federalism and other political accessions on the part of Baghdad will not persuade ‘soft715
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secessionists’ to stay in a federal Iraq. “If there is an opportunity to separate from Iraq
peacefully, we would go for it without thinking twice,” notes Bapiri.718 Mohammed Ihsan
offered a simple, but insightful way for understanding the Kurdish mentality.

He

announces, “Look, our policy is to work for the best, prepare for the worst. This is the
Middle East. When you wake up in the morning, you should have plan A and B.”719
Kurds view independence as a right and a protective measure against the region’s
instability. In short, there are no conditions under which the Kurds would be willing to
stay with Iraq in the long term, say ‘soft-secessionists,’ but they also insist that any
secession must be peaceful and democratic.
Critics in Iraqi Kurdistan retort that the KDP and the PUK are using the dream of
Kurdish independence to preserve their positions of power.

As evidence, Kamiran

Berwari says one ought to look at the track record of the KDP and the PUK, which,
according to him, demonstrates their unwillingness to push for independence.720 Mentik
echoes these sentiments. He adds, “If you study our history, especially in the last fifty
years, you will see that the leader [Barzani] has fought all other Kurdish groups. For
example, the KDP has fought Kurds in Iran, Turkey, and even Kurds in Iraq…There is a
difference between what one says and what one does.

They always talk about

independence and building a state, but in practice it is a different story.”721 This criticism
was a common one amongst those who questioned the Kurdish leadership’s desire for
independence.

The critics argue that the KDP and the PUK use the rhetoric of
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independence to appease the population’s desire for a Kurdish state, but in practice
neither party has made Kurdish independence a policy goal during election campaigns.
Kamiran Berwari and Mentik raise an interesting point regarding the KDP and the
PUK’s policy platforms during elections.

During my observations of the 2013

parliamentary election, neither the PUK nor the KDP offered a clear and explicit plan for
achieving independence. In fact, the question of independence was a non-issue during
the election. Massoud Barzani raised the issue during a campaign speech in Duhok but he
refused to explicitly mention independence.

In vague and uncertain terms, Barzani

suggested that although the KRG has made significant progress in the economic and
security spheres, it would continue to work on achieving ‘something greater.’ It is widely
inferred that Barzani was referring to independence. The central issues of the election
were security, the economy, and improving governance in Iraqi Kurdistan. Similarly,
during the 2014 federal election, Kurdish political parties did not mention independence
as an objective and instead the major political parties, including the KDP, the PUK, and
Gorran promised to advance Kurdish interests in Baghdad and to ensure that Baghdad
continues to provide the Iraqi Kurdistan with the 17 percent revenue of Iraq’s budget to
which it is entitled.
Others criticize the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) in particular, for advancing and protecting their interests rather
than those of the Kurdish region and its population.

These criticisms come from

opposition political parties, including the Change Movement (also known as Change List
and Gorran) and the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU). Gorran was founded in 2009 in
response to the (real and perceived) corruption and nepotism in Iraqi Kurdistan’s politics.
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A 2006 strategic agreement effectively divided the administration of Iraqi Kurdistan
between the KDP and the PUK.722 The agreement would serve as the basis of the KRG
cabinets from 2006 until the regional elections of September 2013 and contributed to the
emergence and success of Gorran.

Nawshirwan Mustafa, who was second to Jalal

Talabani in the PUK, broke away and formed Gorran in opposition to Talabani’s decision
to forge an alliance with the KDP and Massoud Barzani.723 As a response to the PUK’s
perceived nepotism, Nawshirwan Mustafa and his followers split from the PUK to form
Gorran in 2009.724 Gorran capitalized on the disenchantment against the KDP and the
PUK to secure significant support from voters.
Kardo Pirdood Muhammed, Gorran’s caucus leader in the Kurdistan National
Assembly (KNA) from 2009-2013, for example, criticizes the KRG for neglecting the
Kurdish region’s institutional and social development.

In particular, Muhammed

contends that the policies of the KDP and the PUK have led to the politics of exclusion
where members and supporters of other parties feel like second-class citizens. 725 In this
way, Gorran is presented as the alternative to the exclusionary policies of the KDP and
the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). “Gorran is calling for an effective government
that works within effective and accountable institutions. We must make all Kurdish
citizens feel a part of the nation and the political system,” argues Muhammed. The critics
argue that members and supporters of the PUK and the KDP are made to believe that they
are ‘better’ Kurdish citizens. Gorran presents itself as modern reformist party that is
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inclusive. “The main difference between Gorran and the PUK and the KDP is that they
create an environment wherein membership in a political party is more important than
citizenship in the Kurdish region,” claims Muhammed.726
Gorran and its members are less firm than their KDP and PUK counterparts on the
question of independence. In fact, one of Gorran’s main objectives is to improve Kurdish
relations with Baghdad through mutual cooperation in the areas of security, territorial
disputes, implementation of the Iraqi constitution, and the economy.727 Whereas the KDP
and the PUK representatives claim to be unabashedly pro-independence, Gorran’s
members are more reserved on this issue. Instead, Gorran stresses the importance of
institutional reforms to develop the economy and governance. Members of Gorran did
not explicitly reject the notion of Kurdish independence but rather insist that internal
reforms must take place to lay the foundations for a potential Kurdish state. When asked
how Gorran would respond to the Kurdish population’s desire for independence,
Muhammed replied that, “if the people want independence, we must first reform our
government to achieve independence…I believe that the internal reforms will be helpful
in leading to Kurdish independence…Kurdish people have long struggled for national
autonomy, but once we [have] achieved political autonomy we must fight corruption,
inequality, and establish an effective judicial system to strengthen our democracy.”728
Ali Hamah Salih is a leading member of Gorran and was elected to the KNA in
the September 2013 regional election. 729 Salih indicated that the PUK and the KDP
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divide the administration and budget of the Kurdish region between themselves with few
opportunities for those who are not members of the parties.730 Salih further argued that
the popularity of the KDP and the PUK has increasingly waned during each election.
Salih agrees that the KDP and the Barzani family are popular with the population, but it is
also becoming more intolerant of the corruption and in need of economic opportunities.
For example, Salih points to the revenue generated from the Ibrahim Khalil border
crossing on the border of Turkey that is unaccounted for. He argues that the KDP
essentially buys votes especially in Sulaymaniya province. Salih raised an important
issue that was not highlighted by other officials. He noted that Iraqi Kurdistan does not
have defined borders. “How can it become a state if it does not have a clearly defined
territory and borders?” asks Salih.731 He believes that if an independent Kurdistan will
consist of the existing three provinces, such a move is pointless because it has been
effectively independent for 30 years.
Other Gorran members, including Evar Ibrahim and Barzo Majeed, emphasized
the importance of further developing the Kurdish region’s economy, passing a regional
constitution, and implementing widespread change to the region’s political and social
structures. Evar Ibrahim, Gorran member of the Kurdistan National Assembly since
2014, for example, noted that Gorran believes reform is necessary before independence
can be achieved. She says, “Gorran is happy to have an independent Kurdistan, but first
we need to organize ourselves.”732 Ibrahim describes the KRG as gendalchi (corrupt) and
nepotistic. “It is obvious that the KDP and the PUK have failed to meet people’s
730
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demands. As always, they look out for their own interests first. Until now they haven’t
been able to solve their own problems, they’re still divided over the security and
intelligence administration,” she noted.733
Gorran’s objective, according to its members, is to uncover the injustice in society
and to make the financial transactions of the KRG transparent. Ibrahim’s criticism of the
KRG reflects Gorran’s core principles and objectives in trying to identify and expose
what they believe is rampant corruption in the Kurdish region. Barzo Majeed, Head of
Gorran for Erbil Governorate and member of Kurdistan parliament, notes that prior to the
emergence of Gorran, the KRG passed legislation without opposition. Such legislation,
in his words, “was in the interest of two parties [the KDP and the PUK]. There was no
opposition in the parliament. The expenditure of the budget was also problematic as the
two parties were dividing it between themselves and there was little transparency.”734 In
short, Gorran and its members strongly disagree with the way in which the Kurdish
region is being governed.
The Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) also criticizes the policies of the KRG. The
KIU was officially formed in 1994 but its roots can be traced back to the 1970s. Its
formation coincided with the onset of the KDP-PUK civil war, from which the KIU
benefited. The KIU condemned the KDP and the PUK for killing Kurds and Muslims
and for forging expedient alliances with the governments in Baghdad, Tehran, Ankara,
and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The KIU identifies the rights of Kurdish people
as one of its main objectives, including the right to self-determination and the return of
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the disputed areas under Kurdish control. 735

The KIU’s general principles also

emphasize the need for Islamic values and in particular the implementation of Sharia as
the ultimate guarantor of those values.736 It is on these grounds that the KIU criticizes the
KRG. Specifically, the KIU and its members attack the KRG (and the KDP and the
PUK) for nepotism, corruption, and lack of transparency. Bayan Ahmed Hasan, KIU
member of Kurdistan parliament from 2009-2013, criticizes the KRG for failing to
advance Kurdish interests. She states, “First, we still have two administrations [the KDP
and the PUK], two ruling parties that have not been able to accept other political parties
and our people continue to suffer as a result. They don’t recognize other parties, they
prop up puppet political parties whose job it is to support them in the parliament.”737
Ismaeel Ravendi, a member of the KIU’s counselling board, meanwhile, characterizes the
KRG as ineffective, corrupt, and undemocratic.738
Non-partisan officials also emphasized that Iraqi Kurdistan can function within a
united Iraq. Abdulhakeem Khasroo and Ali Kareem provided balanced analyses of the
political situation of the Kurdish region, on the governance of the KRG and, the practices
of the KDP and the PUK. Abdulhakeem Khasroo is professor of political science at
Salahaddin University – Hawler (Erbil). Professor Khasroo indicated that independence
is not the top priority for the Kurdish population despite what some politicians and
political parties suggest. “In terms of public opinion, independence is not at the top of
the list, especially if Kurdistan continues to function as a de facto state. The most
735
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important thing for us is to maintain good relations with Baghdad and build a strong
economy…The Kurdish population desires security and economic growth. Based on
research and observations during elections in the Kurdish region, none of the political
parties has mentioned independence as a goal,” he contends.739 Khasroo supports his
point by suggesting that Kurds would be willing to work within a democratic and federal
Iraq. He says, “if we maintain our current status, we would not have any problem as long
as we are safe and secure and economically viable.”740 Khasroo further notes that the
KDP and PUK’s apparent appeal and strength are tenuous. Indeed, he argues that voters
desire change, but view the opposition parties (i.e., Gorran and KIU) as less capable than
the governing parties.741
The KDP and the PUK’s undemocratic practices are an open secret in Iraqi
Kurdistan. For example, Ali Kareem, the Head of the Kurdistan Institute for Human
Rights, suggests that it is difficult for opposition parties and their members to secure
positions in the Kurdish region due to the policies of the KDP. “Sometimes if one is
loyal to or a member of the opposition it is difficult to receive governmental positions and
one cannot participate in any governmental activities. Generally, [opposition] parties are
ignored. There are very few members of opposition political parties holding official
positions in public institutions.” 742 He further criticizes the KDP and the PUK for
perpetuating the region’s tribal and traditionalistic society. “We have a negative culture
and tradition of dealing with political parties. For example, the tribal system is often
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viewed as an alternative to the government. The KRG (and the PUK and the KDP) are
viewed as a special instrument or tools for the use of its members and not as general
public institutions. This creates bad relations between the government and other political
parties,” reflected Kareem.743
The Kurdistan Communist Party, which has a seat in the Kurdistan National
Assembly (KNA), also views Iraqi Kurdistan’s development as more important than
independence. Barevan Abdulrahman, the Communist Party’s Duhok representative,
outlined his party’s broad goal as protecting the “new reality in Kurdistan.” This entails
the implementation of democracy, the development of civil society, an effective
institutional administration in Iraqi Kurdistan, and to foster good relations between Erbil
and Baghdad. 744 Abdulrahman suggested that independence has taken a backseat to
political and economic development in the Kurdish region.745 Mohammed Amed, former
MP in the KNA and a high-ranking official in the Communist Party, also indicated that
his party hopes to see a “free, democratic, and plural Iraq.”746 Although the population
wants independence, it also wants jobs, social services, and an effective government.747
The period from 2005 to the summer of 2014 was a critical one for Iraqi
Kurdistan. Instead of pushing for independence, the Kurdistan Regional Government
fully participated in the rebuilding of Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan’s main reason for preserving
the status quo is that post-Saddam Iraq has been largely accommodative to its political
and economic goals of the Kurds. These findings suggest that the de facto state literature
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has overlooked the importance of economic development and political accommodation.
Whereas the body of literature asserts that independence is the ultimate goal of all de
facto states, the case of Iraqi Kurdistan suggests that there are conditions under which the
status quo may be satisfactory, or even preferable.
How can we explain the seemingly contradictory positions on Kurdish
independence?

On the one hand, officials were adamant that independence is the

endgame, but on the other hand, they outlined the conditions under which Iraqi Kurdistan
would stay with Iraq. I believe that the status quo (i.e., de facto statehood in a federal
Iraq) satisfied Iraqi Kurdistan’s objectives. After all, the status quo furnishes the Kurds
with all the benefits of an independent state without any of the risks associated with
seceding from the parent state. Without such accommodations, Kurdish officials clearly
indicated that the Kurdish region would push for independence.

In fact, Massoud

Barzani has, on more than one occasion, declared that without federalism and respect for
the democratic process, the Kurds will seek independence. In a 2011 interview, Barzani
said, “I repeat it once again, as I always have, as far as Iraq follows the current
constitution, we would not think of division and establishing an independent state.
Abiding by this constitution is for the benefit of Iraq and the Kurdistan Region,
particularly in this current situation.”748

The Behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan Since June 2014
Preferences
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Iraqi Kurdistan’s second opening for independence materialized following the invasion of
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) into Iraq. This section will examine the ways in
which the ISIS presence in Iraq has changed Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and especially
the decision for independence. The section will briefly outline the emergence of ISIS in
Iraq and the Kurdish reaction to the shifting geopolitics in Iraq. It will include an
analysis of the ways in which ISIS has changed the political dynamics and calculations of
Iraqi Kurdistan. It will demonstrate that although the presence of ISIS poses significant
political, security, and economic challenges to the Kurdish region and Iraq, Iraqi
Kurdistan’s preference regarding independence has not changed.

To be sure, Iraqi

Kurdistan will protect its political and economic interests, but it will also continue to
promote a united and federal Iraq. Although ISIS poses new challenges to the unity of
Iraq, it is a threat that may ultimately prove to be a source of unity between the KRG and
Baghdad.
From June to September 2014, ISIS overran the Iraqi military in northern Iraq and
captured Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. ISIS is a Sunni terrorist group that emerged
following the 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the Syrian civil war that erupted in 2011.749
From the early 2000s to 2006, it operated under the banner of al-Qaeda in Iraq. It has
since developed into a large and well-funded terrorist organization that poses a serious
threat to Iraq and Syria. ISIS’s ultimate objective is to establish an Islamic Caliphate
(i.e., an Islamic state) in the greater Middle East. To this end, the group attacked and
captured large swaths of territory in northern Iraq, as it faced little opposition from the
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Iraqi military responsible for defending the territories. As a consequence, Iraqi Kurdistan
found itself surrounded by the terrorist organization seeking control over all of Iraq.
Initially, the situation looked favourable for the Kurds who were able to seize territory
abandoned by the Iraqi military, including the hotly disputed city of Kirkuk.
Shortly thereafter, in early July 2014, Massoud Barzani announced that the KRG
would hold, first, a referendum to decide whether Kirkuk would remain a part of Iraq or
be incorporated into the KRG and, second, a subsequent referendum on Kurdish
independence. Massoud Barzani defended the KRG’s decision to hold the independence
referendum by highlighting the Kurds’ efforts at preserving Iraq’s unity. He says, “We
spared no effort to help make this new Iraq work. But unfortunately it has failed. So our
question to our doubters is just that: How much longer should we wait, and how much
longer should we deny our destiny for some unknown future?”750 The referendums were
abandoned following ISIS attacks on Kurdish civilians and territory. Since late June
2014, therefore, Iraqi Kurdistan, and its military force the Peshmerga, has been locked in
military battles against ISIS.
Many academics, analysts, and pundits declared that Kurdish independence would
be imminent after ISIS’s incursion into Iraq and Barzani’s declaration to hold an
independence referendum in June 2014.751 The referendum, however, has been postponed
and the Kurds have agreed to participate in the government in Baghdad. Rather than
breakup Iraq, the threat posed from ISIS seems to have provided a common goal and
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strengthened relations between Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad. In a November 2014 forum
in Erbil, the Prime Minister of the KRG, Nechervan Barzani, downplayed Iraqi
Kurdistan’s independence plans by revealing that independence is not a top priority.
Instead, he reiterated the KRG’s commitment to Iraq, but qualified it by noting that the
Kurds will ask for more autonomy. He declares, “Federalism has failed and if we can’t
establish federalism, we are asking for additional autonomy, not for the destruction of
Iraq.” 752 The Kurdish decision to participate in the formation of an Iraqi government
demonstrates the Kurds’ willingness, and indeed their desire, to make Iraq work. The
ISIS crisis may turn out to be a blessing in disguise for the future unity of Iraq.
Kurdish leaders were persuaded to join the unity government in Baghdad
following Baghdad’s promise to treat the Kurds as partners and to furnish Iraqi Kurdistan
with more economic autonomy. The Kurdish decision was a deliberate and calculated
one following conditions imposed on and agreed to by Baghdad. The Kurds agreed to
join on the condition that Baghdad treat the Kurds as partners and adhere to and
implement the Iraqi constitution. This has been the Kurdish position since the creation of
the constitution in 2005. During interviews with the author, many Iraqi Kurdish officials
reiterated this point.
Most KDP officials subscribe to a pragmatic approach to the independence
question. This group includes Najeeba Ibrahim and Abdulhamid Bavi, KDP members of
Iraq parliament, Kareem Sinjari, senior KDP member and the KRG Minister of the
Interior, Omed Sabah, Speaker for the Presidency of the Kurdish region, Abdulsalam
Berwari and Omer Nuradini, KDP members of Kurdistan parliament, Susan Shahab,
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PUK member of Kurdish parliament, Nezhat Hali, Director of Parastin (the KRG’s
intelligence) Agency, and Hemen Hawrami, Head of the KDP’s Foreign Relations
Office.753
Ibrahim and Bavi represent the Kurdish region in the federal parliament of Iraq
and believe that the current federal arrangement could be a long-term solution, but that it
is ultimately up to Baghdad.

Ibrahim emphasized the importance of federalism in

preserving the unity of Iraq. “I don’t think there is any other solution. If anyone tries to
centralize Iraq, it will not be successful,” she explained.754 Bavi added that Kurds are
willing to be a part of Iraq because the status quo furnishes the Kurdish region with
political and economic autonomy. However, Bavi also indicated that the Kurdish region
and its population are uneasy about Baghdad’s centralizing overtures and believes that
such a policy can lead to Iraq’s disintegration. 755 As noted above, the notion of a
dictatorial Iraq has not faded from the Kurdish consciousness. Kurds are apprehensive
about the centralizing policies of Baghdad. As Bavi noted, during his time in Baghdad,
he has observed an environment of mistrust that has, to date, prevented reconciliation.756
Hemen Hawrami spoke resolutely about Iraqi Kurdistan’s status in Iraq and its
relationship with Baghdad. Like other pragmatists, Hemen declares that the Kurdish
region will be a part of Iraq if it is “democratic, pluralistic, and federal.”757 Baghdad’s
adherence to the Iraqi constitution is a condition for Kurdish participation in Iraq. Karim
Sinjari, KRG Minister of the Interior, says, “There must be respect for the constitution, a
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realization and acceptance that Iraq is a federal and pluralistic entity that must be
democratic.”758 The aforementioned mistrust can only be assuaged with adherence to and
implementation of the law of the land.

Kurdish officials noted that decades of

dictatorship fostered unease amongst the Iraqi population in general and the Kurds in
particular.

Sinjari added that Iraq’s unity depends on respect for the principles of

pluralism, federalism, and democracy as outlined in the constitution.759 These sentiments
were echoed by Omed Sabah, who notes, “If they [Sunnis and Shiites] follow the
constitution, we [Kurds] will remain with Iraq. If, however, they stray from the
constitution, the Kurds have many options going forward, including constitutional
rights.”760
The third condition for continued Kurdish participation in Iraq is the resolution of
the disputed territories. Article 140 of the constitution outlines a resolution for the
disputed territories; the most important of which is Kirkuk, not least for its vast oil
reserves. The disputed territories were scheduled to be resolved in 2007, but the article
continues to be postponed without a firm deadline.

Kurdish officials believe that

Baghdad is unwilling to implement the article because it does not want to relinquish
control of Kirkuk’s vast oil reserves to the KRG. Kurdish claims to Kirkuk and the other
disputed territories are based on the presence of a majority Kurdish population in the
areas. According to Kurdish officials, therefore, Kurdish claims to the territories are
based on historical grounds and not the desire to control the vast oil reserves. Such
claims often refer to the 1957 Iraqi census (the last reliable census), which confirms the
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Kurds as a majority with a population of 48 percent. Baghdad, for many reasons, to be
discussed later, continues to vacillate on this issue.
Many KRG officials, therefore, acknowledge that the Kurds would be willing to
stay with Iraq under the abovementioned conditions. Nuradini reasserts that, “If the
federal government adheres to the Iraqi constitution and grants the Kurdish region
significant rights and autonomy it may be possible to keep the Kurds with Iraq. If
Baghdad makes the Kurds a real partner, there is a chance to stay with the rest of Iraq.
But it must be a political and economic setup similar to that of Quebec and Canada. In
this way, there are major benefits to stay with Iraq.”761 Similarly, Ihsan Amedi, KDP
member of Kurdistan parliament from 2005 to 2009, believes that Iraq’s unity can be
preserved if Baghdad furnishes the Kurds with political autonomy and treats the Kurds as
‘partners’ in the Iraqi union.762 In short, the Kurds are willing to accept the status quo as
it provides them with “the status of an independent state without any risks.”763
If Baghdad fails to meet these conditions, the KRG’s Minister for Parliamentary
Affairs, Mawlud Bawmulad announces, then “the Kurds will have the right to go for a
referendum.”764 This view is shared by Hoshyar Zebari, member of the KDP and the
current Finance Minister of Iraq. In a July 2014 interview, Zebari said, “Currently, the
Kurdish leadership is working on two tracks. One is to give another chance to the Iraqis,
to want to build a new Iraq based on constitution, coexistence and real partnership. This
is our last attempt at forming a new government that would eliminate marginalization and
injustice. If that happens, then it would lead to a new situation. If it relapses into the
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former situation, Iraq would no longer be a state.”765 Zebari and other Kurdish officials
have committed themselves to working within a united Iraq and now expect the
government in Baghdad to deliver on its promises and commitments to the Kurds.
Although it may be too early to judge, the Erbil-Baghdad relationship has
significantly improved since the invasion by ISIS. Prior to ISIS, one of the central
concerns for the Kurds was the increasingly authoritarian Nouri al-Maliki. Faced with
strong opposition from the Kurds and other factions in Iraq, al-Maliki reluctantly
abandoned his bid for a third term as prime minister of Iraq. Al-Maliki was replaced by
Haider al-Abadi who, since coming to power, has demonstrated his commitment to
forging a partnership with the Kurds. In a December 2014 editorial in the Wall Street
Journal, al-Abadi noted that his government is committed to defeating the ISIS threat,
which can be achieved by uniting Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish factions.766
In addition, al-Abadi contacted Massoud Barzani to give his support and praise
for the Kurdish Peshmerga and their fight against ISIS. 767 The Kurds and al-Abadi’s
government also reached an agreement on oil and the KRG’s budget from Baghdad. The
agreement calls on the KRG to export 250,000 barrels of oil per day to Baghdad and in
exchange the Kurds will be permitted to export about 300,000 barrels of oil per day
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through the pipeline connecting Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey’s Ceyhan port.768 In return,
Baghdad will release the KRG’s share of the Iraq budget of 17 percent. These are
significant developments in a relationship that has been strained for the past several
years. These were two of the main points of contention between the Kurds and the alMaliki administration and placed a serious strain on the Erbil-Baghdad relationship. AlAbadi’s diplomatic overtures and gestures and the agreement on oil have improved the
relationship and more importantly, suggest that the union can be salvaged through
diplomacy and cooperation.

Capabilities
The invasion of Iraq by ISIS and the subsequent military clashes with the Kurdish
Peshmerga has revealed that Iraqi Kurdistan’s military capabilities are limited. ISIS’s
modern and heavy weaponry, which it captured following the withdrawal of the Iraqi
military from northern Iraq in June 2014, proved to be superior to the Peshmerga’s light
and outdated artillery.

As a consequence, ISIS made advances into the disputed

territories on the border of the Kurdish region, only to be stopped by a combination of
US-led airstrikes and counterattacks on the ground by the Peshmerga. Certainly, the
Peshmerga have demonstrated a commitment to defeating the ISIS threat, but it would
difficult, if not impossible, without the military support from the US and several other
states, including Canada and the UK.
Based on this assessment of the KRG’s capabilities, Iraqi Kurdistan does not
possess the military capabilities to secede from Iraq. Once again, realist assumptions
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argue that capabilities are the primary factor for determining whether or not a de facto
state will declare independence. Without sufficient capabilities, therefore, Iraqi Kurdistan
will not secede from Iraq. Although such an argument is not entirely inaccurate, it
overstates the importance of capabilities and the degree to which the KRG’s
independence decision is shaped by them.

Iraqi Kurdistan may not possess strong

military capabilities, but it may not need such capabilities to secede from a militarily and
politically fragile Iraq. Indeed, this chapter outlined two openings for Iraqi Kurdistan to
declare independence when Baghdad was powerless. Instead of seceding from Iraq, the
Kurds saved its parent state from the brink of collapse on both occasions. Realism cannot
account for Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to maintain Iraq’s unity following the crisis of June
2014.
Constructivism, meanwhile, does provide some insights into the behaviour of
Iraqi Kurdistan. Nationalism can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy where ethnic identity,
although constructed, is hardened over time and compels leaders to declare independence.
In the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, the sense of nationalism has certainly been hardened over
time and there is a desire for independence. However, Kurdish elites successfully appease
demands for independence by highlighting the benefits of the status quo and the need for
protecting Kurdish interests.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, critics of the Kurdistan Regional Government
often accuse Massoud Barzani and the leadership of other political parties of using
Kurdish nationalism and the dream of statehood to maintain their hold on power and to
advance their economic interests. These elites have been criticized for mobilizing the
Kurdish population by appealing to their ethnic identity and thereby exploiting Kurdish
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nationalism to achieve their objectives. It is true that the Kurdish elite have benefitted
from Kurdish nationalism, but they have also made sacrifices.

The Barzanis and

Talabanis have lost thousands of people from their tribes in the military conflicts against
Baghdad. For example, in 1983, 8,000 members of the Barzani clan disappeared and
were subsequently murdered by the Saddam Hussein regime.769 Indeed, one could argue
that independence would better serve the personal interests of these elites. If elites use
nationalism to advance their personal interests then what explains the behaviour of the
Kurdish leadership?
The point is this: The summer of 2014 presented the Kurds with the opening to
declare independence from Iraq, and instead Iraqi Kurdistan cooperated with Baghdad to
maintain the unity of Iraq. Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour is best explained by liberalism
and in particular the role of political institutions and economic incentives. Kurdish
demands for political autonomy have been largely met within the framework of a
constitutionally defined federal Iraq and there are economic benefits to a union with Iraq.
Hypothesis one stipulates that a de facto state will pursue independence when the
parent state is unwilling to offer ‘sufficient accommodation’ in the form of political
institutions, such as autonomy and federalism. Iraqi Kurdistan has not only secured
federalism, but functions with a significant degree of autonomy from the central
government in Baghdad. Moreover, the Kurds occupy high profile posts in the central
government, including the presidency, minister of finance, and deputy prime minister.
Such political posts allow the Kurds to protect and advance Iraqi Kurdistan’s political,
economic, and cultural interests. Baghdad’s ‘history of bad acts’ remains top of mind for
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the Kurds, but two factors mitigate this issue. Saddam Hussein’s regime, which was
responsible for much of the violence perpetrated against the Kurds, has been removed.
Although it still faces serious challenges, Iraq appears to be undergoing meaningful
democratic reforms. Second, the union with Iraq provides Iraqi Kurdistan with economic
benefits that it would otherwise not have.
Hypothesis two contends that material factors, including economic incentives and
political benefits, can persuade a de facto state to forgo independence. Economically,
Iraqi Kurdistan is better off in a union with Iraq than it would be as an independent state.
The economic benefits from a union with Iraq are quite significant. The KRG is entitled
to 17 percent of Iraq’s annual budget based on its population. (The KRG is entitled to 13
percent as a proportion of its population and an additional four percent as reparations for
Baghdad’s historic mistreatment of the Kurdish population.) In 2013, the 17 percent
translated into about $20 billion. At the same time, the KRG possesses access to and
control over vast natural resources from which it can generate additional revenues. In
this way, Iraqi Kurdistan not only receives a significant sum of money from the central
government, but it also has the autonomy to pursue its own economic initiatives.
The World Bank forecasts that Iraq’s GDP will grow at a rate of 5.9 per cent in
2014 and a slightly higher rate of 6.7 per cent in 2015.770 In addition, Iraq’s Central Bank
estimates that Iraq’s GDP per capita will grow to approximately $10,000 by 2015. 771
These figures will likely be lower as a consequence of the ISIS invasion of Iraq.
However, the point here is to show that the overall economic picture for Iraq is positive.
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That is, since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s economy has experienced strong
growth (see Appendix III at the end of this chapter for Iraq’s and Iraqi Kurdistan’s
economic figures). The trend is expected to continue. Based on this positive outlook,
Iraqi Kurdistan stands to benefit from Iraq’s strong economic growth.
In short, Iraqi Kurdistan’s position in Iraq, although precarious at times, is
constitutionally entrenched and provides the Kurds with meaningful political autonomy
and significant economic benefits. Given these conditions, we should expect Iraqi
Kurdistan to continue to function in a united Iraq despite the emotional and national
appeals for independence. Iraqi Kurdistan’s political and economic position vis-à-vis
Iraq will persuade the Kurds to maintain Iraq’s unity.
In addition, the role of international support is a factor in shaping Iraqi
Kurdistan’s decision. Regional governments, including Turkey and Iran, are opposed to
the breakup of Iraq. The US is also tirelessly working to ensure that Iraq remain united.
However, the lack of international support has not discouraged de facto states from
declaring independence. For example, Eurasia’s de facto states (i.e., South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh), the Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus, Chechnya, Taiwan, and many other de facto states have declared independence
even in the knowledge that international and regional support would not materialize. The
point here is that international support does not independently influence a de facto state’s
decision regarding independence. The discussion below will elaborate on the role of
regional states and the US.
Regional and international actors have contributed to Iraqi Kurdistan’s decision to
stay in a united Iraq. Michael Gunter notes that should the federal and democratic project
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fail in Iraq, Iraqi Kurdistan will surely move towards independence. 772 He notes,
however, that the KRG must persuade the US, Turkey, and other regional powers (i.e.,
Iran) that an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would not lead to instability in the region.773
The policies of Turkey, Iran, and the US converge on the unity of Iraq. All three actors
have promoted, albeit for different reasons, the territorial integrity of Iraq. The KRG has
worked to reassure these governments that Iraqi Kurdistan is not on the path to
independence. In a 2012 interview with Time magazine, Nechervan Barzani noted that
the oil pipeline from the Kurdish region to Turkey’s Ceyhan port is not a prelude to the
breakup of Iraq.
Furthermore, Nechervan has reiterated that Kurds will not seek independence if
Baghdad adheres to the Iraqi constitution. He says, “We have a constitution in this
country. We will not take any other step until we lose hope in that constitution. There is
no doubt if and when we lose hope that the constitution is not adhered to, certainly there
are other options.”774 Nechervan further noted that Kurdish independence has never been
so viable, but there remain challenges. According to Nechervan, Kurdish independence
is unlikely and, indeed, impossible without support from a regional neighbour, referring
to Turkey, and the US.775 Turkey, therefore, will play a major role in the future of Iraqi
Kurdistan.
Following the establishment of the safe zone in Iraqi Kurdistan and the regional
elections that formed the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Turkey began to take
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an active role in Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey hoped to increase its influence on the KRG
ostensibly to prevent the breakup of Iraq and to maintain a tight control over its own
Kurdish population.776 Turkey fears that Iraqi Kurdish autonomy will ultimately lead to
independence, which will lead to unrest with its own Kurdish population and threaten
Turkey’s territorial integrity.

This fear is a mainstay of Turkey’s policy in Iraqi

Kurdistan.
In 1969, a Turkish political commentator articulated Turkey’s unease vis-à-vis
northern Iraq. He says, “The autonomy for the Kurds in Iraq is the first step towards an
independent Kurdish state in the Middle East…What if [the Kurds in Iraq] put forward
some claims on Turkish territory…The Kurdish problem, which was until yesterday a
domestic affair of Iraq, is now about to knock at our door.” 777 Turkey’s Iraq policy,
therefore, is to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurdish state that will threaten
Turkey’s sovereignty. Åsa Lundgren says, “Ankara’s strong objections to Kurdish selfrule and the insistence that Iraq remains intact – is not…based on concern about the unity
and sovereignty of Iraq…[it is] about the unity and sovereignty of Turkey.” 778 In an
effort to pre-empt Kurdish independence and to effectively battle the PKK, Turkey
engaged with Iraqi Kurdistan in the early 1990s. 779

In doing so, Turkey has

unintentionally contributed to the survival and development of Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey
has always supported the territorial integrity of Iraq and it has declared that a single group
(i.e., the Kurds) cannot decide Iraq’s future.780
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Despite the obstacles, Turkey’s relationship with the KRG blossomed in the mid2000s following a series of diplomatic gestures between Massoud and Nechervan Barzani
on the one hand and the current President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on the
other. The rapprochement has economic and political benefits for both parties. For
example, Turkey’s decision to connect Iraqi Kurdistan’s new pipeline to its Ceyhan line
provides the KRG with a source of revenue independent from Baghdad. Yet, it does not
resolve Iraqi Kurdistan’s territorial predicament. After all, Iraqi Kurdistan is landlocked
and must rely on Turkey for its economic wellbeing. Turkey’s willingness to import Iraqi
Kurdistan’s oil signals a significant shift in Turkey’s policy towards the KRG and Iraq.
From Baghdad’s perspective, the status quo, although not ideal, is perhaps better than the
alternative of losing Iraqi Kurdistan. Marina Ottaway and David Ottaway argue that
“Baghdad doesn’t want to lose Kurdistan and its oil, and Kurdistan isn’t ready to face the
challenges of independence, including a short-term loss of oil revenue; damage to
Kurdish relations with Turkey, which prefers to deal with a semiautonomous region
rather than an independent Kurdish state; and a long, costly process of obtaining
international recognition.”781
Iran is similarly fearful that an independent Kurdistan on its border will lead to
instability amongst its own Kurdish population. Iran is host to about 6-7 million restive
Kurds and Tehran is forced to confront sporadic military clashes with the militant
Kurdish group, the Free Life Party of Kurdistan (PJAK). Iraqi Kurdistan’s autonomy has
prompted neighbouring Kurds in Iran to make similar political and economic demands
from Tehran. As a result, Iran is on high alert and wary of the prospect of an independent
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Kurdistan on its border. To this end, Iran is working closely with Shia political leaders in
Iraq and Tehran also has close ties with the PUK. Iran provided the PUK with military
assistance to fight ISIS in June 2014.782 In exchange for military and political support,
Iran expects the PUK to promote a united Iraq. It is no surprise then that the PUK’s party
program underscores the need to “maintain and promote the democratic, federal and
parliamentary systems of Iraq.”783 Iran will continue to influence the domestic politics of
Iraq to promote stability on its border.
Finally, the US has been involved in the Kurdish region since it established the
no-fly zone in 1991. Successive US administrations have firmly maintained that Iraq’s
territorial integrity is a priority of the US. This has not changed since the overthrow of
Saddam Hussein. Indeed, if anything, the US is even more committed to the unity of
Iraq. Most recently during the ISIS crisis, the US Secretary of State John Kerry visited
Massoud Barzani to encourage the Kurds to participate in a unity government in Baghdad
and to forgo independence.784 Washington’s “one Iraq” policy will continue to shape the
US’s relationship with Iraqi Kurdistan.785 There is no reason to believe US policy will
change anytime soon. Indeed, the KRG’s Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Mawlud
Bawmurad, revealed that the Kurds’ decision to form a government with their Arab
counterparts in Baghdad was due to pressure from the US and Iraqi Kurdistan’s security
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imperatives. 786 That is, Washington offered the Iraqi Kurds military assistance in
exchange for Kurdish participation in the government in Baghdad. Bawmulad reveals
that: “The US president, his vice president and most of America had made it a condition
that, unless there is an inclusive government in Baghdad, they wouldn’t be willing to
fight terrorist groups and the IS in Iraq. So the Kurds had to go to Baghdad.”787 Renas
Jano, a KDP member of parliament in Baghdad, reveals that the US assured the Kurds
that should Baghdad fail to meet its conditions (i.e., treating the Kurds as partners and
adhering to the constitution), the Kurds could pull out of the government in Baghdad
paving the way for independence.788

Conclusion
This chapter relied on empirical and theoretical grounding to argue that Iraqi Kurdistan’s
decision to maintain its de facto statehood is deliberate.

Empirically, the chapter

demonstrates that Iraqi Kurdistan’s relationship with the rest of Iraq, and especially with
governments in Baghdad, has been shaped by a dark history of political and military
conflicts. The Kurds have endured decades of oppression and have engaged in two civil
wars against regimes in Baghdad in an attempt to secure political autonomy. The Kurds
inadvertently gained de facto statehood in 1991 and Iraqi Kurdistan has since functioned
as a de facto state within Iraq. Although the academic literature on de facto states
contends that independence is the end goal of de facto states, Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour
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challenges this notion. Indeed, Iraqi Kurdistan passed on two opportunities to secede
from Iraq since 2003. De facto statehood and the current political framework in Iraq
provides the Kurds with sufficient political accommodation and significant economic
benefits. In other words, Iraqi Kurdistan functions as an independent state in everything
but name. The chapter argued that if Baghdad meets Iraqi Kurdistan’s political and
economic demands, Iraqi Kurdistan would continue to function as a de facto state within
a united Iraq.
Theoretically, the chapter argues that liberalism best explains the preferences and
behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan. Although realism and constructivism also offer insights
into the preferences and behaviour of de facto states, they do not provide a thorough
explanation for the behaviour of Iraqi Kurdistan. Realism’s emphasis on power, security,
and capabilities cannot account for Iraqi Kurdistan’s willingness to function as a de facto
state within a united Iraq. Constructivist notions of ideas and norms also fail to explain
Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour. Liberal assumptions about political institutions and
economic factors provide the best explanations for Iraqi Kurdistan’s preference for de
facto statehood rather than full independence. The explanatory power of liberalism is
most evident in this case. Liberal assumptions and ideas clearly account for and explain
Iraqi Kurdistan’s preferences and behaviour.
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Chapter 7:

Conclusion

This project was guided by several questions related to the emergence and evolution of de
facto states. The questions included: Why and how do de facto states emerge? Why do
some de facto states unilaterally declare independence while others do not? And finally,
what are the implications for Iraqi Kurdistan? The central question is why Kosovo and
South Sudan declared independence while Iraqi Kurdistan continues to function as a de
facto state. The underlying theme of the project is to identify the conditions under which
a de facto state will forgo independence in favour of the alternatives: The status quo or a
federal arrangement with the parent state. The project argued that de facto states will
forgo independence: When the appropriate political institutions are adopted by the parent
state; there are economic incentives to remain with the parent state; and when the
domestic, regional, and international environments oppose independence. When a parent
state lacks the institutional capacity and economic prosperity to accommodate the
requests of the de facto state, disgruntled groups will often turn to independence to pursue
their interests. The complete argument is laid out in Chapters 2 to 6.
Chapter 2 outlined the emergence and evolution of de facto states and provided
the theoretical grounding for the thesis.

The chapter outlined the theoretical and

empirical explanations posited from the existing literature and offered new insights
informed by theory from international relations. Theoretically, the findings lend the most
support to the liberal view that de facto state preferences and behaviour are shaped by
political institutions, economic factors, and the domestic, regional, and international
contexts. Although realist and constructivist assumptions also provide insights into the
preferences and behaviour of de facto states, they are insufficient for a thorough
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understanding of de facto state behaviour. Realism overlooks the role of the domestic
political structure and economic interests and institutional design.

Constructivism,

meanwhile, overstates the power of nationalism on de facto state preferences and
behaviour.
The chapter found that liberalism provides the best theoretical explanation for the
emergence of de facto states. It found that the role of institutions, economic factors, and
the domestic political system play a significant role in the origins and objectives of de
facto states. In other words, de facto states often emerge as a result of the parent state’s
unwillingness to adopt the institutional framework necessary to appease a minority
group’s political and economic grievances. There are many ways in which the parent
state can appease the minority group, including representation in the executive or
legislature of the state, granting the minority with political, civil, and economic rights
previously denied, or adopting a federal system that furnishes the minority with political
and economic autonomy.
Empirically, Chapter 2 found that international interventions often play a key role
in the emergence de facto states, including Iraqi Kurdistan and Kosovo. The chapter
supports the existing literature’s explanation that most de facto states emerge from civil
wars that end in a stalemate. In many cases, weak parent states do not possess the
capacity to prevent the establishment of de facto states and therefore they cannot bring
the de facto state back into the fold. In sum, the chapter concluded that de facto states
emerge in one of two ways: civil wars between a minority group and the parent state, or
international interventions. In terms of the outcome of de facto states, the empirical
record revealed that five de facto states were forcefully reintegrated and four have been
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peacefully reintegrated. We can also add Iraqi Kurdistan to the list of de facto states that
have been peacefully reintegrated into the parent state.

After all, Iraqi Kurdistan,

although a de facto state, functions as an autonomous region within a federal and united
Iraq. Additionally, although the existing literature argues that gaining independence is
very difficult for de facto states, the empirical evidence suggests that graduating to
independence is as common as forceful or peaceful reintegration. To date, five de facto
states have graduated to full independence. The chapter found that the most de facto
states maintain the status quo and are neither defeated nor persuaded into re-joining the
parent state.
Chapters 3 to 6 provided the empirical evidence to support the theoretical claims.
The project adopted Mill’s method of difference to identify the similarities and
differences and to evaluate the variation between the three cases. Mill’s method was
complemented by in-depth case studies on Kosovo, South Sudan, and Iraqi Kurdistan. It
must be emphasized that case studies, by their nature, limit one’s ability to generalize.
However, this limitation does not preclude researchers from understanding and
explaining the behaviour of de facto states. The case studies attempted to identify the
conditions that shape a de facto state’s preferences and behaviour.
The research found that de facto state preferences are shaped less by capabilities
or a sense of nationalism and more by political institutions and economic factors.
Political institutions, often in the form of autonomy and federalism, provide minority
groups with the political framework for advancing and protecting their interests. The
preference for the status quo is bolstered if the parent state possesses a strong economy
and the de facto state receives economic benefits from the union with the parent state.
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The empirical data and the three case studies clearly demonstrate that de facto states will
push for independence if the parent state is unwilling to furnish the minority group with
political autonomy and if it does not possess a strong economy. Additionally, the research
found that mitigating factors play a role in influencing de facto states. The mitigating
factors include the de facto state and parent state’s domestic political scenes, the role of
regional and international actors, and finally, the presence or absence of the ‘old regime.’
The cases of Kosovo and South Sudan illustrate the above points very clearly.
The parent states, Serbia and Sudan, repeatedly showed unwillingness to provide Kosovo
and South Sudan, respectively, with the level of autonomy that was requested. As a
consequence, Kosovo and South Sudan were convinced that only independence would
protect their political and economic interests. In the case of Kosovo, it is true that Serbia
offered Kosovo significant autonomy following international mediation. However, from
Kosovo’s perspective, this offer was ‘too little too late’ and Kosovo found it difficult to
trust Serbia following decades of political and military conflict. Moreover, Kosovo did
not stand to gain any economic benefits from Serbia. As a result, Kosovo declared
independence in 2008.
Serbia possessed the policy tools for preserving its territorial integrity but decades
of mismanagement of the Kosovo question and broken promises ultimately led to its
undoing. Serbia’s unresponsive political system paved the way for Kosovo to make
independence demands and for the international community to provide support. Decades
of oppression and violence against Kosovo provided the international community with
the pretext for intervening and supporting Kosovo’s independence. The international
community based its support for Kosovo on decades of Serbian oppression and
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unwillingness to accommodate Kosovar Albanian minority. Had Serbia provided Kosovo
with the degree of autonomy the Kosovars were requesting from the 1950s to 1980s,
secession would have been difficult, as the international community would not have a
reason to intervene in Kosovo.
South Sudan faced similar circumstances in Sudan. Following two prolonged
civil wars, the government in Sudan offered the South significant autonomy,
representation in the central government in Khartoum, and promises of democracy. South
Sudan, however, had little reason to trust a regime that had reneged on similar promises
in the past. The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, therefore, did little to assuage
South Sudanese concerns over an oppressive regime in Khartoum. Finally, whereas
Sudan possesses a weak economy and few prospects, South Sudan possesses vast oil
reserves that could provide the economic development it was seeking. South Sudan
declared independence following an independence referendum that received about 97
percent support from the voters.
Although the case of Iraqi Kurdistan does not have the same outcome as Kosovo
and South Sudan, it further supports the conditions outlined above. That is, a de facto
state will forgo independence when a parent state adopts the appropriate political
institutions and when it possesses a strong economy. Since the 2003, Iraq has been
transformed into a democracy, albeit with shortcomings, with a federal constitution that
furnishes Iraqi Kurdistan with significant political and economic autonomy. Moreover,
those who committed the bad acts against the Kurds have been completely removed from
the power apparatus in Baghdad. Iraq also has experienced a significant economic boom
since 2005 and Iraqi Kurdistan is a major beneficiary of the economic progress. Iraqi
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Kurdistan stands to receive billions of dollars annually from Baghdad and, in addition,
the Kurds generate their own revenues from oil sales.
Drawing on field research, Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrated that Iraqi Kurdistan is
willing to continue as an autonomous entity if Baghdad treats the Kurds as partners in a
democratic Iraq. In addition, Iraqi Kurdish officials indicated that the constitution of Iraq
must be adhered to and implemented and that Baghdad must respect Iraqi Kurdistan’s
political and economic autonomy. These findings suggest that independence is not the
end goal of de facto states, but rather a means to political autonomy and economic
development. The implication, of course, is that under the right conditions de facto states
can be persuaded to forgo independence.
There were also mitigating factors that facilitated the secession of Kosovo and
South Sudan, but not Iraqi Kurdistan. First, regional and international governments
provided Kosovo and South Sudan with the diplomatic support, in the form of
recognition, necessary for statehood. In the case of Kosovo, it also received extensive
economic, military, and administrative support on its way to independence. Iraqi
Kurdistan, on the other hand, faces strong opposition from regional and international
governments. Kurdish independence would be a difficult task without support from Iran,
Turkey, and the US. Second, the presence of the Bashir regime in Sudan and remnants of
the Milošević regime in Serbia heightened South Sudan and Kosovo’s mistrust for the
parent state. South Sudan and Kosovo found it difficult to maintain a union with regimes
responsible for violence directed at them. In Iraq, the removal of Saddam Hussein’s
regime has facilitated cooperation and trust between the Kurds and governments in
Baghdad.
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The empirical record shows that the preferences and behaviour of de facto states
are shaped by institutions, economic incentives, and domestic and international politics.
Political institutions play an important role in mollifying minority demands for political
representation and autonomy. Institutions such as federalism or autonomy could
The implications of these findings are particularly noteworthy for Iraqi Kurdistan
and Iraq’s future. The Kurds and successive governments in Baghdad were locked in
political and violent conflict for more than four decades. During this period, from the
1960s to the 1990s, the Kurds demanded and fought for political autonomy from an
oppressive and often violent Baghdad. There seemed little hope for the future of a united
Iraq with a partnership between Kurds and Arabs. However, the removal of Saddam
Hussein’s regime in 2003 and the emergence of democracy have renewed hopes for a
democratic, federal, and peaceful Iraq. Although the union is characterized by political
disagreements and at times high tensions, including military posturing, there is promise
for a peaceful and prosperous future. Iraq has made great political and economic strides
since 2005 – a success that has been shared with Iraqi Kurdistan.
Iraqi Kurdistan also functions with significant political autonomy and receives
economic support from Baghdad.

Baghdad’s willingness to furnish the Kurds with

political and economic autonomy has extended the unity of Iraq and ensured regional
stability. The existing arrangement, therefore, is workable in the medium-term and could
conceivable provide a long-term solution for the future of Iraq. Kurdish dreams of
independence can be shelved, at least for now, in favour of a more pragmatic and
beneficial political arrangement.
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A second implication is that Iraqi Kurdistan could move towards independence
should Baghdad fail to adhere to the Iraqi constitution and uphold Iraqi Kurdistan’s
political and economic autonomy.

Should the Kurds move towards independence,

officials in Baghdad and others will criticize the Kurds for not making a sincere effort to
preserve Iraq’s unity. Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate, however, that Iraqi Kurdistan has
made every effort to participate in a federal and democratic Iraq. Indeed, the project
illustrated that Iraq Kurdistan has saved Iraq from the brink of collapse on two occasions
in the past decade alone. The Kurds have demonstrated their commitment to a federal
and democratic Iraq and could therefore justify secession on these grounds.
These findings may also aid policymakers in formulating effective solutions for
managing de facto states and their relationships with the parent state. The emergence of
de facto states is often a violent process and their existence challenges the sovereignty of
the parent state and international norms. However, this does not suggest conflict is
inevitable. Indeed, the findings here argue that de facto states can be managed in a
peaceful manner under the right conditions. Policymakers must carefully balance the
requests of de facto states with the rights of the parent state. This is particularly important
given the role of international support in facilitating secession. Powerful states can use
their position of power to reduce the scale of violence in multiethnic states. This is can
be achieved in one of two ways. One, international actors can support the minority ethnic
group and facilitate its secession in a peaceful way. Two, powerful states can mediate
between the de facto state and the parent state and create the institutional framework for
coexistence.
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Facilitating a de facto state’s independence should not be taken lightly as it can
often lead to more instability in the region in which the secession is occurring. Such an
act can also encourage and embolden other minorities to make claims to secession and
create more political instability. As a result, this policy should not be taken lightly
because it can lead to a domino effect and create instability. For instance, the
international community’s support for the secession of Kosovo provided Russia with the
pretext for supporting the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to secede
from Georgia in 2008. When and if the international community chooses to intervene in
the domestic affairs of a state to protect a minority, it must carefully consider the rights of
the parent state. Without diplomacy and negotiations with the parent state, international
involvement can further divide the de facto state and the parent state. Kosovo is a case
and point. The international community facilitated the secession of Kosovo despite
Serbia’s protestation and as a consequence, Serbia and other states have opposed
Kosovo’s inclusion into international organizations.
Where international actors choose to encourage unity, it is important that
policymakers take note that the presence of the old regime can hinder political
cooperation and unity between the de facto state and the parent state. The thesis does not
suggest or promote regime change. Instead, the international community can work with
the parent state and the de facto state to encourage negotiations for the peaceful removal
of the old regime. The international community should not, however, undermine the
parent state by encouraging dissident groups in the state to remove the regime as such
action can be counterproductive and lead to conflict.

Instead, the international

community should provide the parent state and the de facto state with resources and a
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forum for negotiations and encourage diplomacy.

In particular, the international

community could provide the parent state and the de facto state with assistance for
creating the institutional framework that would provide the conditions for cooperation.
There are also lessons for states that fear the breakup of their territorial integrity
when ethnic minorities make autonomy requests. The cases here demonstrate that heavyhanded policies do not work. Rather than ignore the political requests of ethnic
minorities, governments would be well advised to open dialogue and provide the political
framework necessary for accommodating minorities. Political accommodation is the best
tool available to states for maintaining their territorial integrity.

In addition, by

accommodating autonomy requests, the international community cannot use humanitarian
grounds to intervene on behalf of and support ethnic groups that attempt to secede.
Finally, the findings outlined in this project also have implications for the existing
and future research agendas. The findings suggest that the existing literature has
overlooked the ways in which de facto state preferences are formed and how this process
influences de facto state behaviour. The existing literature assumes that de facto states
prefer independence across time and space. The findings here question the notion that
independence is the ultimate goal of de facto states and that they will not settle for
anything short of it. Instead, my research concludes that independence is one of many
options for de facto states. Under the right conditions, de facto states will preserve the
status quo. Many de facto states have been functioning as such for more than two
decades. This demonstrates that de facto statehood can be a long-term solution and not
merely a way station to something else.
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The lessons to be drawn from the findings of this project are twofold. First,
political actors do not have fixed preferences. The preferences of individuals, groups, de
facto states, and states are neither fixed nor the result of exogenous factors. Instead, the
research demonstrates that various factors, including institutions, economics, and
domestic politics, shape preferences and behaviour. This lesson is significant for
understanding and researching de facto states. The existing literature has characterized de
facto states in one of two ways: At one extreme de facto states are viewed as irrational
entities whose policies are driven by the fervor of nationalism and at the other extreme de
facto states are compelled by the security dilemma to seek independence. My research
presents an alternative view by showcasing the complexity of de facto states and the ways
in which these entities form preferences.
Second, a ‘tenuous’ and uncertain status, such as de facto statehood, although
undesirable, can provide political stability and serve as a medium to long-term solution.
Iraqi Kurdistan’s de facto status has provided the Kurds with a sense of security,
economic well being, and political recognition. One could also make the case that
Kosovo would be in a better political and economic position as a de facto state. Many of
the challenges facing Kosovo are a result of its unilateral declaration of independence,
which has hardened Serbia’s resolve to block Kosovo’s integration into the international
community. As a consequence, Kosovo is struggling economically as demonstrated by
the exodus of Kosovar migrants to Europe. Iraqi Kurdistan, on the other hand, has
experienced strong economic development and growth despite its de facto status.
I intend to pursue these findings with my further research.

First, I hope to

examine the case of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It has been a de
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facto state since the 1980s and actively sought recognition from the international
community. It is recognized only by Turkey and it has largely struggled economically.
More recently, the prospect of unification with Cyprus has become increasingly attractive
for the TRNC. In fact, in a 2004 UN-mandated referendum, almost 65 percent of Turkish
Cypriots voted in favour of unification.

What accounts for the TRNC’s shift in

preferences from independence to unification and what is the role of institutions and
economic incentives?
A second project will examine the case of Taiwan as a model of sorts for other de
facto states such as Iraqi Kurdistan. Although a minority of states recognize Taiwan (it is
officially recognized by 21 states), it effectively functions as an independent state. It
mints its own coin, issues its own passports, and controls its defense and foreign policy,
and yet Taiwan is not recognized by the US or international organizations such the UN.
This arrangement has been in practice since 1979 and appears to be a viable long-term
solution to the dispute over its status. Is Taiwan a unique case or can it serve as a model
for other de facto states?
Finally, I intend to further explore the internal dynamics of Iraqi Kurdistan to
better understand its preference formation. In particular, I hope to shed light on the
preferences and values of the general population by conducting a social, political,
economic, and religious survey in Iraqi Kurdistan. Such data will offer more insights into
Iraqi Kurdistan’s behaviour and preferences and complement the research and findings
from this thesis.
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Appendices
Appendix I: Economic Performances of Kosovo and Serbia (1990-2012)
Kosovo789
Year
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

GDP ($)
6,445,201,981
6,636,703,418
5,750,799,437
5,634,824,257
5,771,473,142
4,743,437,689
3,918,176,308
3,743,116,980
3,639,935,348
3,355,083,117
2,702,427,047
2,535,333,632
1,849,196,082
1,909,129,923
2,826,937,025
3,198,955,565
3,465,043,853
5,382,372,119
2,484,741,820
2,433,830,382
3,164,182,744
4,136,797,027
4,489,386,272

GDP Per Capita ($)
3,568
3,706
3,239
3,199
3,303
2,736
2,279
2,194
2,135
1,970
1,588
1,490
1,088
685
1,006
1,137
1,241
1,960
933
958
1,319
1,830
2,443

789

GDP Annual Growth (%)
2.7
4.5
3.2
3.0
7.2
8.3
3.4
6.0
2.6
6.0
-0.7
27.0
2.7
-22.8
-8.5
7.7
8.7
8.1
0.0
-24.7
-25.3
-11.0

The data for the years 2000 to 2012 are from the World Bank and the data for 1990 to 1999 are from the
United Nations.
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Serbia790
Year
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990

GDP ($)
37,488,935,010
43,291,846,196
36,990,001,284
40,249,479,880
47,760,580,366
38,952,093,544
29,221,081,587
25,234,408,773
23,649,854,234
19,550,781,969
15,102,567,925
11,390,468,619
6,082,791,506
17,632,705,913
16,204,161,184
21,380,951,576
18,662,409,858
17,498,398,432
16,220,248,574
15,486,053,510
21,781,363,485
29,607,638,155
32,369,820,042

GDP Per Capita ($)
5,190
5,964
5,073
5,498
6,498
5,277
3,943
3,391
3,169
2,614
2,014
1,518
809
2,338
2,141
2,795
2,448
2,294
2,128
2,034
2,864
3,898
4,099

790

GDP Annual Growth (%)
-1.7
1.6
1.0
-3.5
3.8
5.4
3.6
5.4
9.3
2.7
4.1
5.3
5.3
-11.2
0.7
10.1
7.8
6.1
2.5
-30.5
-27.2
-9.8
-8.0

The GDP and the GDP per capita from 1997 to 2012 and the GDP Growth are from the World Bank.
The GDP and GDP per capita from 1990 to 1996 are from the United Nations.
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Appendix II: Economic Performances of South Sudan and Sudan
South Sudan791
Year
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008

791

GDP (Billions $)
10,220,256,857
19,145,887,852
15,178,973,598
11,853,474,305
15,264,618,786

GDP Per Capita ($)
943
1,844
1,527
1,245
1,674

All data are from the World Bank.
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GDP Annual Growth (%)
-47.55
1.57
4.24
4.31

Sudan792
Year
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994

792

GDP ($)
58,768,800,833
63,997,129,027
64,849,930,758
52,839,990,731
54,082,389,393
45,456,460,335
35,159,250,985
26,524,992,225
21,457,886,199
17,646,271,397
14,803,423,335
13,182,872,555
12,257,299,163
10,682,027,627
11,250,220,583
11,681,179,553
9,018,303,154
13,830,369,880
12,793,798,349

GDP Per Capita ($)
1,580
1,538
1,422
1,191
1,253
1,083
862
669
557
472
407
373
356
319
346
369
293
462
440

All data are from the World Bank.
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GDP Annual Growth (%)
8.43
8.58
5.86
5.81
6.61
1.38
1.38
-0.70
46.50
-41.30
-7.80
-6.60
-4.30
24.80
34.80

Appendix III: Economic Performances of Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraq
Iraq793
Year
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004

GDP (Billions $)
222,879 355 403
210,279,947,256
180,606,795,374
135,488,471,368
111,659,988,889
131,611,819,294
88,837,727,881
65,141,035,028
36,743,640,204
25,509,364,916

GDP Per Capita ($)
6,670
6,455
5,687
4,376
3,702
4,472
3,091
2,321
1,342
956

GDP Annual Growth (%)
3.95
8.43
8.58
5.86
5.81
6.61
1.38
1.38
-0.70
46.50

Iraqi Kurdistan794
Year
2013796
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004

GDP (Billions $)

GDP Per Capita ($)795

GDP Annual Growth (%)

29,500,000,000
23,600,000,000
22,000,00,000
19,250,000,000
17,350,000,000
8,500,000,000
6,250,000,000
3,750,000,000
2,000,000,000

4,600
4,452
4,300
4,100
4,200
2,000
1,500
800
500

12

793

All data are from the World Bank.
GDP Annual Growth was not unavailable for 2004-2007 and 2010-2011.
795
Data for the GDP Per Capita were collected from the KRG’s Statistics Office.
796
Data were not available for 2013.
794

261

4.3
1.5

Bibliography
Interviews
Abdulrahman, Berevan. Representative of Kurdistan Communist Party – Duhok Branch.
Duhok, Iraq. 4 June 2013.
Abdulla, Brzo Majeed. Member of Kurdistan Parliament – Gorran. Erbil, Iraq. 16 June
2013.
Amed, Mohammed. Former Member of Kurdistan Parliament and Official of Kurdistan
Communist Party. Duhok, Iraq. 4 June 2013.
Amedi, Ihsan. Former Peshmerga and Former Member of Kurdistan Parliament. Duhok,
Iraq. 3 June 2013.
Bamarni, Said. Former KDP security and intelligence officer and member of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party’s First Branch. Duhok, Iraq. 5 June 2013.
Bapiri, Abdulkhaliq. Head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s First Branch. Duhok,
Iraq. 10 June 2013.
Bavi, Abdulhamid. Iraq Council of Representatives Member – Kurdistan Democratic
Party. Duhok, Iraq. 31 May 2013.
Berwari, Abdulsalam. Member of Kurdistan Parliament – Kurdistan Democratic Party.
Erbil, Iraq. 7 May 2013.
Berwari, Kamiran. Professor at the University of Duhok. Duhok, Iraq. 31 May 2013.
Hali, Nezhat. Kurdistan Regional Government’s Director of Parastin (Intelligence)
Agency. Erbil, Iraq. 20 June 2013.
Hasan, Bayan Ahmed. Member of Kurdistan Parliament – Kurdistan Islamic Union.
Duhok, Iraq. 8 June 2013.
Hawrami, Hemen. Minister of Foreign Affairs for Kurdistan Democratic Party.
Salahaddin, Iraq. 15 May 2013.
Hawrami, Omar S. Member of Kurdistan Parliament – Kurdistan Democratic Party. Erbil,
Iraq. 5 May 2013.
Ibrahim, Evar. Female Representative for Gorran in Erbil. Erbil, Iraq. 16 June 2013.
Ibrahim, Najeeba Najeeb. Iraq Council of Representatives Member – Kurdistan
Democratic Party. Duhok, Iraq. 21 May 2013.

262

Ihsan, Mohammed. Minister of the Kurdistani areas outside the Kurdish region –
Kurdistan Regional Government. Erbil, Iraq. 9 May 2013.
Jano, Renas. Iraq Council of Representatives Member – Kurdistan Democratic Party.
Duhok, Iraq. 20 June 2013.
Kareem, Ali. Head of Kurdistan Institute for Human Rights. Erbil, Iraq. 16 June 2013.
Khasroo, Hakeem. Chair of Political Science, Salahaddin University – Hawler. Erbil,
Iraq. 15 May 2013.
Kucher, Tamer. Governor of Duhok Province. Duhok, Iraq. 21 May 2013.
Loeuder, Louis Caro (Luis Caro Bender Mansour). Iraq Council of Representatives
Member – Chaldean Syriac Assyrian Popular Council. Duhok, Iraq. 2 June 2013.
Mentik, Kameran. Professor of History and Political Science, Salahaddin University –
Hewler. Erbil, Iraq. 16 June 2013.
Muhammed, Kardo Pirdood. Member of Kurdistan Parliament - Gorran. Erbil, Iraq. 6
May 2013.
Nuradini, Omer. Member of Kurdistan Parliament – Kurdistan Democratic Party. Erbil,
Iraq. 6 May 2013.
Othman, Omed Sabah. Speaker for the Presidency of the Kurdistan Regional
Government. Salahhadin, Iraq. 8 May 2013.
Ravendi, Ismael. Leadership Council of the Kurdistan Islamic Union. Duhok, Iraq. 8 June
2013.
Salih, Ali Hama. Member of Kurdistan Parliament – Gorran. Erbil, Iraq. 16 June 2013.
Samani, Ibrahim Ali. Journalist. Erbil, Iraq. 29 May 2013.
Schute, Harry. Advisor to the Minister of the Interior – Kurdistan Regional Government.
Erbil, Iraq. 16 May 2013.
Shaban, Parizad. Iraq Council of Representatives Member – Kurdistan Democratic Party.
Duhok, Iraq. 5 June 2013.
Shahab, Susan Nouri. Member of Kurdistan Parliament – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.
Erbil, Iraq. 7 May 2013.

263

Sinjari, Karim. Minister of the Interior – Kurdistan Regional Government. Erbil, Iraq. 16
May 2013.
Talabani, Bayiz. Minister of Finance and Economy – Kurdistan Regional Government.
Erbil, Iraq.
Reports
Damjanovic, Viktor and John Chapman. “Two Years In, Kosovo Albanians More Sober
on
Independence.”
Gallup.
16
February
2010.
Available
at
http://www.gallup.com/poll/125978/twoyearsKosovoalbanianssoberindependence.aspx?v
ersion=print.
Human Rights Watch. “Kosovo War Crimes Chronology.”
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/campaigns/kosovo98/timeline.shtml.

Available

at:

Human Rights Watch. Iraq: Forcible Expulsion of Ethnic Minorities. Vol. 15, No. 3(E).
March 2003. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/iraq0303/Kirkuk0303.pdf.
International Court of Justice. “Accordance with international law of the unilateral
declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo.” Advisory Opinion of 22 July 2010.
Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15987.pdf.
International Crisis Group. “Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Peace.” Europe Report
No. 188 – 6 December 2007.
International Crisis Group. “Kosovo and Serbia After the ICJ Opinion.” Europe Report
N°206 – 26 August 2010.
International Crisis Group. “North Kosovo: Dual Sovereignty in Practice.” Europe Report
N°211 – 14 March 2011.
International Crisis Group. “Kosovo and Serbia: A Little Goodwill Could Go a Long
Way.” Europe Report N°215 – 2 February 2012.
International Crisis Group. “Serbia and Kosovo: The Path to Normalisation.” Europe
Report N°223 – 19 February 2013.
Middle East Watch. “Genocide in Iraq – The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds.”
Human Rights Watch (July 1993).
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. “Public Opinion in Kosovo
Baseline Survey Results, November 2010. Washington DC: UBO Consulting, 2010.

264

The World Bank. “Global Economic Prospects: Middle East and North Africa.” 4
November 2014. Available at: http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/globaleconomic-prospects/regional-outlooks/mena#2.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. 10 June 1999. Available at:
http://daccessddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf?OpenEle
ment.
United Nations. “Sudan, South Sudan must fully implement cooperation agreements –
Security Council.” United Nations News Centre. 23 August 2013. Available at:
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/story.asp?NewsID=45693&Cr=sudan&Cr1=sout
h+sudan#.Uymnv160bBI.
USAID. “Post-Election Opinions in Kosovo 2010: Findings from an IFES January 2010
Survey.” Washington DC: IFES 2010.
World Bank. “Sudan Economic Brief: Recent Economic Developments, 2nd Semester
2012.” Issue No. 2012-02. December 2012. Available at: http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2013/02/21/00035616
1_20130221125126/Rendered/PDF/754930BRI0Suda00Box374332B00PUBLIC0.pdf.
Agreements
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of South Sudan and the Government
of the Republic of Sudan on Oil and Economic Matters. Available at:
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2012/09/Oil-Agreement-betweenSudanSouthSudan0001.pdf.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army. Section 1.1 and Section
1.5.2. Available at: http://unmis.unmissions.org/Portals/UNMIS/Documents/General/cpaen.pdf.
The Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South
Sudan.
Available
at:
http://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/files/2012/09/TheCooperation-Agreement-Between-Sudan-and-South-Sudan0001.pdf.
United Nations Security Council. “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status
Settlement.”
26
March
2007.
Available
at:
http://www.unosek.org/docref/Comprehensive_proposal-english.pdf.
US Senate. “Kosovo: A Way Forward?” Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations: United States Senate – One Hundred Ninth Congress, First Session (8
November 2005).

265

Websites
Abbas, Mushreq. “Oil Deal a Sign of Hope between Baghdad, Erbil,” Al-Monitor. 5
December 2014. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/iraqkurdistan-oil-agreement-relations.html#.
Assembly of Kosovo. “Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence.” Republic of Kosovo
Assembly.
17
February
2008.
Available
at:
http://www.assemblykosova.org/?cid=2,128,1635.
CIA.
The
World
Factbook.
“Kosovo.”
Available
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kv.html.

at:

Flottau, Renate and Olaf Ihlau. “Vir sind ein geteiltes Volk [We are a Divided People],”
Der
Spiegel.
Hamburg.
17
April
2000.
Available
at:
http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-16215423.html.
Garang, John. “SPLM Chairman’s Address to Signing Ceremony of the Sudan
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” Nairobi, Kenya. 9 January 2005. Available at:
http://www.splmtoday.com/docs/statements%20and%20speeches/2005%20Garang%20S
peech%20CPA%20Signing%20Ceremony.pdf.
General Manifesto and Code of Practice of Kurdistan Islamic Union. Official Website –
About
Us.
1
May
2012.
Accessed
13
August
2013.
http://www.kurdiu.org/en/aboutus.php.
Hamilton, Rebecca. “U.S. Played Key Role in Southern Sudan’s Long Journey to
Independence.” Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting. 9 July 2011. Available at:
http://pulitzercenter.org/articles/south-sudan-independence-khartoum-southern-kordofanus-administration-role.
Institut Kurde de Paris, “Remains of Massacred Iraqi Kurds Return Home 20 Years On,”
Institut Kurde de Paris. Available at: http://www.institutkurde.org/en/info/remains-ofmassacred-iraqi-kurds-returned-home-20-years-on--1129889606.html.
Kittleson, Shelly. “US, Iran woo rival Kurdish factions in battle against IS.” Al-Monitor.
22
September
2014.
Available
at:
http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/Peshmerga-iraq-iran-kurd-isis-krg.html#.
Kurdistan Democratic Party. “Founding of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.” Translated
from
Kurdish.
Available
at:
http://www.kdp.info/p/p.aspx?p=15&l=16&s=040100&r=365.
Kurdistan Regional Government. “Kurdistan Regional Government Unification
Agreement.”
23
January
2006.
Available
at:
http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?r=223&l=12&a=8891&s=02010100&s=010000.

266

Miftari, Vehbi. “Rugova: The Symbol of Independence.” Democratic League of Kosovo,
44. Available at: http://www.ldk-ks.eu/public/uploads/pdf/tresh-1352471021.pdf.
Newton-Small, Jay. “An Interview with Nechirvan Barzani: Will There Be an
Independent
Kurdistan?”
Time.
21
December
2012.
Available
at:
http://world.time.com/2012/12/21/an-interview-with-nechirvan-barzani-will-there-be-anindependent-kurdistan/#ixzz2Fnix3uj9.
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. “Program:
http://www.pukpb.org/en/program.

General Objectives.” Available at:

Qadir, Kamal Said. “The Kurds and the KGB: The Secret History of the Barzani
Dynasty.”
Anti
War
(August
31
2006).
Available
at:
http://www.antiwar.com/orig/qadir.php?articleid=9629.
Taiwan Matters. “Poll statistics regarding Taiwan’s independence vs. unification.” 14
December 2009. Available at: http://taiwanmatters.blogspot.ca/2009/12/poll-statisticsregarding-taiwans.html.
The
Change
Movement
(Gorran).
http://gorran.net/En/Content.aspx?LinkID=189&Action=2.

Election

Platforms.

The
Treaty
of
Sevres,
1920.
Available
(http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Section_I%2C_Articles_1_-_260).

at:

Newspapers
Abdullah, Namo. “Richard Haass: A Unified Multi-Ethnic Iraq May be Over,” Rudaw. 16
December 2014. Available at: http://rudaw.net/english/interview/16122014.
Ahren, Raphael. “Kurds in Iraq Deserve Independence, Netanyahu says,” The Times of
Israel. 29 June 2014. Available at: http://www.timesofisrael.com/kurds-in-iraq-deserveindependence-netanyahu-says/.
al-Abadi, Haider. “A United Iraq is Pushing ISIS Back.” The Wall Street Journal. 18
December 2014. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/haider-al-abadi-a-united-iraqis-pushing-back-the-islamic-state-1418946399.
Barzani, Massoud. “Kurdistan is a Model for Iraq.” The Wall Street Journal. 12
November 2008. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB122645258001119425.
Binder, David. “In Yugoslavia, Rising Ethnic Strife Brings Fears of Worse Civil
Conflict.” The New York Times (1 November 1987). Available at:
http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/01/world/in-yugoslavia-rising-ethnic-strife-bringsfears-of-worse-civil-conflict.html.

267

CBS News. “John Kerry urges Kurds not to give up on Iraq.” 24 June 2014. Available at:
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/john-kerry-to-urge-kurds-not-to-give-up-on-iraq/.
Chulov, Martin. “ISIS: The Inside Story.” The Guardian. 11 December 2014. Available
at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/11/-sp-isis-the-inside-story.
Day, Mattew. “Kosovo ‘to wipe citizens’ debts’ in bid to stop exodus to EU.” The
Telegraph.
6
February
2015.
Available
at:
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/kosovo/11397051/Kosovo-to-wipecitizens-debts-in-bid-to-stop-exodus-to-EU.html.
Devi, Sharmila. “Kurdistan PM downplays prospect of independence now.” 5 November
2014. Available at: http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/05112014.
EUobserver. “Serbia to Start EU Membership Talks in January.” 18 December 2013.
Available at: http://euobserver.com/enlargement/122519.
European Union External Action. “Serbia and Kosovo Reach Landmark Deal.” 19 April
2013.
Available
at:
http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/190413__eufacilitated_dialogue_en.htm.
Filkins, Dexter. “The Fight of Their Lives.” The New Yorker. 29 September 2014.
Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/09/29/fight-lives.
Filkins, Dexter. “Will the US Help the Kurds Fight ISIS?” The New Yorker. 4 August
2014. Available at: http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/will-u-s-help-kurdsfight-isis.
Galston, William A. “Now is the Moment for Kurdish Independence.” The Wall Street
Journal. 24 June 2014. Available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/now-is-the-momentfor-kurdish-independence-1403650500.
Howe, Marvine. “Exodus of Serbians Stirs Province in Yugoslavia.” The New York Times
(12 July 1982). Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/12/world/exodus-ofserbians-stirs-province-in-yugoslavia.html.
Iraq Business News. “Iraq’s Per Capita Income to Double by 2015.” 1 March 2011.
Available at: http://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2011/03/14/iraqs-per-capita-income-todouble-by-2015/.
Kurdish Globe. “Translation of interview of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper with President
Masoud
Barzani.”
17
June
2011.
http://www.krg.org/a/d.aspx?l=12&s=02010200&r=73&a=40404&s=010000.

268

Ott, Stephanie. “Baffling Kosovo mass exodus exposes domestic hardships.” Al Jazeera.
13
March
2015.
Available
at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/03/baffling-kosovo-massexodusexposesdomestic-hardships-150308120251939.html.
PBS Frontline. “Interviews: Hashim Thaci.” PBS Online. Available
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/thaci.html.

at:

Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty. “Serbia, Kosovar PMs Meet Over Judiciary.” 13
December 2013. Available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/kosovo-serbia-judiciarytalks/25199769.html.
Reuters. “S. Sudan Makes First Call for Independence.” Reuters. 31 October 2009.
Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/31/us-sudan-south-independenceidUSTRE59U1FT20091031.
Rudaw. “Hoshyar Zebari on Iraq, the Kurds and Declaring Independence.” Rudaw. 17
July 2014. Available at: http://rudaw.net/english/interview/17072014.
Rudaw. “Kurdistan Minister: ‘The Kurds Had to Go to Baghdad.’” Rudaw. 10 September
2014. Available at: http://rudaw.net/english/interview/10092014.
The Kurdish Globe. “Abadi and Masum Congratulate President Barzani.” The Kurdish
Globe.
20
December
2014.
Available
at:
https://www.kurdishglobe.net/article/C5B28D1ED0B4980177C1B7EE43DE71C2/Abadi
-and-Masum-congratulate-president-Barzani.html.
Whitcomb, Alexander. “Kurds Close to Participation in Iraqi Government,” Rudaw. 13
October 2014. Available at: http://rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/13102014.
World Investment News. “Interview with H.E. Ibrahim Rugova.” World Investment
News. 18 April 2002. Available at: http://www.winne.com/topinterviews/rugova.htm.
Secondary Sources
Aalen, Lovise. “Making Unity Unattractive: The Conflicting Aims of Sudan's
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” Civil Wars Vol. 15, No. 2 (2013): 173-191.
Ahmed, Mohammed M. A. “Laying the Foundation for A Kurdistani State in Iraq: 19912006,” In Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter (eds.), The Evolution of
Kurdish Nationalism (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, Inc., 2007).
Ahmed, Mohammed M.A. “Kurdish Spring, Iraqi Kurdistan.” In Mohammed M.A.
Ahmed and Michael Gunter (eds.), The Kurdish Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the
Kurds (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2013).

269

Ahmed, Mohammed M.A. Iraqi Kurds and Nation-Building (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012).
Ahmed, Mohammed M.A. Iraqi Kurds and Nation-building (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2012).
Akol, Lam. Southern Sudan: Colonialism, Resistance, and Autonomy (Trenton: Red Sea
Press, Inc. 2007).
al-Istrabadi, Feisal Amin Rasoul. “A Constitution without Constitutionalism: Reflections
on Iraq’s Failed Constitutional Process.” Texas Law Review Vol. 87 (2009): 1627-1654.
Alier, Abel. Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured (Exeter: Ithaca Press,
1990).
Anderson, Liam. “Reintegrating Unrecognized States: Internationalizing Frozen
Conflicts.” In Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (eds.), Unrecognized States in the
International System (London: Routledge, 2011).
Arato, Andrew. Constitution Making Under Occupation: The Politics of Imposed
Revolution in Iraq (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
Axelrod, Robert, and Robert O. Keohane. “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy:
Strategies and Institutions.” World Politics Vol. 38, No. 1 (1985): 226-254.
Babuna, Aydin. “The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia: Ethnic Identity Superseding
Religion.” Nationalities Papers Vol. 28, No. 1 (2000): 67-92.
Bakke, Kristin M., John O’Loughlin, and Michael D. Ward. “The Viability of De Facto
States: Post-War Developments and Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia.” Presented at the
American Political Science Association, Seattle, (September 1-4, 2011).
Bardos, Gordon N. “The Regional and International Implications of Kosovo
Independence.” Mediterranean Quarterly Vol. 19, No. 4 (2008): 54-67.
Barkey, Henri and Ellen Laipson, “Iraqi Kurds and Iraq’s Future.” Middle East Policy
Vol. XII, No. 4 (2005): 66-76.
Baylis, John, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens. The Globalization of World Politics: An
Introduction to International Relations, Fifth Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011).
Belanger, Louis. Érick Duchesne, and Jonathan Paquin, “Foreign Interventions and
Secessionist Movements: The Democratic Factor.” Canadian Journal of Political Science
Vol. 38, No. 2 (2005): 435-462.

270

Bengio, Ofra. The Kurds of Iraq: Building a State Within a State (Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 2012).
Berg, Eiki and Raul Toomla, “Forms of Normalisation in the Quest for De Facto
Statehood.” The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 44,
No. 4 (2009): 27-45.
Berg, Eiki. “Examining Power-sharing in Persistent Conflicts: De Facto Pseudostatehood versus de JureQuasi-federalism.” Global Society Vol. 21, No.2 (2007): 199217.
Berg, Eiki. “Merging Together or Drifting Apart? Revisiting Political Legitimacy Issues
in Cyprus, Moldova, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Geopolitics Vol. 18, Iss. 2 (2013):
467-492.
Berg, Eiki. “Pooling Sovereignty, Losing Territoriality? Making Peace in Cyprus and
Moldova.” Royal Dutch Geographical Society Vol. 97, No. 3 (2006): 222-236.
Buchanan, Allen. “Uncoupling Secession from Nationalism and Intrastate Autonomy
from Secession.” In Hurst Hannum and Eileen F. Babbitt (eds.), Negotiating SelfDetermination (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006).
Calic, Marie-Janine. “Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historical Account.” In
Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Kosovo and the Challenge of
Humanitarian Intervention (New York: United Nations University Press, 2000).
Caporaso, James. “Is there a Quantitative-Qualitative Divide in Comparative Politics?
The Case of Process-Tracing.” In Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.), The Sage
Handbook of Comparative Politics (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009).
Carmichael, Cathie. “Brothers, Strangers and Enemies: Ethno-nationalism and the
Demise of Communist Yugoslavia.” In Dan Stone (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of
Postwar European History (Oxford University Press, 2012).
Caspersen ,Nina and Gareth Stansfield. Unrecognized States in the International System
(London: Routledge, 2011).
Caspersen, Nina. “Playing the Recognition Game: External Actors and De Facto States.”
The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs Vol. 44, No. 4,
(2009): 47-60.
Caspersen, Nina. “States without Sovereignty: Imitating Democratic Statehood.” In Nina
Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield (eds.), Unrecognized States in the International System
(London: Routledge, 2011).

271

Caspersen, Nina. Unrecognized States: The Struggle for Sovereignty in the Modern
International System (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012).
Chorev, Matan. “Iraqi Kurdistan: The Internal Dynamics and Statecraft of a Ministate.”
Alnakhlah (Fall 2007): 1-11.
Christopher, Anthony J. “Secession and South Sudan: An African Precedent for the
Future?” South African Geographical Journal Vol. 93, No. 2 (2011): 125-132.
Ciment, James. The Kurds: State and Minority in Turkey, Iraq and Iran (New York: Facts
On File, 1996).
Cornell, Svante E. “Autonomy as a Source of Conflict: Caucasian Conflicts in
Theoretical Perspective.” World Politics Vol. 54, No. 2 (2002): 245-276.
Corrin, Chris. “Developing Democracy in Kosova: From Grass Roots to Government.”
Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 55, No. 1 (2002): 99-108.
Danilovich, Alex. Iraqi Federalism and the Kurds: Learning to Live Together (Ashgate
Publishing, Ltd., 2014).
Daskalovski, Zidas. “Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and Self-Determination.” In Florian
Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds.), Understanding the War in Kosovo (London: Frank
Cass, 2003).
Dawisha, Adeed. Iraq: A Political History From Independence to Occupation (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009).
de Waal, Alex. “Sizzling South Sudan: Why Oil is Not the Whole Story.” Foreign Affairs
(February 7, 2013).
de Waal, Alex. Sudan: What Kind of State? What Kind of Crisis? CSRC Occasional
Paper 2 (London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, 2007a).
Dent, Martin J. Identity Politics: Filling the Gap Between Federalism and Independence
(Conrwall: Ashgate, 2004).
Dion, Stéphane. “Secession and the Virtues of Clarity.” Ottawa Law Review Vol. 44, No.
2 (2012-2013).
Dion, Stéphane. “Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons
from Quebec.” British Journal of Political Science Vol. 26, No. 02 (1996): 269-283.
Downs, William M. “Comparative Federalism, Confederalism, Unitary Systems.” In John
T. Ishiyama and Marijke Breuning (eds.), 21st Century Political Science: A Reference
Handbook (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Inc., 2010).

272

Doyle, Michael. “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.” Philosophy and Public
Affairs Vol. 12, No. 3 (1983): 205-235.
Doyle, Michael. Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).
Dunne, Tim. “Liberalism.” In John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of
World Politics. Second Edition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Economides, Spyros, James Ker-Lindsay, and Dimitris Papadimitriou. “Kosovo: Four
Futures.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy Vol. 52, No. 5 (2010): 99-116.
Economides, Spyros. “Kosovo, Self-Determination and the International Order.” EuropeAsia Studies Vol. 65, Issue 5 (2013): 823-836.
Edmonds, Cecil J. Kurds, Turks, and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in NorthEastern Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).
El-Battahani, Atta. “The Post-Secession State in Sudan: Building Coalitions or
Deepening Conflicts?” In Gunnar M. Sørbø and Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed (eds.), Sudan
Divided: Continuing Conflict in a Contested State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2013).
Entessar, Nader. Kurdish Ethnonationalism (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).
Eprile, Cecil. War and Peace in the Sudan, 1955-1972 (Newton Abbot: David & Charles,
1974).
Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996).
Frendreis, John P. “Explanation of Variation and Detection of Covariation: The Purpose
and Logic of Comparative Analysis.” Comparative Political Studies Vol. 16, No. 2
(1983): 255-272.
Frieden, Jeffrey A. “Actors and Preferences in International Relations.” In D. A. Lake
and R. Powell (eds.), Strategic Choice and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1999), 39.
Frioretos, Orfeo. “The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Preferences: Varieties of
Capitalism in the European Community.” In Peter A. Hall and David W. Soskice (eds.),
Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Vol. 8
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Geddes, Barbara. “How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection
Bias in Comparative Politics.” Political Analysis Vol. 2, No. 1 (1990): 131-150.

273

Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).
Geldenhuys, Deon. Contested States in World Politics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2009).
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. Case studies and Theory Development in the
Social Sciences (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005).
Gerring, John. “The Case Study: What it is and What it Does.” In In Carles Boix and
Susan C. Stokes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007).
Ghanim, David. Iraq’s Dysfunctional Democracy (Santa Barbara: Prager, 2011).
Ghareeb, Edmund. The Kurdish Question in Iraq (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1981).
Gomey, Guma Kunda. “Back to War in Sudan: Flawed Peace Agreement, Failed Political
Will.” In Gunnar M. Sørbø and Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed (eds.), Sudan Divided:
Continuing Conflict in a Contested State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
Gordy, Eric D. Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of
Alternatives (University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2010).
Gray, Richard, “The Southern Sudan.” Journal of Contemporary History Vol. 6, No. 1
(1971): 108-120.
Grieco, Joseph. “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the
Newest Liberal Institutionalism.” International Organization Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988): 485507.
Gulyas, Lazslo. “A Brief History of the Kosovo Conflict with Special Emphasis on the
Period 1988-2008.” Historia Actual Online No. 27 (2012): 141-150.
Gunter, Michael M. “Arab–Kurdish Relations and the Future of Iraq.” Third World
Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 9 (2011): 1623-1635.
Gunter, Michael M. The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem
in Iraq and Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
Gunter, Michael. “A De Facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq.” Third World Quarterly
Vol. 14, No. 2 (1993): 295-319.

274

Gunter, Michael. “Canvassing the Kurdish Spring.” In Mohammed M.A. Ahmed and
Michael Gunter (eds.), The Kurdish Spring: Geopolitical Changes and the Kurds (Costa
Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 2013).
Gunter, Michael. “Federalism and the Kurds of Iraq: The Solution or the Problem?” In
Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham Dawod (eds.), The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics (London:
SAQI, 2006).
Gunter, Michael. “Iraqi Kurdistan’s Two Contrasting Economic Images.” International
Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies Vol. 6, No. 1 (2012): 89-95.
Gunter, Michael. “Turkey’s New Neighbor, Kurdistan.” In Brendan O’Leary, John
McGarry and Khaled Salih (eds.), The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
Gunter, Michael. The Kurdish Predicament in Iraq: A Political Analysis (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1999).
Gunter, Michael. The Kurds Ascending: The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in
Iraq and Turkey (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
Gunter, Michael. The Kurds of Iraq: Tragedy and Hope (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1992).
Hall, Michael R. “Chalabi, Ahmed Abd al-Hadi.” In Thomas R. Mockaitis (ed.), The Iraq
War Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2013).
Hawkins, Darren. “Case Studies.” In Todd Landman and Neil Robinson (eds.), The Sage
Handbook of Comparative Politics (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009).
Hiltermann, Joost. “Revenge of the Kurds: Breaking Away from Baghdad,” Foreign
Affairs Vol. 91, No. 6 (Nov./Dec. 2012).
Hopf, Ted. “The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory.”
International Security Vol. 23, No.1 (1998): 171-200.
Horowitz, Donald. “Irredentas and Secessions: Adjacent Phenomena, Neglected
Connections.” In Naomi Chazan (ed.), Irredentism and International Politics (Boulder:
Lynne Rienner, 1991).
Horowitz, Donald. Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1985).
Huliaras, Asteris. “The Unanticipated Break-up of Sudan: Causes and Consequences of
Redrawing International Boundaries.” Commonwealth & Comparative Politics Vol. 50,
No. 3 (2012): 257-270.

275

International Crisis Group. “Kosovo Countdown: A Blueprint for Peace.” Europe Report
No. 188 (Brussels, 6, December 2007).
Ivlevs, Artjoms and Roswitha M. King. “Kosovo – Winning the Independence but Losing
its people? Recent Evidence on Emigration Intentions.” July 2009. Available at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1448569 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1448569.
Jahn, Beate. “Liberal Internationalism: From Ideology to Empirical Theory – And Back
Again.” International Theory Vol. 1, No. 3 (2009): 409-438.
Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics Vol. 30, No. 2
(1978): 167-214.
Johnson, Douglas H. African Issues: The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003).
Judah, Tim. “Kosovo’s Moment of Truth.” Survival Vol. 47, Issue 4 (2005): 73-84.
Kakai, Falaq al-Din. “The Kurdish Parliament.” In Fran Hazelton (ed.), Iraq Since the
Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy (London: Zed Books, 1994).
Kasfir, Nelson. “Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis Ababa Agreement.” African
Affairs Vol. 76, No. 303 (April 1977): 143-166.
Kaufmann, Chaim. “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars.”
International Security Vol. 20, No. 4 (1996): 136-175.
Keating, Michael. “Rethinking Sovereignty: Independence-lite, Devolutionmax and
National Accommodation.” Revista d'estudis autonòmics i federals. No 16 (2012): 9-29.
Keohane, Robert. “International Institutions: Two Approaches.” International Studies
Quarterly Vol. 32, No. 4 (1988): 379-396.
Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in World Political
Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Ker-Lindsay, James. “Preventing the Emergence of Self-Determination as a Norm of
Secession: An Assessment of the Kosovo ‘Unique Case’ Argument.” Europe-Asia
Studies Vol. 65, No. 5 (2013): 837-856.
Ker-Lindsay, James. Kosovo: The Path to Contested Statehood in the Balkans (London:
I.B. Tauris, 2009).
King, Charles. “Eurasia’s Nonstate States.” East European Constitutional Review Vol.
10, No. 4 (2001): 99-107.

276

King, Charles. “The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized
States.” World Politics Vol. 53, No. 4 (July 2001): 524-552.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific
Inference in Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1994).
King, Iain and Whit Mason. Peace at any Price: How the World Failed Kosovo (London:
Hurst and Company, 2006).
Koeck, Heribert Franz, Daniela Horn, and Franz Leidenmuehler. From Protectorate to
Statehood: Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity in the Case of Kosovo and the
Position of the European Union (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2009).
Kolstø, Pal and Helge Blakkisrud. “Living with Non-recognition: State- and Nationbuilding in South Caucasian Quasi- states.” Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 60, No. 3 (2008):
483-509.
Kolstø, Pal. “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” Journal of
Peace Research Vol. 43, No. 6 (2006): 723-740.
Konig, Marietta. “The Effects of the Kosovo Status Negotiations on the Relationship
Between Russia and the EU and on the De Facto States in the Post-Soviet Space.” OSCE
Yearbook 2007. Hamburg: Centre for OSCE Research (CORE), 2008.
Kubo, Keiichi. “Why Kosovar Albanians Took up Arms against the Serbian Regime.”
Europe-Asia Studies Vol.62, Issue 7 (2010): 1135-1152.
Laitin, David. Identity in Formation: The Russian Speaking Populations in the Near
Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild (eds.). The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
Lando, Barry M. Web of Deceit: The History of Western Complicity in Iraq, From
Churchill to Kennedy to George W. Bush (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2007).
Lijphart, Arend. “Comparative Politics and The Comparative Method.” American
Political Science Review Vol. 65, No. 3 (1971): 682-693.
Lijphart, Arend. “The Comparable Cases Strategy in Comparative Research.”
Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 8, No. 2 (1975): 158-177.
Lundgren, Åsa, The Unwelcome neighbour: Turkey’s Kurdish Policy (London: I.B.
Tauris, 2007).

277

Lynch, Dov. Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto
States (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2004).
Mahoney, James and Celso M. Villegas. “Historical Enquiry and Comparative Politics.”
In Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschmeyer. “Comparative Historical Analysis:
Achievements and Agendas.” In James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer (eds.),
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2003).
Malazogu, Leon. “When Doves Support War and Hawks Oppose It: An Analysis of
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosova.” In Florian Bieber and Zidas Daskalovski (eds.),
Understanding the War in Kosovo (London: Frank Cass, 2003).
Malcolm, Noel. Kosovo: A Short History (New York: New York University Press, 1998).
Malwal, Bona. People and Power in Sudan: The Struggle for National Stability (London:
Ithaca Press, 1981).
McDowall, David. A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004).
McGarry, John, and Brendan O’Leary. “The Political Regulation of National and Ethnic
Conflict.” Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 47, No. 1 (1994): 94-115.
McGarry, John. “Forward: De Facto States and the International Order.” In Tozun
Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry Srebrnik (eds.), De Facto States: The Quest for
Sovereignty (New York: Routledge, 200s4).
Mearsheimer, John J. “Kissing Cousins: Nationalism and Realism.” Yale Workshop on
International Relations. 5 May 2011.
Mertus, Julie A. Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1999).
Milner, Helen. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).
Mockaitis, Thomas R. (ed.). The Iraq War Encyclopedia (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO,
2013).
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Liberal International Relations Theory: A Social Scientific
Assessment.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
Working Papers Series. Paper No. 01-02 (2001).

278

Moravcsik, Andrew. “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International
Politics,” International Organization Vol. 51, No. 4 (1997): 513-553.
Moravcsik, Andrew. “Wahn, Wahn, Uberall Wahn: A Reply to Jahn’s Critique of
Liberalism Internationalism.” International Theory Vol. 2, No. 1 (2010): 113-139.
Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th
edition (New York: Knopf, 1973).
Natali, Denise. “The Politics of Kurdish Crude.” Middle East Policy Vol. 19, No. 1
(2012): 110-118.
Natsios, Andrew S. and Michael Abramowitz, “Sudan's Secession Crisis: Can the South
Part From the North Without War?” Foreign Affairs (2011): 19-26.
Nye Sr., Joseph S. Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and
History (Sixth Edition) (New York: Pearson Longman, 2007).
O’Ballance, Edgar. Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99 (London: Macmillan Press,
2000).
O’Ballance, Edgar. The Kurdish Revolt, 1961-1970 (London: Faber and Faber Limited,
1973).
O’Ballance, Edgar. The Kurdish Struggle, 1920-94 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996).
O’Leary, Brendan. “The Federalization of Iraq and the Break-up of Sudan.” Government
and Opposition Vol. 47, No. 4 (2012): 481-516.
O’Loughlin, John, Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal. “Inside Abkhazia: A Survey of
Attitudes in a De Facto State.” Post-Soviet Affairs. Vol. 27, No. 1 (2011): 1-36.
Oduho, Joseph and William Deng, The problem of the Southern Sudan (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1963).
Omer, Mohamed Beshir. The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace (London: C. Hurst
and Company, 1974).
Ottaway, Marina and David Ottaway, “How the Kurds Got Their Way: Economic
Cooperation and the Middle East’s New Borders.” Foreign Affairs Vol. 93, No. 3 (2014).
Pavkovic, Aleksandar. “Seceding by force of Arms: Chechnya and Kosovo.” In
Aleksandar Pavkovic and Jean-Pierre Cabestan (eds.), Secessionism and Separatism in
Europe and Asia: To Have a State of One’s Own (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013).

279

Pavlakovic, Vjeran and Sabrina Petra Ramet. “Albania and Serb Rivalry: Realist and
Universality Perspectives on Sovereignty.” In Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and
Henry Srebrnik (eds.), De Facto States: The Quest for Sovereignty (London: Routledge,
2004).
Pegg, Scott. “De Facto States in the International System.” Institute of International
Relations at the University of British Columbia. Working Paper No. 21 (February 1998).
Pegg, Scott. International Society and the De Facto State (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998).
Pelletiere, Stephen. The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf (Boulder: Westview,
1984).
Perritt, Henry H. Kosovo Liberation Army: The Inside Story of an Insurgency (Chicago:
University of Illinois Press, 2008).
Perritt, Henry H. The Road to Independence for Kosovo: A Chronicle of the Ahtisaari
Plan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
Pettifer, James. The Kosova Liberation Army: Underground War to Balkan Insurgency,
1948-2001 (Columbia University Press, 2012).
Phillips, David L. “Comprehensive Peace in the Balkans: The Kosovo Question.” Human
Rights Quarterly Vol. 18, No. 4 (1996): 821-832.
Poggo, Scopas S. The First Sudanese Civil War: Africans, Arabs, and Israelis in the
Southern Sudan, 1955-1972 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
Pokalova, Elena. “Framing separatism as terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo.” Studies in
Conflict & Terrorism Vol. 33, No. 5 (2010): 429-447.
Posen, Barry R. “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival Vol. 35, No. 1
(1993): 27-47.
Przeworski, Adam and Henry Teune. The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry (New
York: Wiley Interscience, 1970).
Ramet, Sabrina P. Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, Second
Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
Randolph, Sean S. “The Status of Agreements Between the American Institute in Taiwan
and the Coordination for North American Affairs.” The International Lawyer Vol. 15,
No. 2 (1981): 249-262.
Reus-Smit, Christian. “Constructivism.” In Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.),
Theories of International Relations (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan,
1996).

280

Reus-Smit, Christian. “The Strange Death of Liberal International Theory.” European
Journal of International Law Vol. 12, No. 3 (2001): 573-593.
Rolandsen, Øystein H. Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan
During the 1990s (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2005).
Romano, David. “Iraqi Kurdistan: Challenges of Autonomy in the Wake of US
Withdrawal.” International Affairs Vol. 86, No. 6 (2010): 1345-1359.
Romano, David. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and
Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Ruay, Deng D. Akol. The Politics of Two Sudans: The South and the North, 1821-1969
(Nordic Africa Institute, 1994).
Rusinow, Dennison. “Nationalities Policy and the “National Question.” In Pedro Ramet
(ed.), Yugoslavia in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).
Ryan, Stephen. Ethnic Conflict and International Relations (Aldershot: Dartmouth
Publishing Company, 1995).
Rywkin, Michael. “The Phenomenon of Quasi-states.” Diogenes Vol. 53, No. 2 (2006):
23-28.
Sabrina P. Ramet, Thinking About Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates About the Yugoslav
Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2005).
Said, Beshir Mohammed. The Sudan: Crossroads of Africa (London: Bodley Head,
1965).
Salih, Mohamed. “Conflict and Nation Building: Lessons for Darfur from South Sudan.”
In Gunnar M. Sørbø and Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed (eds.), Sudan Divided: Continuing
Conflict in a Contested State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
Schmidt, Dana Adams. Journey Among Brave Men (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1964).
Sens, Allen, and Peter Stoett, Global Politics: Origins, Currents, Directions, Fourth
Edition (United States: Nelson Education Ltd., 2010).
Sidahmed, Abdel Salam and Alsir Sidahmed. Sudan (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
Sidahmed, Abdel Salam. “Institutional Reform and Political Party Engagement:
Challenges to Democratic Transformation in post-CPA Sudan.” International Journal of

281

African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity Vol. 5, No. 1 (2010):
19-35.
Silander, Daniel and John Janzekovitz. “State-Building and Democracy: Prosperity,
Representation and Security in Kosovo.” International Studies Interdisciplinary Political
and Cultural Journal Vol. 14, No. 1 (2012): 39-52.
Simpson, Gerry. “The Ethics of New Liberalism.” In Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan
Snidal (eds.), Oxford Handbook of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2008).
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “A Liberal Theory of International Law.” Proceedings of the
Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) Vol. 94 (April 5-8, 2000): 240253.
Slaughter, Anne-Marie. “Liberal International Relations Theory and International
Economic Law.” American University International Law Review Vol. 10, No. 2 (1995):
717-743.
Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country (New York: I.B. Tauris,
2007).
Spoerri, Marlene. “Crossing the Line: Partisan Party Assistance in post-Milošević
Serbia.” Democratization Vol. 17, No. 6 (2010): 1108-1131.
Smith, Anthony D. “The Ethnic Sources of Nationalism,” in Michael E. Brown (ed.),
Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
Sørbø, Gunnar M. and Abdel Ghaffar M. Ahmed (eds.). Sudan Divided: Continuing
Conflict in a Contested State (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).
Stansfield, Gareth and Shoresh Haji Resool. “The Tortured Resurgence of Kurdish
Nationalism in Iraq, 1975-1991.” In Mohammed M. A. Ahmed and Michael Gunter
(eds.), The Evolution of Kurdish Nationalism (Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, Inc.,
2007).
Stansfield, Gareth. “From Civil War to Calculated Compromise: The Unification of the
Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.” In Robert Lowe and Gareth Stansfield (eds.),
The Kurdish Policy Imperative (London: Chatham House, 2010).
Stansfield, Gareth. “The Kurdish Question in Iraq, 1914-1974.” The Middle East Online
Series 2: Iraq 1914-1974 (Thomson Learning EMEA Ltd, Reading, 2006).
Stansfield, Gareth. “The Unravelling of the Post-First World War State System? The
Kurdistan Region of Iraq and the Transformation of the Middle East,” International
Affairs Vol. 89, No. 2 (2013): 259-282.

282

Stansfield, Gareth. Iraqi Kurdistan: Political Development and Emergent Democracy
(London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003).
Tamir, Yael. Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
Tanchum, Micha’el. “The Kurds’ Big Year: The Political Conditions that Favor Kurdish
Independence in Iraq.” Foreign Affairs (12 January 2015).
Tansey, Oisín. “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-Probability
Sampling.” PS: Political Science & Politics Vol. 40, No. 04 (2007): 765-772.
Udovicki, Jasminka and James Ridgeway (eds.). Burn This House: The Making and
Unmaking of Yugoslavia (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000).
Vali, Ferenc A. Bridge Across the Bosporus: The Foreign Policy of Turkey (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
van Esch, F.A.W.J. “Why States Want EMU: Developing a Theory on National
Preferences.” In Amy Verdun (ed.), The Euro: European Integration Theory and
Economic and Monetary Union, (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2002).
Varshney, Ashutosh. Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).
Vickers, Miranda. Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo (New York:
Columbia University press, 1998).
Viotti, Paul R., and Mark V. Kauppi. International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism,
Globalism, and Beyond, Third Edition (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999).
Visser, Reidar. “The Kurdish Issue in Iraq: The View from Baghdad at the Close of the
Maliki Premiership,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs Vol. 34, No. 1 (Winter 2010):
77-93.
Wai, Dunstan M. The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan (New York and London:
Africana Publishing Company, 1981).
Walt, Stephen M. “International Relations: One World, Many Theories.” Foreign Policy,
Issue 110 (1998): 29-46.
Walt, Stephen M. “The Enduring Relevance of the Realist Tradition.” In Ira Katznelson
and Helen Milner (eds.), Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: W.W.
Norton and Company, 2002).
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979).

283

Warbrick, Colin. “I. Kosovo: The Declaration of Independence.” International and
Comparative Law Quarterly Vol. 57, Iss. 3 (2008): 675-690.
Weber, Max. Politics as a Vocation. Translated by H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1965).
Weller, Marc. “The Vienna Negotiations on the Final Status for Kosovo.” International
Affairs Vol. 84, No. 4 (2008): 659-681.
Weller, Marc. “The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo.” International Affairs Vol. 75,
No. 2 (1999): 211-251.
Wendt, Alexander. “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of
Power Politics.” International Organization Vol. 46, No. (1992): 391-425.
Wendt, Alexander. “Constructing International Politics.” International Security Vol. 20,
No. 1 (1995): 71-81.
Wendt, Alexander. Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
Wolff, Stefan. “Governing (in) Kirkuk: Resolving the Status of a Disputed Territory in
Post American Iraq.” International Affairs Vol. 86, No. 6 (2010): 1361-1379.
Yihun, Belete Belachew. “Ethiopia’s Role in South Sudan’s March to Independence,
1955-1991.” African Studies Quarterly Vol. 14, Issues 1-2 (2013): 35-54.
Yildiz, Kerim. The Kurds in Iraq: The Past, Present and Future (London: Pluto Press,
2007).
Young, John. “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace.” Review of
African Political Economy Vol. 32, No. 103 (2005): 99-113.
Young, John. The Fate of Sudan: The Origins and Consequences of a Flawed Peace
Process (London: Zed Books, 2012).
Young, Robert A. The Secession of Quebec and the Future of Canada
(Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1998).

284

Zheger Hassan
Department of Political Science
University of Western Ontario
________________________________________________________________________

EDUCATION
The University of Western Ontario, Canada
Ph.D. Political Science, (Expected June 2015).
Fields: Comparative Politics & International Relations.
Fieldwork: the Kurdish regions (Iraq and Turkey).
Research interests: de facto states, federalism, power-sharing, democratization,
secession, nationalism, states.
University of Windsor, Canada
M.A. Political Science (2009)
Thesis: Kurdish Nationalism and the Dream of Statehood: The Case of Iraqi Kurdistan.
The University of Western Ontario (King’s University College), Canada
B.A. Honours, Political Science and History (2007)

PUBLICATIONS
Peer-Reviewed Articles
1. “Kurdish Nationalism: What are its origins?” International Journal of Contemporary
Iraqi Studies. Vol. 7, No. 2 (2013): 75-89.
2. “The Peshmerga and Kurdish Nationalism,” in Essays on Kurdish Narratology and
Folklore: Oral tradition, History, and Nationalism. Forthcoming (expected 2017).
WORKS IN PROGRESS
3. “Comparing Nationalists in Quebec and Iraqi Kurdistan.”
4. “De Facto States and Independence: Implications for Iraqi Kurdistan.”
5. “Ethnic Conflict and Secession: An Institutional Explanation.”

PRESENTATIONS AND CONFERENCES
1. “De Facto States and Independence: Implications for Iraqi Kurdistan.” The
Canadian Political Science Association, University of Ottawa, Canada. 2 June
2015.
2. “Iraqi Kurdistan: Is Independence Desirable?” International Studies Association
Annual Convention, Toronto, Canada. 27 March 2014.
3. “De Facto States and the Independence Question: Is Iraqi Kurdistan an
Exception?” International Conference: The PKK, Kurdish Nationalism and the
Future of Turkey, Alexandria, VA. USA. 7 November 2013.
285

4. “De Facto States: Is Recognition the Endgame?” International Studies
Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, CA, USA. 4 April 2013.
5. “Using and Abusing History: The Case of Halabja.” Second International
Conference on Kurdish Studies, University of Exeter, UK. 6-8 September 2012.
6. “The Kurdistan Regional Government’s Policy Since 2003.” International Studies
Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, USA. 3 April 2012.
7. “Kurdish Nationalism: Where did it come from and where is it going?”
International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Diego, CA, USA. 3
April 2012.
8. “The Future of Kurdistan.” The Canadian Political Science Association, Wilfrid
Laurier University, Waterloo. 17 May 2011.

SCHOLARSHIPS AND GRANTS
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Doctoral Fellowship
Ontario Graduate Scholarship
Western Graduate Research Scholarship
Graduate Thesis Research Award, UWO
Department of Political Science (UWO) Travel Grant
International Studies Association (ISA) Travel Grant
Society of Graduate Students Travel Grant
Graduate Teaching Assistant Union Travel Grant
University of Exeter, Travel Grant

2014-2015
2013-2014
2010-2014
2013
2011-2014
2012-2014
2011-2014
2011-2014
2012

TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Course Instructor
Introduction to Comparative Politics – 2245E King’s University College at UWO
20115

2014-

Guest Lectures/Seminars





“Global Production and Social Responsibilities” – Topics in International Relations
487, 13 August 2014
“Ideologies” – Introduction to Politics 1020, 24 September 2012
“Levels of Analysis” – International Relations 2231, 25 September 2012
“Canadian Electoral System” – Introduction to Politics 100, 12 December 2010

TEACHING RECOGNITION
Nominated for a Graduate Teaching Students Award
2014
The University of Western Ontario – Teaching Assistant
POL2211 - Business and Government, Sept. 2011 – April 2014

286

2013-

POL 2231 - Introduction to International Relations, Sept. 2010 – April 2011
POL 1020 - Introduction to Political Science, Sept. 2009 – April 2010
University of Windsor – Teaching Assistant
POL 275 - Research Methods in Political Science, Sept. 2008 – Dec. 2008
POL 100 - Introduction to Canadian Government, Sept. 2007 – April 2008
Administered weekly tutorials, met with students upon request, proctored examinations/tests,
graded written work, including final exams/papers, and delivered the occasional lecture to the
class.

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE
The University of Western Ontario – Research Assistant
Research Assistant to Professor Samuel Clark, 2005-2007
• Conducted research and produced reports, including document retrieval/analysis.
Research Assistant to Professor Hugh Mellon, 2006-2007
• Conducted research and document analysis.

SERVICE
International Observer for the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) for the
Kurdish region’s parliamentary election – 21 September 2013, Erbil, Iraq.
International Observer for the Independent High Electoral Commission of Iraq (IHEC) for
Iraq’s federal parliamentary election – 30 April 2014, Dohuk, Iraq.
UWO Department of Political Science Representative for Society of Graduate Students
Council

LANGUAGES
English – native language.
Kurdish (Kurmanji) – reading and writing intermediate; speaker advanced.
French – beginner.
Arabic – beginner.

CITIZENSHIP
Canadian

PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

287

International Studies Association (ISA), Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA),
American Political Science Association (APSA), Middle East Studies Association (MESA),
Kurdish Studies Association (KSA), Middle East and North Africa Research Group
(MENARG).

288

